Archive for: September, 2008

Legal responsibility for the attempt in copyright law

September 25th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

In Capitol Records v. Jammie Thomas, CIV 07-3417 MJD/JJK (D.Minn. August 26, 2008), PDF file, Judge Michael J. Davis presented two very forcible arguments.

Plaintiffs and their supporters also urge the Court to consider an entirely separate title of the U.S. Code, Title 18, addressing criminal penalties for distribution of child pornography. In that context, the term “distribute” has been interpreted to include placing the material on a shared folder of a peer‐to‐peer network. See, e.g., United States. v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223‐24 (10th Cir. 2007) (interpreting term “distribute” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) to include placing child pornography in Kazaa folder and freely allowing others to access and download the files). The criminal statute regarding distribution of child pornography is unrelated to the Copyright Act. The Court does not find the comparison to criminal law persuasive.

(…)

there is no liability for an attempt to infringe under the Copyright Act, there is corresponding liability for attempted distribution in the criminal context. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (b)(1)

(…)

However, the Court does note that, while Congress has not added “offer to distribute” to § 106(3) of the Copyright Act.

(…)

The Court’s examination of the use of the term “distribution” in other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well as the evolution of liability for offers to sell in the analogous Patent Act, lead to the conclusion that the plain meaning of the term “distribution” does not including making available and, instead, requires actual dissemination.

I can only add that extending the interpretation (interpretatio extensiva) is not even an option in Polish criminal law. This kind of analogy is prohibited in criminal law. Two most important and basic rules include prohibition of criminalizing of human acts by any regulation that isn’t a legal act adopted by the Polish parliament (Latin rule nullum crimen sine lege scripta) and the ban for extending analogy and interpretation to the detriment of the perpetrator (Latin rule nullum crimen sine lege stricta).

Illegal links

September 22nd, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

I was wondering whether I should use a different title for this post. Something more like “how to overturn technological realities upside down by the law” but it is probably too pretentious and far too long. Ad rem. What is the problem? The problem is whether the act consisting of giving links within a website may be subject to legal liability (criminal, civil, etc.). Someone who studied history and specification of HTML for a while will probably smile and nag his or her head in the negative. Ok, so let’s think about couple of problems. First question: whether adding a link to a particular source may be subject to legal liability? Even if a certain resource contains illegal content, for example: materials containing child pornography. The second question: whether you can claim for the legal ban of the use of links, for example, whether someone can prohibit the use/indication of a link to my page. There are other questions and I have more examples, but these two seem most important to me for now. The issue raised in my second question appeared in the U.S. in two recent interesting cases.

In Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, 1:2008 cv04572 (ND Ill.. August 12, 2008), a large law firm (and I was afraid to give up the name ;) – Jones Day has sued BlockShopper.com for trademark infringement by publishing links and information about two flats bought by lawyers working for Jones Day. The petition does not mention any copyright infringement claims. It included trade mark ifringement claims based on 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and § 1125(a)

Defendants’ use of the Jones Day Marks, in connection with their real estate advertisement scheme, is likely to deceive and cause confusion and mistake among customers as to the source or origin of the services provided or offered for sale by Defendants and the affiliation of Jones Day with those services and/or the sponsorship or endorsement of those services by Jones Day.

and false designation of origin claim based on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

Defendants’ use of the Jones Day Marks, in connection with their real estate advertisement scheme, is likely to deceive and cause confusion among consumers as to the source of origin of the services offered by Defendants and the sponsorship or endorsement of those services by Jones Day.

and trade mark dilution claim based on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)

Defendants’ use of the Jones Day Marks is disparaging the distinctiveness of the Jones Day Marks.

