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Archive for: October, 2010

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 347/10

October 29th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 9 July 2005, the Polish Patent Office registered word-figurative trade mark “PERŁY I ŁOTRY SHANGHAJU” R-164275 for Grzegorz Majewski “SINONIS” from Katowice. Michał Gramatyka, Wojciech Harmansa, Adam Saczka and Sławomir Olko filed a request for the invalidation of the right of protection. They claimed that they were members of the music band “PERŁY I ŁOTRY SHANGHAJU”, the band’s name is a common right and therefore the registration of this name as a trademark by Grzegorz Majewski violated the rights of other band members. The applicants alleged that Majewski filed for the registration at a time when he was not an active member of the band and he also knew that “PERŁY I ŁOTRY SHANGHAJU” continues its operation, accordingly he acted in bad faith. Bad faith is also confirmed by the fact that based on the granted right of protection for the trade mark in question, Majewski demanded the cessation of business activity of the other band members. The sign in question is a word-figurative trade mark and similarities that exist may mislead the public with “PERŁY I ŁOTRY” R-194932 trade mark registered for Firma Usługowo-Handlowa HARPEL II Wojciech Harmansa. See also “Trade mark law, case Sp. 211/08“.

R-164275

The Polish Patent Office dismissed the request and concluded that there was no reason to believe that the grant of protection to the trade mark at issue violated the personal rights of applicants if a civil court’s judgment submitted during the invalidation proceedings included a statement that they are not entitled to such a personal right/interest to the band name. The applicants filed a complaint against this decision.

R-194932

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 24 August 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 347/10 annulled the contested decision and ruled it unenforceable. The VAC held that there was a breach of procedural law. The Court held that the PPO, in fact, did not properly examine the request for invalidation. The PPO based its findings only on certain statements issued in the judgment of the Apellate Court in Katowice, and draw more far-reaching conclusions. And so, from the finding of the Appellate Court that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the fact that they are entitled to the name of the band “Perły i Łotry Szanghaju”, the PPO reached a conclusion that the applicants shall have no personal or property rights, and then ruled the argument of acting in bad faith as unfounded. This jugdgment is not final.

Trade mark law, case IV CSK 231/10

October 27th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Court in its judgment of 21 October 2010 case file IV CSK 231/10 held that the combination of colors may serve as a trademark but the entrepreneur, who is entitled to the right of protection, cannot prohibit the use of one of such colors that is used by another entrepreneur in its trade mark. Judge Wojciech Katner stated that the single color cannot be a trademark.

R-115856

The object of protection is in this case a combinations of colors, as referred to in Article 120(2) of the Polish Industrial Property Law. The trade mark infringement occurs when the proportions and the use of a given color by another entrepreneur will not allow for distinguishing of trade marks. Sending the case back for reconsideration the Court stated that the judgment of the court of the second instance should be clarified so that the dominance of the green color, would not suggest that this was British Petroleum fuel station. The court agreed with the defendant that one cannot monopolize the colors, and only some are valuable on the fuels market. The Court held that although different entrepreneurs use the same color to designate their stations, it will not lead to consumers confusion because of the layout, and even a shade of these color. See also “Trade mark law, case IV CSK 61/09“.

Personal interest, case XXIV C 760/09

October 26th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

Kataryna, actually Katarzyna Sadło appeared in the Polish blogoshpehre shortly after the so-called Rywin affair. Since then Kataryna simultaneously publish her blogs on both blox and salon24.pl websites. She quickly became well-known person who comments on political life in Poland and received a large number of comments. Her identity quickly began to attract the interest of the mass-media. A few journalists were suspected for writing under this pseudonym. Kataryna gave interviews in press but did not disclose her identity.

In May 2009, the owner Salon24 website announced that Krzysztof Czuma, son of the Polish Minister of Justice Andrzej Czuma, sent a letter to Salon24 seeking the removal of lying and offensive blog entry of “a Kataryna”. Salon24 responded that the content of the blog posts does not affect the TOS of Salon24 and therefore it will not be removed. However, Kataryna announced that if the minister Czuma would like to bring the civil lawsuit against her, she will reveal her personal data.

Shortly after that, the Polish daily newspaper “Dziennik Polska-Europa-Świat” published information that it knows the identity of the blogger. Although the newspaper did not publish her name, but described it in a way that allowed for unambiguous identification. These were more than enough information to let Internauts to identify Katarzyna Sadło as Kataryna.

