Polish IP & IT law – copyright trademark computer internet telecomm » 2012

Archive for: January, 2012

Trade mark law, case Sp. 500/11

January 30th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

On July 2008, Barbara Hildman requested the Polish Patent Office to invalidate the right of protection of the word-figurative trade mark BIKINI CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS R-175224 owned by Parfums Christian Dior from Paris, and registered for goods in Class 03 such as body and face care products. Barbara Hildman argued that BIKINI CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS R-175224 is similar to the trade mark BIKINI R-124158 registered with an earlier priority.

R-175224

Parfums Christian Dior admitted that the trade mark at issue was registered for similar range of goods, but the disputed sign has other distinctive elements such as CHRISTIAN DIOR and a colorful label, which proves that there is no risk of consumers’ confusion. Moreover, the Company argued that the contested mark containing the element CHRISTIAN DIOR is produced and marketed by the producer of luxury goods and it is basically identical to the well-known and reputable company name of the holder – Parfums Christian Dior. These products, as exclusive goods, are always sold at exposed places clearly marked with the company name “Christian Dior”, which reduces to zero the possibility of confusion with cosmetic products to other companies.

The Adjudicative Board of the Polish Patent Office dismissed the request. PPO decided that there is no likelihood of confusion, also, because the questioned trade mark is a carrier of the allure, prestigious image and aura of luxury. The combination of the weak trade mark BIKINI with a strong and recognizable sign CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS, completely eliminates the risk of confusion between the compared trade marks by the oriented and attentive consumer.

Barbara Hildman filed a complaint against this decision. She argued that merging of the word BIKINI with the words “CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS” and a graphic element, is like appropriation of someone else’s trade mark. The creation of trade marks by adding to them a company name and its seat distorts the nature and function of a trade mark, because each sign could be easily imitated, only adding a company name to such a sign, and in that case the registration of the earlier mark would be quite superfluous and without legal significance.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 13 May 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 41/11 repealed the contested decision and returned it to the PPO for further reconsideration. The Court ruled that the PPO did not properly examine the similarity of goods. There were no comparison on „which shelf” these identical goods are placed and who is their recipient, which in consequence it does not exclude the risk of association of the earlier trade mark with the later one. The Polish Patent Office did not consider that the necessary condition for the likelihood of confusion is at least the minimum similarity between compared trade marks. The lack of examination of this condition would mean that the company Christian Dior, or any other reputable or well-known company – due to its brand recognition, is granted the possibility to “append” to a recognizable name, or names – of any signs that are protected with earlier priority, and presenting it as their own. This would also mean illusory protection for an earlier trade mark in a situation where the reputable sign would build the family of marks, without prejudice to its recognition, just by adding a known company name or surname to any sign. In any of such cases, the appropriation by the prestigious brand of less known earlier trade marks, would show that their position and earlier protection do not apply and such protection has not been given any legal effect, and each of such a character – compared with the prestige trade mark, would have been assessed as having weak distinctive ability.

The Polish Patent Office in its decision of 19 January 2012 case Sp. 500/11 invalidated the right of protection for the trade mark BIKINI CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS R-175224.

Polish patent attorneys, case II GSK 833/10

January 20th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 1 September 2011 case file II GSK 833/10 decided the cassation appeal that was filed by the National Council of Patent Attorneys in the case of the candidate for the patent attorney traineeship. The candiate did not agree with grades that she received during the entry exam. The SAC held that the cassation complaint was unjustified because of the lack of clarity in the rules of operation of the examination committee could cause significant differences in the assessments and grades that were issued by individual members of the committee. Grades that were issued for the same answer for the same question were so significantly different (4 and 10, 3 and 10) that it could indicate only that not all members of the committee acted in accordance with objective, reliable rules. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 11 February 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1713/09 correctly annulled the resolution of the National Council of Patent Attorneys, because the Council did not use clear criteria for assessing candidates for the patent attorney traineeship, thus giving rise to the recognition by the VAC that such resolution violated the requirements for reasons and justification of the administrative decision. The SAC held that the sufficient guarantee of proper operation of the committee would be, apart from the personal reliability of its members, formulation and disclosure of clear criteria for evaluation in all fields of the exam.

Copyright law, case IV CSK 133/11

January 18th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Court in its judgment of 21 October 2011 case file IV CSK 133/11 held that the respective remuneration for the culpable infringement as defined in Article 79(1) pt. 3 letter b of the Polish Act on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych) of 4 February 1994, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631, with subsequent amendments, does not depend on proof of actual damage that was suffered by the rightholder.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 839/10

January 17th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

Nufarm Australia Limited, the owner of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428 registered for goods in Class 5, requested the Polish Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for DUAL IR-0534713 owned by Syngenta Participations AG. Earlier before, Syngenta opposed the registratin of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428.

Syngenta requested the PPO to dismiss the request. The Company provided evidence of use of the trade mark DUAL IR-0534713. There were six copies of VAT invoices from the period from 2002 to 2006, of sale of goods bearing the sign “DUAL GOLD 960 EC”, and two newspaper articles concerning this product and the material safety data sheets of “DUAL GOLD 960 EC of August 2005.

The Polish Patent Office decided on the lapse of the right of protection for DUAL IR-0534713 and dismissed the opposition against the registration of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428. Syngenta filed a complaint against this decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 19 March 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1807/09 dismissed it. Syngenta filed a cassation compliant.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 3 October 2011 case file II GSK 839/10 repealed the contested judgment and returned it to the VAC for further reconsideration. The SAC ruled that the cassation complaint can be based on the following grounds: a) the violation of substantive law by its erroneous interpretation or misuse, or the violation of proceedings rules, if it could affect the outcome of the case. The specific provisions of substantive law or procedural law, which were violated the court of first instance, should be indicated. Furthermore, it should be precisely explained What was the misapplication or misinterpretation – in relation to substantive law, or it should be demonstrated what was the significant impact of the violation of procedural law to decide the case by the court of first instance – in relation to the rules of proceedings. The Supreme Administrative Court cannot change or precise cassation complaints and their grounds, or otherwise correct them, due to limitations resulting from the mentioned rules. If the cassation complaint alleges violation of both substantive law and proceedings, as it was in the present case, the Supreme Administrative Court recognizes the allegation of violation of proceedings, in the first place.