In Reisinger v. Perez et. al, 2:2008 cv00708 ((EDWis. August 20, 2008), the City of Sheboygan, requested from Jennifer Reisinger to remove the link to the official site of the Police – sheboyganpolice.com. Initially, being impressed by the cease and desist letter, PDF, 52 KB, she has received, Mrs. Reisinger dediced to remove the aformentioned link. But after some time she decided to sue the city (in the person of Mayor Perez) for violation of freedom of speech granted her under the First Amendment to the Constitution in relation to the provisions of 42 U.S.C § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

Of course, the question of liability for the use of links is a little bit more complicated if you use trade marks in the content of the link (for example: Do not buy Pepsi), or link’s content is potentially subject of libel (for example: he is really an id*ot), or when the content would include works protected by copyright. However, as you can see in the accompanying examples, the problem does not affect the process of linking to a resource, but only the relationship of resources and content between tags <A HREF=”"> and </A> and in my humble opinion that’s completely different issue.

Update on September 23, 2008.
I forgot to add a link to linksandlaw.com website.

“Protected” PDF

September 21st, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

Eric Goldman wrote about the judgment in Saadi v. Maroun, 2008 WL 4194824 (MD Fla.. Sept. 9, 2008), while pointing to the “protected” PDF file with complaints in the aformentioned case. Someone tried to “protect/hide” personal data of one of the parties. I suggest to perform a simple action: select and copy the black section and paste it into any text file. It’s a post I wrote a propos of certain comments which appeared on Piotr Waglowski website.

Finally, I got this judgment

September 18th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

You will probably recall one of my previous posts entitled “Give me this judgment!“. Well, finally, I got it. After sending fax message at 11:57 am (CET) I received 12 pages document containing the judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 March 2008, case file II CSK 539/07, at 12:31. It was sent directly to my mailbox. Of course I decided to publish this judgment at orzecznictwo.net website. It is in Polish language but I promise to write a short comment note for my English readers soon.

How many lines is de minimis?

September 17th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

It looks like not too much. In Dun & Bradstreet Software Services, Inc. v Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 US 1032, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003), the court held that copying 27 lines of total 525,000 lines of computer software code is copyright infringement.

In Veritas Operating Corp. v Microsoft Corp., No. 06-0703, 2008 US Dist. LEXIS 8166 (W.D. Wash. Feb 4, 2008), the Court held that copying 54 lines of total 160,000 lines of computer software code is copyright infringement and such action is not eligible for de minimis defense.

2. Whether the Code at Issue is Protected by Copyright Law
To succeed on its copyright infringement claim, Veritas will have to prove that Microsoft “copied protected elements of [Veritas'] work.” Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1126, 121 S.Ct. 881, 148 L.Ed.2d 790 (2000). Absent direct evidence of copying, such as an admission that defendant copied the work at issue, this factor is normally proven by circumstantial evidence of defendant’s access to plaintiff’s work and substantial similarity between the works. Id. Before the Court reaches the substantial similarity analysis, however, the Court must first filter out any non-protected material from the purportedly protected expression. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir.1992). As to whatever “golden nugget” of protected expression in the LDM code remains, the Court will then consider whether it is substantially similar to the allegedly infringing LVM code. Id.

i. Non-Protected Elements
*8 The section of code allegedly infringed, by both parties’ accounts, is a “transaction macro.” (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27), Pl.’s Resp. 26 (Dkt. No. 289 at 32).) Veritas’ expert Dr. Chase describes transaction processing as a “transactional update and recovery in the implementation of configuration changes to disk groups or packs.” (Chase Report ¶ 102 (Dkt. No. 296-3 at 61).) As best the Court can determine, the transaction macro essentially works to preserve data and prevent its loss in the event of a range of hardware or software failures. Dr. Chase opines that “[t]his core code to store, update, and recover disk group configurations safely is crucial to the value of the software in an enterprise setting.” ( Id.)

Under copyright law, even as to software code, “functional elements and elements taken from the public domain do not qualify for copyright protection.” Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir.1992). Microsoft argues that the transaction macro was “required to maintain functionality with the Defined Interface, as required by the Agreement,” and as such, constitutes a functional, non-protected element of the allegedly infringed work. (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27).) However, Veritas’ expert Dr. Chase states that copying the transaction macro “was not necessary to maintain compatibility with the LDM on-disk structures.” (Chase Report ¶ 96 (Dkt. No. 296-3).) As a result, whether the transaction macro is a functional element is a disputed material fact.