Kataryna decided to reveal (tweet) the contents of SMS, which has received from Sylwia Czubkowska, a journalist reporter from Dziennik, in which the she urged Kataryna to disclose her identity in the newspapers and warned that otherwise the information may be used by “Fakt” which is a tabloid owned by the same publisher – Axel Springer Poland. Kataryna sued Axel Springer, the publisher of “Dziennik” and the editors of this newspaper for violation of her right to privacy. The case was brought before the District Court in Warsaw case file XXIV C 760/09, however it was settled out of the court.

Access to public information, case II SAB/Lu 44/10

October 26th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

A resident of Lubartów town has requested the mayor to deliver a photocopy of the legal opinion on a referendum on the development of the local square. The mayor refused on the grounds that the opinion is not public information within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Polish Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information – API – (in Polish: Ustawa o dostępie do informacji publicznej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 112, item 1198, with subsequent amendments.

Article 1.1 Each information on public matters constitutes public information in the understanding of the Act and is subject to being made available on the basis of principles and under the provisions defined in this Act.
2. The provisions of the Act shall not breach the provisions of other acts defining different principles and the mode of access to the information being public information.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Lublin in its judgment of 17 August 2010 case file II SAB/Lu 44/10, decided on the failure to act against the mayor of Lubartow. The Court ruled that a legal opinion prepared for a particular case or cases, serving as an internal document dealing with issues and tasks of the authority is public information. Such opinion applies to the facts had been made in the organizational structure of the authority, it concerns its activities, and therefore in accordance with Article 1(1) of the API is deemed as public information. The court noted also that the obligation to provide public information arises only if it was not previously available and does not function in public circulation, and the person concerned cannot familiarize with it otherwise than by making a request for making the public information available.

Categories: Art. 1(1) API | Art. 10 API | Art. 14 API | Polish Act on access to public information | Voivodeship Administrative Court.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1133/10

October 25th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

This is the continuation of a story described in “Trade mark law, case II GSK 496/09“. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 4 August 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1133/10 anulled the PPO’s decision and ruled it unenforceable. The Court held that the Polish Patent Office, while assessing the similarity of the opposing signs, ignored in general the question of the impact of a trade mark on recipient/consumers/buyers of the goods bearing the sign, and therefore it did not considered in a comprehensive way the impact of the entire mark, focusing only on one of its verbal elements – PREMIUM word, without attempting to explain the “impact strength (distinguishing ability)” of PREMIUM word as an informational sign that is used to designate the exceptional quality of a product.

IR-802093

In the opinion of the courts, this issue is very important, because while examining the compared signs, the impact of the opposing character – its distinctive ability may not be indifferent, and a “weak” sign must often tolerate the coexistence of the close signs. See U. Promińska, Ustawa o znakach towarowych. Komentarz, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze PWN, Warszawa 1998, p. 42.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 501/10

October 25th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company EDIPRESSE POLSKA S.A. from Warsaw applied for the right of protection for word trade mark NEW Z-294152 for goods in Classes 16, 35 and 41. The Polish Patent Office refused to register this sign claiming that it does not have sufficient distinctive character that would allow to individualize the source of the goods. The PPO concluded that the sign is not distinctive, because it informs that the goods and services for which the registration is sought, are… new. EDIPRESSE filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 27 May 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 501/10 held that the common practice of the Polish Patent Office in registering trade marks containing descriptive elements was definitely too liberal, especially if it is considered that while examining the registrability, the future interest of other entrepreneurs in access to a given sign should be taken into account. According to the VAC there must be a significant reduction in the number of registered trademarks with the descriptive elements, geographical or generic names, as the result of understanding the proper function of a trade mark, because the primarily function of a trade mark is to indicate the origin of the goods from a particular undertaking. If, therefore, the applied sign may be perceived by the average consumer as information about the characteristics (properties) of goods or services, the origin from a particular geographic area, it cannot be a trademark due to lack of distinctive ability which is required for trade marks. The importance of the principle of freedom of access to certain descriptive signs must therefore lead to a significant reduction in the number of signs with descriptive elements that were registered as individual trade marks. The judgment is not final.