The SAC decided the PPO has erred in its findings because it considered that the evidence submitted on, was from the years 2002-2006, while there was also an invoice from March 2007 on the case file, which was of the relevance to the case. It was a sales invoice of the preparation DUAL GOLD 960 EC 12 XI and DUAL GOLD 960 EC 4X 5 L. Surprisingly, the Supreme Administrative Court acknowledged, that the case facts showed that the trade mark DUAL GOLD lapsed on June 2006, so as a trade mark it ceased to exist on the market from that date (it was not registered). Since the trade mark DUAL GOLD ceased to exist in legal transactions after June 2006, the Polish Patent Office should examine whether this sign could be used in this situation, as indicated on the invoice of March 2007, or perhaps the invoice indicated the use of any other trade mark, for example, the trade mark DUAL, and therefore the Article 170 (1) of the IPL should be applied in this case.

Article 170
1. Subject to paragraph (2), the Patent Office shall dismiss a request for declaring the right of protection lapsed in the case referred to in Article 169(1)(i), if before the submission of the request genuine use of the mark has started or has been resumed.

2. Start or resumption of the use of the trademark after the expiration of an uninterrupted period of five successive years of non-use and within a period of three months preceding the submission of the request for declaring the right of protection lapsed, shall be disregarded, if preparations for the start or resumption of the use have been undertaken immediately after the right holder became aware of possible submission of such request.

3. Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply accordingly in the cases referred to in Article 169(7).

4. Loss of a right to use a sign or a symbol, referred to in Article 131(2) incorporated in a trademark shall not constitute a ground for non-making a decision declaring the right of protection for that trademark lapsed, if that sign or symbol ceased to be used in the trademark before a request for the declaration of the right of protection lapsed has been submitted.

In light of this evidence, which were the facts of this case, where a detailed analysis could affect the outcome of the case, it was premature by the court of first instance to rule and to say that, in this case that the genuine use of the mark has not started or has not been resumed, and PPO in this case did not erred in law, because it has analyzed all the evidence gathered. Considering other procedural allegations, the SAC held that administrative courts are not required in justification of its judgments to refer to each decision of Polish or European courts, that were cited by the author of a complaint. Such obligation can not be inferred from any provision of the Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts. However, the administrative court should refer to these judgments, of which the applicant derives important arguments for the assessment of the case. In this case, the Court of first instance did not meet this requirement.

The SAC noted that the doctrine of law and case-law indicate that the trade mark proprietor may use its sign in an altered form in connection to the form of a sign that was registered. This alteration however, cannot apply to elements that decide on the distinctiveness of the sign, or may not lead to changes in represented form as a distinctive whole. See the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 May 2006 case file II GSK 70/06. The SAC confirmed the high degree of freedom to dispose of a trademark by its proprietor, and cited the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 June 2008 case file II GSK 251/08. See “Trade mark law, case II GSK 251/08“. The SAC found that the VAC has not sufficiently analyzed of all substantive rules in the context of this case. However, both situation where the violation of substantive law may happen, i.e., violation of substantive law by its incorrect interpretations or inappropriate use, refer only to cases where the facts of the case were established in no uncertain terms. Otherwise, the alleged breach of substantive law is at least premature. This situation took place in this case, because the author of the complainant cassation alleged in the first place the violation of the proceedings by the VAC. The violation of proceedings was based on the refusal by the court of first instance to repeal the decision issued by the Polish Patent Office, in a situation when that PPO did not adequately explain the facts of the case and did not examine in a comprehensive manner the whole of the evidence.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 586/11

January 2nd, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Patent Office refused to grant the right of protection for the word-figurative trade mark @ @lfanet Z-331247 applied for by @ALFANET Marcin Małolepszy from Borowo Kolonia for for goods and services in Classes 09, 37, 38, 42 and 45.

Z-331247

The PPO decided that the applied trade mark is similar to the word trade mark ALFANET R-145012 registered with the earlier priority for the Polish company ALPHANET sp. z o.o. for services in class 38. The PPO did not agree with the applicant that ALFANET sign has weak distinctive character. Although the ending “net” is not distinctive for services related to the IT industry, but combined with the word “alpha”, it creates a neologism, which can be deemed as a fanciful sign.

Mr Małolepszy filed a complaint against the decision of the PPO, arguing that grant of a right of protection for a trade mark in respect of specific goods should not constitute an autonomous ground for refusal to grant a right of protection for a trade mark in respect of the goods identical or similar to those of another undertaking for a sole reason that the trade mark contains an identical or similar sign which refers to personal interests, in particular the owner’s name.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 24 June 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 586/11 dismissed the complaint and held that the argument that the applicant relied on is an exception to the rule of inadmissibility of the coexistence of similar signs, and as such can not be broadly interpreted, and it should be applied with caution, taking into account not only the ratio legis, but also the principles provided in the Polish Industrial Property Law, that relate to trade marks and their basic functions. Although the provisions of Article 135 of the IPL, in contrast to previous regulations, do not include the condition that the applied trade mark should not be misleading, but, in the opinion of the Court, the interpretation that would lead to the registration of two identical or similar trade marks for identical goods and/or services, could not be accepted.