Additionally, Microsoft argues that similar transaction macros have been in the public domain for decades, and that therefore the transaction macro at issue is not protected by copyright. (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27).) Veritas’ expert, however, has stated that the transaction macro was a proprietary feature that was developed by Veritas over many years. (Chase Report ¶ 103 (Dkt. No. 296-3 at 62).) Even Microsoft’s expert, Dr. Gary Nutt, recognizes that the transaction macro is crucial to the value of the product and stated that he was not aware of the publication of the macro:

Q: I am asking you whether you are aware of any publication by Veritas or anyone else of the unique implementation details associated with the transactions technology in LDM?

A: I would repeat that I am unaware of any source code being published, any of Veritas’ LDM source code appearing in publication.

(Nutt Dep. 51:3-13, 145:4-7 (Dkt. No. 296-4 at 15, 41).) It may be that similar transaction macros were common in computer science, as Microsoft contends, (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27)), but there is at least a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.

Finally, Microsoft’s argument that the alleged copying is de minimis is unpersuasive:

[E]ven a quantitatively small amount of copied material may be sufficiently important to the operation of plaintiff’s program to justify a finding of substantial similarity. For instance, a small portion of the structure or code of a program may nonetheless give it distinctive features or may make the program especially creative or desirable. In such a case, a finding of substantial similarity would be appropriate.

*9 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03(F)(5). In the instant case, as noted above, Veritas’ expert has opined that the transaction macro at issue makes the disputed technology more “desirable” because it is “robust against a range of adverse events that might occur” and “is crucial to the value of the software in an enterprise setting.” (Chase Report ¶ 102 (Dkt. No. 296-3 at 61).) Microsoft’s expert agrees with that characterization. (Nutt Dep. 145:5-7 (Dkt. No. 296-4 at 41). Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the copyright claim on de minimis grounds.

Anonymous personal data

September 12th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

There is an ongoing discussion at Piotr Waglowski’s website within the post entitled “GIODO: first name, surname, photo, school, class and graduation year – are not personal data…” concerning a recent decision of the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) of

September 3, (the date is illegible on the scan I’ve got), with a signature (again illegible) DOLiS/DEC 515/08/22857

However, I would like to write about deleting parties’ personal data from judgments decided during administrative proceedings. Just for example, see judgment of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court of 20 November 2007, case file II GSK 138/07 which is available only in Polish language.

The Supreme Administrative Court composed of the President: Judge Jan Kacprzak, after hearings of 20 November 2007, during non public session, in the Chamber of Commerce, on the motion of P. P. L. “K.” J. K. S. j. from L. regarding the separate division of a cassation complaint brought by R. B. G. with headquaters in F. an S., A. against the judgement of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in W. of 7 September 2006, case act signature VI SA/Wa 557/06 on the complaints of P. P. L. “K.” J. K. S. j. and R. B. G. with headquaters in F. an S., regarding the decision of the Polish Patent Office of November [...] 2005, No [...] on the invalidation proceedings of the right of protection of a trade mark, decides: to reject the motion.

So far so good and completely anonymously right? And I know… this text is badly translated and very complicated for non-Polish speaking readers and lawyers. Anyway, to have the story linked somehow I suggest you to visit the website of the Polish Patent Office (PPO). First, go under the “Press” link, where PPO, in accordance with a statutory license (or not), in the context of the current publications on industrial property law issues appearing in newspapers and web portals has made available neat news compilation of 12 September 2008, PDF file, which reads:

GAZETA PRAWNA, 12.09.2008, p. 9
“Even the renowned trade mark may be invalidated” (more…); author Joanna Barańska.
The reputation of the trade mark is irrelevant to the invalidation proceedings – a case of invalidation proceedings of the international trade mark registration of Red Bull sign in class 30 – for ice cream, confectionery products, etc. (case act signature II GSK 138/07).

I added the link to Gazeta Prawna’s article for the convenience of my respectable readers. With regard to personal data I recommend you to check the trademark database of Polish Patent Office and to perform a search with the fololowing criteria used in the advanced search options (TLP ZawWyr ‘ “Red” and “bull”‘) AND (NIC ZawWyr’30′).