Computer crime, case II K 127/10

October 21st, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

A young man was charged with the removal of computer data in the form of virtual objects belonging to a specific game avatar. He acted to the detriment of another person, without authorization, with an Internet account in the Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game – Metin2. According to the indictment he obtained access (login, password) to someone else’s account using a keylogger software. The charges were based on provisions of Article 287 § 1 of the Criminal Code – CRC – (in Polish: Kodeks Karny) of 6 June 1997, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 88, item 553, with subsequent amendments.

Article 287. § 1. Whoever, in order to gain material benefits, affects automatic processing or transmitting information, or changes or deletes record or introduces a new record on an electronic information carrier, without being authorised to do so,
shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for a term of between 3 months and 5 years.
§ 2. In the event that the act is of a lesser significance, the perpetrator shall be subject to a fine, the penalty of restriction of liberty or the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to one year.
§ 3. If the fraud has been committed to the detriment of a next of kin, the prosecution shall occur on a motion of the injured person.

The Regional Court in Sławno in its judgment of 19 August 2010, case file II K 127/10 found him guilty of committing the offense, and sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment, suspended for a three-year period of probation. The court also ordered him to pay a fine up to 20 daily rates (10 PLN for a rate, a total of 200 PLN) and placed under supervision by a probation guardian.

Computer crime, case XII K 32/10

October 20th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

A locally practicing lawyer (advocate) from Kielce used the nickname “bondd007” and posted on an online forum, among others such comments that the Director of the Tax Office in Kielce “probably likes” when the manager of one of the departments “puts an ice cream” – the expression in Polish slang that means oral sex.

The Regional Court in Kielce in its judgment of March 2010 case file XII K 32/10, found the lawyer guilty of defamation. The Court held that such words insulted the manager, slander her to sexual contact with the principal in the workplace and thus exposed her to a loss of trust necessary for the position occupied. The District Court in Kielce in its judgment of 19 October 2010 upheld the judgment.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1099/10

October 20th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company Polski Koncern Naftowy ORLEN S.A. applied for the right of protection for word-figurative trade mark “BIG energy drink” Z-336460 for goods in Classes 06, 16, 32, 35, 43.

Z-336460

The Polish Patent Office issued a decision refusing to grant the protection in part of goods in Class 32 such as energy drinks, juices and juice drinks, carbonated and non-carbonated mineral water, drinks other than alcohol, syrups, concentrates for the preparation of drinks, sports drinks, nectars, beer and in part of services in Class 35 such as retail and wholesale sale services of energy drinks, juices and juice drinks, mineral water, alcoholic drinks, syrups, concentrates in the preparation of drinks, sports drinks. The PPO found also a conflicting CTM “BIG ENERGY” No. 002135812 registered for goods such as non-alcoholic beverages, fruit drinks, fruit juices and fruit nectars, bases and essences (included in class 32) for making the aforesaid beverages. ORLEN filed a complaint against this decision claiming that the refusal was based solely on the likelihood and hypothetical clues, not actual evidence of a convergence of signs and the resulting collision. There was also no presence of the product bearing the opposed trade mark on the Polish territory.

CTM-002135812

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 30 August 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1099/10 annulled the contested decision. The VAC ruled the relationship between the petrol stations retail networks and certain “additional products”, bearing their trademark, is becoming ever closer. In such situation it significantly reduces the risk of confusion – the risk of misleading the public, which includes in particular the risk of associating the trademark with an erlier trade mark. The consumer begins to associate certain product (e.g., energy drink), not only with a specific sign, but also with a specific network of petrol stations, in which the drink will be available. The judgment is not final.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 765/09

October 18th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 September 2010 case file II GSK 765/09 held that the view that the content and scope of rights as referred to in Article 153 of the IPL were an obstacle to a possible objection by the entities, which do not have rights, which they claim to protect, does not deserve the acceptance.

Article 153
1. The right of protection shall confer the exclusive right to use the trademark for profit or for professional purposes throughout the territory of the Republic of Poland.

2. The term of the right of protection shall be 10 years counted from the date of filing of a trademark application with the Patent Office.

3. The term of protection may, at the request of the right holder, be extended for subsequent ten-year periods in respect of all or of a part of the goods.

4. The request referred to in paragraph (3) shall be submitted before the expiration of a running protection period, however not earlier than one year before the expiration thereof. The request shall be submitted together with the payment of a due protection fee.