Applicant/owner: Red Bull GmbH, Fuschl am See, AT
Plenipotentiary: Drzewiecki, Tomaszek & Wspólnicy Spółka Jawna Jarosz Wojciech, Warszawa, PL

Copyright law, case I ACr 590/95

September 12th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

The No Electronic Theft Act (Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (Dec. 16, 1997)) introduced changes into 17 U.S.C § 101. Definitions.

The term “financial gain” includes receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.

In Poland, we have judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 12 December 1995, case file I ACr 590/95, published in OSA 1997, No 3, item 16, at page 32, where the Court held that benefits are generally a part of the net profit achieved as a result of copyright infringement. The benefits are also the savings on expenses for copyright fees, if the copyright infringement was based on the use of work without a proper remuneration. Interesting approaches in two different jurisdictions. I just need to remind you that the Republic of Poland is not a common law country.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

HOWTO eliminate personal use of copyrighted works

September 11th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

You just need to remember that historia magistra vitae est. The story that I am going to tell could serve as a short HOWTO eliminate personal use of copyrighted works. I will try to be brief. First, there is a judgment in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The holding it is not too good for copyright holders but it is the analog technology i.e. copies are not as good as originals. The content providing industry will handle it. The Audio Home Recording Act (Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237) with its (17 U.S.C § 1002 (a)), (17 U.S.C. § 1002(c)) and (17 U.S.C. § 1003. Obligation to make royalty payments) is a very good job! The lobby is better, but what tha heck is that: 17 U.S.C. § 1008. Prohibition on certain infringement actions)?

No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.

The judgment in Recording Industry Ass’ n of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 29 F. Supp.2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998), 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) is not very not good sign for the owners!

The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or “space-shift,” those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive (…) Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the AHRA

No Electronic Theft Act (Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (Dec. 16, 1997)) is what they needed.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 390/08

September 8th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

RSX Company from Katowice applied for and was granted trade mark protection for word trade mark MERCI on 4 September 2003, R-146586. The sign covered substitutes for coffee and coffee-based beverages as provided in class 30.

August Storck KG, the manufacturer of MERCI chocolates from Germany, filed a request for invalidation of the right of protection of the RSX trade mark. August Storck has owned the MERCI word trade mark R-68903 protected in Poland since 1990, also in class 30 (cocoa, chocolate, sweets). The decision on registration was issued by the Polish Patent Office on 4 March 1992. August Storck also registered a MERCI word-figurative trade mark in Poland, based on the Madrid Agreement’s provisions, IR-0728855.

IR-0728855

The German company alleged during the invaidation proeceedings that between those two signs there exists a risk of collision. Originally, the Polish Patent office ruled that there was no chance of such risk, because the goods were different, namely, coffee and cocoa. Accordingly, the PPO rejected the opposition filed by August Storck.

The German Company appealed against the PPO’s decision to the Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw. August Storck’s representative alleged that PPO has incorrectly analyzed the goods in question. The VAC agreed with this argument in its judgement of 13 October 2006, case file VI SA/Wa 895/06 and it annulled the PPO’s decision. The court emphasized the fact that there was no doubt that coffee and cocoa belonged to the same group of goods and that they were sold in the same stores. Coffee is a component of many chocolate products. In the court’s opinion, the PPO wrongly considered that these goods were not homogeneous. DAC also found that PPO improperly accepted that coffee and cocoa may be produced by different undertakings.

The case went back to the Polish Patent Office. RSX argued that coffee is a specific drink and no-one would connect it with cocoa, since they are not complementary goods. The RSX representative pointed that in one class the goods may be heterogeneous, for instance chewing gum and chocolate. However, the PPO in its decision of 28 August 2007 (Sp. 65/07) annulled the disputed mark. The Office held that in accordance with article 9(1)(1) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 31 January 1985, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with later amendment, three conditions have to be fulfilled: the signs are identical or similar, homogeneity of goods, the possibility of leading a consumer into confusion as to the origin of goods. The PPO acknowledged in its decision that all three conditions were met.