5. The request referred to in paragraph (3) may also be submitted, against payment of an additional fee, within six months after the expiration of a protection period. The said time limit shall be non-restorable.

6. The Patent Office shall make a decision on refusal to extend the term of protection for a trademark, where the request has been submitted after the expiration of the time limit referred to in paragraph (5) or the due fees referred to in paragraphs (4) and (5) have not been paid.

The legislature thus entails exclusive rights to the use of the trade mark for the profit or professional purposes and filing the opposition is not a form of use of the mark as shown above. The same conclusions may be reached while interpreting the provisions included in Article 296(2) of the IPL, in which the legislature combines the scope of trademark protection in the form of civil claims with the use of signs in business, while the opposition is not an action in the context of economic activity.

Article 296
2. Infringement of the right of protection for a trademark consists of unlawful use in the course of trade of:
(i) a trademark identical to a trademark registered in respect of identical goods,
(ii) a trademark identical or similar to a trademark registered in respect of identical or similar goods, if a likelihood of misleading the public, including in particular a risk of associating the trademark with a registered trademark, exists;
(iii) a trademark identical or similar to a renown trademark registered for any kind of goods, if such use without due cause would bring unfair advantage to the user or be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trademark.

Given those conditions, the exclusive rights of trademark protection does not cover the monopoly beyond the boundaries of economic activity or, in other words, use of the mark for the profit or professional purposes. The opposition remains outside the so-defined borders. This case concerned LORD R-88669 trade mark owned by REKORD S.A.

Procedural law, case VI SA/Wa 934/10

October 12th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

In 2006, the Polish legal advisor (radca prawny) Sławomir Reszka from Warsaw applied for the right of protection for KHORTYTSA CHORTYCA Z-311311 and BLAGOV BLAGOFF Z-311312 trade marks for goods in Class 33 such as alcoholic beverages. During the examination proceedings, the Polish Patent Office has found almost identical signs such as word trade mark BLAGOV R-218323 and word-figurative trade mark KHORTYTSA ULTIMATE PERFECTION R-219919 owned by the Ukrainian company – the affiliate “Image Holding” of the JSC “Image Holding ApS” from Novoe Zaporozhye, that were also registered for alcoholic beverages. The Ukrainian company argued that it had used its trade marks previously in Poland and that these signs are still used in Ukraine. The PPO refused to grant the right of protection for Sławomir Reszka.

R-219919

Decisions of the Polish Patent Office are liable to a party’s request for re-examination of the matter within the meaning of the Administrative Proceedings Code. The provisions of the APC governing deciding on appeals from decisions shall apply accordingly to proceedings on re-examination of the matter. In this particular case, the PPO found that the illness did not entitled Sławomir Reszka for the restoration of the deadline because he had a representative. As a basis for denying the request the PPO cited provisions of Article 243(1) of the IPL.

Article 243
1. Unless otherwise stipulated in this Law, where in the course of proceedings a time limit to perform an act requisite, under this Law, for continuance of the proceeding has not been observed, the Patent Office may, at the party’s request, restore the time limit, provided that the party provides a plausible explanation that non-observance was without fault on its part.

2. Subject to paragraph (4), the request referred to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted to the Patent Office within two months from the date on which the reason for non-observance has ceased to exist, however not later than within six months from the date of the expiry of that time limit. At the same time, the requesting party shall be required to perform the act in respect of which the time limit was fixed.

3. A time limit to submit the request referred to in paragraph (2) shall not be restorable.

4. Where a decision has been taken on discontinuance of the proceeding for the reason of failure to observe a time limit for performance of a specified act, that decision, at the party’s request for re-examination of the matter, may be reversed, provided that the party provides in the request a plausible explanation that the non-observance was without fault on its part, while performing, at the same time, the act in respect of which the time limit was fixed.

5. Where the time limit for filing an application for the purpose of preserving the right of earlier priority or the time limit for furnishing a document expires on a day on which the Patent Office is closed to the public, the application or the document received on the first subsequent day on which the Patent Office is open to the public shall be deemed to have been received within the time limit concerned.

6. In respect of time limits, to which paragraph (1) is not applicable, and the non-observance of which has been caused by exceptional circumstances, the provisions on suspension of the course of negative prescription caused by acts of God shall apply accordingly. In such cases, the Patent Office shall give orders after having been furnished with relevant evidence by the interested party.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (5) and (6), the Patent Office shall secure the reception at any time of day of letters delivered by interested persons.

Mr Reszka filed a complaint against this order. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 22 July 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 934/10 did not examine the merits of the case, namely whether, in the event of a failure to comply with a deadline, the illness of a representative should be taken into account. The VAC annulled the questioned order refusing to restore the deadline, because the PPO applied the wrong provision. The deadline for lodging a request for a retrial shall be restored on the basis of Article 58 of the APC.

Article 58
§ 1. If the deadline is infringed it may be rescheduled at the request of an interested party if it appears probable that the infringement was not caused by that party.
§ 2. A request to reschedule the deadline should be made within 7 days of the reason for the deadline’s infringement coming to an end. However, the actions for which the deadline was set must be carried out simultaneously with the request being made.
§ 3. It is not possible to reschedule the deadline for making the request referred to in § 2.

The Court held that the provisions of Article 243 of the IPL are applicable in deadlines set by the Polish Patent Office in the course of the given case. After the issuance of a negative decision in a case the the proceeding is not pending because it has been completed. It may be continued after upon successful acceptation of the request to reschedule the deadline. Therefore, Article 243 of the IPL could not be applicable in the above-mentioned case. See also “Procedural law, case VI SA/Wa 2091/07“.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 203/10

October 11th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company INTERKOBO Sp. z o.o. filed a request for the invalidation of the right of protection for “kucyk pony” R-139097 trade mark registered for HASBRO POLAND Sp. z o.o. Kucyk means “pony” in Polish language. INTERKOBO argued that it has the legitimate interest in the invalidation proceedings because it is a manufacturer of toys, and it offers products such as toy ponies. In addition, in the cease and desist letter dated on 24 April 2007, HASBRO called INTERKOBO to stop the infringement of the right of protection for “kucyk pony” R-139097 trade mark which consisted of using by the INTERKOBO of “Princes’ s Pony” sign for designation of ponies’ toys. INTERKOBO argued also that HASBRO restricts the freedom of economic activity of its competitors, asking them to stop marketing of toys in the form of a small pony and requesting destruction of such products. By registering of the trade mark in question HASBRO had the intention of its use in isolation from the goods for which it was registered, and the intention of closing the access to the market for its competitors, the more that HASBRO as a professional market player should knew or should have known that the term “kucyk pony” as used for the toys in the form of a pony does not have any sufficient distinctiveness. INTERKOBO stressed that HASBRO Sp. z o.o. is a part of capital group operating on the global toys market, which is the position that allows it to dominate the market for local manufacturers of toys and contrary to the scope of the use made of registration to combat competition, which is contrary to the principles of the social coexistence.

HASBRO claimed that its sign is used on the Polish market, on the packaging of “kucyk pony” toys and other materials, since 1998 and is the subject of a number of marketing activities, and the brand “kucyk pony” includes not only toys, but also videos and a monthly magazine for children. HASBRO argued that its trade mark has a strong distinctive character and can be regarded as a reputable one, in relation to the goods it designates it has the so-called primary distinctive character.

The Polish Patent Office dismissed the request. INTERKOBO filed a complaint against PPO’s decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 24 June 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 203/10 affirmed this decision and dismissed the case. The VAC held that the trade mark in question is is a fanciful sign and has the primary distinctive character. It is not a generic name of any of the listed goods, and it does not inform about their properties. Pony (in Polish: kucyk) is the generic name of the horse species while it is not the name of the goods protected by the trade mark, which goods do not have any direct connection with any species of horses.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 691/09

October 5th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 14 October 2002, the Polish company BWS Polska Sp. z o.o. based in Zaczernie applied for the right of protection for VARNA Z-256235 trademark for goods in Class 33 such as wines. The Polish Patent Office informed the applicant that it cannot be granted a right of protection because VARNA is also a geographical name of the Bulgarian city of Varna, which is located in the eastern Black Sea region famous for producing high quality white wines. Due to the fact that the seat of the applicant is located on Polish territory, the sign may lead the potential buyers to confusion as to the origin of goods. In response, BWS noted that the sign does not contain any false information, while simultaneously indicating that it is an importer and distributor of wines from south-eastern Europe, including Bulgaria.