This time RSX appealed the PPO’s decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw in its judgment of 30 July 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 390/08 dismissed the complaint and ruled that PPO’s decision was this time correct. Coffee and cocoa are competitive products and the consumers overlap. Cocoa can be bought by a follower of coffee (not necessarily a person who drinks it), for example, as a gift for someone. Therefore, these are homogeneous goods.

Poland: new rules for medicines advertising

September 7th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

In the article entitled “Przybędzie zakazów w reklamach leków“, the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita reports a recent legislative initiative regarding a draft regulation on advertising of medicinal products prepared by the Polish Ministry of Health. Monitors displaying ads may disappear from pharmacies. Advertising of any medicines will not be allowed in hospitals or pharmacies. The proposed draft especially concerns audio and audiovisual advertising. A similar ban exists in the current Regulation of the Minister of Health of 16 December 2002 on the advertising of medicinal products, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2002 No. 230, item 1936, however, it allows for advertising contained in radio and television programmes. There were assembled special monitors to broadcast TV spots in some pharmacies. Such exceptions will no longer be allowed , and the display of medicine advertising spots will become illegal.

The proposal also includes the types of advertising of medicinal products: i.e. advertising which is targeted to the general public or persons who are entitled to issue medical prescriptions or persons engaged in the marketing of medicinal products. The Ministry of Health has stresses that such specification will clearly defined market rules and will have a positive effects on fair competition.

Advertising in visual form must contain a warning.

Before use, read the label, which includes indications, contra-indications, data on side effects, dosage and information about the medicinal use of the product, or consult your doctor or pharmacist.

The warning has to be included in any part of advertising, on a flat surface which is not less than 10 percent of total surface area of the ad. The text must be distinguished from the background and it be legible. A warning in an audiovisual advertising has to be placed in the lower parts of the plane, which is not less than 20 percent of the total surface area. It must also be clearly legible in the Polish language and appear on the screen for not less than 5 seconds.

Trade mark law, cases Sp. 428/07 and Sp. 442 /07

September 6th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita reports recent cases (act signatures Sp. 428/07 and Sp. 442 /07) brought before the Polish Patent Office by German company Klöckner Moeller GmbH, which opposed the registration of the PowerControl trade mark by the Lestar Company from Opacz. Both parties are involved into a dispute as to whether the PowerControl mark is a sign of fanciful character and whether it has sufficient ability to distinguish the goods of one undertaking from the another.

The Polish company from Opacz applied for a trade mark registration for PowerControl in 2001, in class 9 (cables and electrical wires, electrical controls of light, signals and switching and in class 35 (sale of various goods in a shop with wiring articles). The PPO has issued a favourable decision and registered this trade mark in 2006, R-174685.

R-174685

The patent attorney who is representing the company from Germany declared that one can not claim such simple words (power and control) as a trade mark, it gives the owner a monopoly on the use. The sign creates a cluster of words whose meaning is known in Poland. There are thus distinctive capabilities which are required for a brand. And it must identify the goods of an entrepreneur. But the Polish company argued that a sign which is composed of foreign words can be considered fanciful in Poland. Therefore PowerControl is able to distinguish goods, especially technical equipment.

The Polish Patent Office has not yet resolved the dispute.

Poland: Tiffany fought with Tiffany

September 6th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

Recently, two American companies were keenly disputing trade marks with a TIFFANY element before a Polish court. The Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw in its recent judgments of 24 July 2008, cases files VI SA/Wa 237/08 and VI SA/Wa 238/08, dismissed Tiffany & Broadway Inc. Div. of Texpol Corporation’s appeals against the Polish Patent Office (PPO) decision of 19 March 2007, cases files Sp. 68/04 and Sp. 69/04, regarding the cancellation of the right of protection for word-figurative trade marks: TIFFANY R-128063 and “Tiffany & Broadway Inc.” R-128064 which were registered in class 25 for shoes.