The PPO received also comments issued by BSG Poland Sp. z o. o. in which the company raised objection of lack of statutory requirements for the protection of the questioned trade mark. Comments were sent to BWS but the company has not agreed to these statements.

The Polish Patent Office refused to grant a right of protection. The PPO ruled that VARNA sign is information on the place of the origin of wine – the site of a wine-growing and processing, without informing the consumer about anything else. According to the PPO, the importer has the right to register its trade mark, but the choice that violates the rights of manufacturers who conduct business in the region of Varna – infringes on the principles of merchant’s honesty. A situation in which the Bulgarian wine producers could not provide the Polish consumer that the wine has been produced by them is not fair, because they were outrun by an entity whose relationship with Bulgaria is at least questionable.

BWS requested the retrial of its case. The company reduced the original list of goods to wines from Bulgaria. It argued also that, under a contract with the Bulgarian multi-vendor, which is located in Varna, it has exclusive rights to sell original bottled VARNA wine. BWS indicated that the packaging of imported wine, includes bottle shape and color and shape, color, composition and location of the graphic label and it is its own creation. The company pointed out that the Trade Mark Register includs other signs being the name of national and international cities, towns, and in its opinion, the registration of VARNA trade mark will not be the monopolization of the word, because the Varna city remains a geographical name, the name of the appellation of origin or possibly the name of the seat of the suppliers of wine.

After reconsidering the matter, the Polish Patent Office upheld the contested decision. The PPO withdrew from contesting the trade as contrary to good merchant’s practice and public policy, pointing out also that the limited list of goods also been removed as an obstacle to the misleading nature of the sign. However, the PPO ruled that VARNA is the word trade mark, with no graphics, and indicates the origin of goods, therefore, it cannot be registered. The average consumer will read the sign as the Bulgarian city or geographic region on the Black Sea, famous for making wines. BWS filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 18 March 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 2098/08 held that the contested decision is the right. According to the Court the basic prerequisite for the grant of the right of protection is the distinctive character of a sign. The legal doctrine distinguishes between the so-called abstract distinctive ability and the concrete distinctive ability. The mark is characterized by the abstract distinctive ability, where a sign is examined abstractly (in isolation from the specific goods or services) capable of distinguishing the goods of one undertaking from those of another. The mark has concrete distinctive character when it is capable of distinguishing goods or services specified in the application to the Patent Office of goods or services of another company.

BWS filed a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 13 July 2010 case file II GSK 691/09 reversed the contested judgment and refered the case back for reconsideration. The SAC held that the VAC overlooked in its deliberations, the fact that the disputed word mark VARNA is not present in the Polish language as the name of the city in Bulgaria. This spelling of the city name does not occur in Bulgarian either (it’s Варна). However, in Polish language the city is known as Warna. Meanwhile the VAC in assessing the facts of the case stated that it was undisputed that the sign is the name of the VARNA city in Bulgaria and that by placing it on the goods (wines originating from Bulgaria) it will indicate the relevant public without difficulty and without no additional actions the origin goods. The Court had the duty to assess the legality of the contested decision of the Polish Patent Office even if the allegation was not raised in the complaint. The law requires that the assessment whether the mark is sufficiently distinctive has to be made individually for each sign. The VAC should also examine the issue whether a questioned sign due to the use of the first letter “V” and not “W” (as is correctly spelled in Polish) has sufficient distinctiveness, although phonetically the “V” and “W” letters sound the same in the Polish language. Of those grounds the SAC held that the VAC has not made an overall assessment of distinctive character of the sign in question, taking into account its visual, aural or conceptual elements, and therefore the VAC infringed on Article 113 §1 and Article 145 §1 point 1 C of the Polish Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, since it dismissed the case without adequate explanation of the matter. The SAC noted also that the BWS claimed that, under the earlier decisions of the PPO, it acquired rights of protection for trademarks, even though they were the names of cities (Melnik – a city in Bulgaria), Calama (a city in Chile), or Beverly Hills (a city in California), however, the VAC did not respond to such arguments. In light of the settled case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, the administration body can change its opinion on the content of the right conclusion, which should be issued in a specific type of cases, but it must carefully justify such a change, especially when changing the view of decisions taken in relation to the same applicant. The case-law of the administration may therefore be subject to change, if the authority demonstrates that there are reasonable grounds.