The cancellation proceedings were started by Tiffany & Co. from New York. The New York’s company alleged not only the similarity of signs but also a breach of its over-150-year reputation applied to jewellery products. During one of the hearings before the Polish Patent Office, Tiffany & Co. provided evidence of a witness as regards the reputation and universal knowledge of Tiffany & Co. brand. The witness stressed that, although in post-war Poland the Tiffany brand was not present on the Polish market, the press (women’s magazines and other publications) wrote about the Tiffany & Co. as the provider of luxurious jewellery.The court has affirmed the PPO’s findings that the TIFFANY trade mark has the reputation even if it was not registered in Poland. Judge Olga Żurawska-Matusiak decided that renowned signs or snobbish signs (sic!) do not need to be widely known to the public. It is a sufficient factor if they are known to the relevant public, to whom such signs are addressed, those are consumers who are interested in buying luxury goods. If there exists an international reputation of a sign – it also includes Poland.

Give me this judgment!

September 5th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

In the era of the Internet and processing of documents in digital form, Tomasz Rychlicki must go to the Supreme Court to buy stamps for the sum of 12 Polish złoty. He has to stick these stamps on the sheet of paper on which he also has to include – write down – the signature of the judgment of the Supreme Court of 11 March 2008, case act signature II CSK 539/07, which he knows about only from information made available in the Bulletin No. 7/08 of 8 August 2008, PDF file, that in laconic way only says that:

Username (nickname) which is used by a person in Internet services is a subject to legal protection on the same grounds as the protection of personal name, pseudonym or company.

Tomasz Rychlicki has to write his e-mail address on the same sheet of paper together with judgement’s act signature and stuck and cross out (sic) stamps. When he sends this sheet of paper by fax, Tomasz Rychlicki receives the ruling via e-mail sent to the specified e-mail address. Nice ladies are working in the Supreme Court, who are really willing to help, but some procedures are set out by ******** (autocensorship). Piotr Waglowski has also wrote some comments about this judgement. After our brief conversation I was “elected” to get the text of this judgment.

Unfair commercial practices, case DOK-6/2008

September 4th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

In December 2005, the OCCP instituted antitrust proceedings against ZAiKS and the Polish Filmmakers Association (SFP), suspecting that – in order to maximise their profits – these organisations had made an agreement and fixed uniform charges for using audiovisual works and refused to negotiate their rates.

Penalties for a total of more than $ 1.2 million Polish złoty were imposed by the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) on The Association of Authors (ZAiKS) and the Polish Filmmakers Association (APF) because of their agreement “to eliminate competition between them”.

UOKiK has found that since 2003, ZAiKS and SFP, seeking to guarantee itself the highest profits, have operated under the unlawful antitrust agreement. SFP and ZAiKS concluded an agreement which established a uniform, rigid rates for the use of audiovisual works (such as DVD movies) and refused to negotiate them – announced Malgorzata Krasnodębska-Tomkiel (the President of the UOKiK) at a press conference in Warsaw.

The decision of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection of 29 August 2008, case file DOK-6/2008 The official press release is available at uokik.gov.pl website, in Polish language.

Funny terms and Carl wants to be sued

September 4th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

There is an article available at valleywag.com website commenting on funny terms from TOU/TOS licenses. There is also a post regarding recent action of Carl Malamud at slashdot.org website. Go Carl!

California claims copyright to its laws, and warns people not to share them. And that’s not sitting right with Internet gadfly, and open-access hero, Carl Malamud. He has spent the last couple months scanning tens of thousands of pages containing city, county and state laws — think building codes, banking laws, etc. Malamud wants California to sue him, which is almost a given if the state wants to continue claiming copyright. He thinks a federal court will rule in his favor: It is illegal to copyright the law since people are required to know it. Malamud helped force the SEC to put corporate filings online in 1994, and did the same with the patent office. He got the Smithsonian to loosen its claim of copyright, CSPAN to stop forbidding people from sharing its videos, and most recently Oregon to quit claiming copyright on state laws.

I’d like to remind you of some of my post I’ve “commited” regarding licenses’ issues. Among other things are posts such as “Oh, these Internet’s contracts” and “TOS not so absolute“.