Archive for: EU law

Tax law, case I FSK 1444/09

May 21st, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish entrepreneur asked the Director of the Tax Chamber in Kraków, whether the inclusion in the billing of VAT of the amount of tax charged on the purchase of goods and services on the basis of invoices and correction invoices received by e-mail or fax, not in the form of electronic invoices with digital signature, is correct. The Director ruled that such interpretation is incorrect. The Company did not agree with this decision and filed a complaint to the administrative court. The Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Kraków in a judgment of 17 March 2009, case file I SA/Kr 97/09 dismissed the case. The Company filed a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment of 20 May 2010, case file I FSK 1444/09, ruled that invoices that were sent via fax or e-mail are equivalent to these sent via traditional mail. What’s more important, such invoices do not need any electronic signature.

Tax law, case III SA/Wa 396/10

April 18th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw in a judgment of 8 April 2010, case file III SA/Wa 396/10, ruled that there is no legislative impediment to the existence of a mixed system for the storage of invoices, which consists of sending an invoice in paper and storage of its electronic copies with the option to print at the request of a legitimate authority. Such an interpretation was corroborated by teleological considerations, environmental and economic. According to the VAC the different findings would lead to a breach of the principle of proportionality, as set out in article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union.

3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.

The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.

Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 83 of 30 March 2010. PDF files.

Who is the controller in social networking sites?

February 14th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The question of who is the “controller” and the differences between a “controller” and “processor” as defined in the article 2(d) and (e) of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, in the context of social networking sites (SNS), are at least controversial not only in Polish case law. See for instance T. Zeggane, W. Maxwell, US and EU Authorities Review Privacy Threats On Social Networking Sites, Ent. L.R. 2008, 19(4), 69-74.

The second area requiring clarification is the concept of “data controller” in an SNS environment. Under European privacy law, the controller is the entity which determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. In an SNS context, there are two broad categories of data: the information that the user provides to the SNS platform to register (such as the user’s real name and email address), and the data that the user uploads onto his or her profile. The former is personal data which the SNS platform controls. The latter is “user generated content”, which the user controls and can choose to share (or not) with others. Some SNS platforms provide the user with tools to control the extent to which information such as photos, personal tastes and the like are used to develop targeted advertising. Where such tools exist, the argument can be made that the user (and not the SNS platform itself) is the “controller” of the content the user uploads onto the profile. The concept of data controller is the cornerstone of European privacy law. The concept of controller as it is traditionally interpreted does not fit easily into the SNS environment, where the user is the focal point

As you can read from the above, the authors suggest that the situation requires a clarification of the concept of “controller” in terms of SNS. A similar view was also presented in the report of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), “Security Issues and Recommendations for Online Social Networks“, PDF file, p. 25.

See also “Polish regulations on personal data protection” and “Polish case law on personal data protection“.

Personal data protection, case I OSK 667/09

February 13th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 15 January 2008, Tomasz W. filed with the General Inspector for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) a complaint concerning an unauthorized processing of personal data carried out by the Polish company Nasza Klasa Sp. z o.o. from Wroclaw, the owner of nasza-klasa.pl website. He informed the GIODO, that this very popular Polish website on classmates, hosts a photo featuring his image together with a list of names of other photographed people attached to it. Tomasz W. has repeatedly appealed to the website administrators with the request to remove his name from the list. However, he received no response from Nasza Klasa company.

As a result of the investigation, the GIODO found that on 31 December 2007, a registered user of nasza-klasa.pl posted classmates’ photo featuring students of a primary school. On the same day, another registered user, placed the names of people who were portrayed at the photograph – including the name and surname of Tomasz W. On 2, 9 and 14 January 2008, Tomasz W. requested Nasza Klasa Sp. z o.o. the removal of his personal data.

In a decision of 27 May 2008, case file DOLiS/DEC-314/08/13239, the GIODO, relying on the provisions of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 29 October 1997, No. 133, item 883, unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with later amendments, ruled that information on the applicant’s full name, school and class to which he attended, together with his image, are personal data and the data collector is Nasza Klasa Sp. z o.o.

However, the GIODO also ruled that it should be borne in mind that according to the provision of the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204, as amended, Nasza Klasa sp. z o.o. provides electronic services for registered users of the portal website, consisting of the storage of data of these users in the computer system. This activity is the condition to legalize the processing of personal data in accordance with article 23(1) pt. 5 of the PPD. In addition, the GIODO found that in this case the applicant’s rights have not been violated, because the access to its data was limited to a group of people registered on nasza-klasa.pl website.

Tomasz W. asked the GIODO for the retrial. He pointed out that the reasons for the decision have many contradictions, inconsistencies and is ambiguous. He accused the GIODO of laconic and cursory treatment of his case. He again emphasized that his personal data have been published on the nasza-klasa.pl website without his knowledge or consent, in violation of his civil rights and liberties.

After the rehearing of the case, the GIODO annulled the contested decision, and discontinued the proceedings. GIODO claimed that the re-examination of the case leads to the conclusion that the disputed information about Tomasy W. did not fall within the definition of personal data. The name and surname have been given under his old image from many years ago. Hence, the combination of photos from the past, with a name and surname of a person and a primary school, which such person attended did not allow for the identification of a person without excessive costs and time. The findings that the disputed information is not personal data within the meaning of the PPD caused the proceedings in the matter to be groundless and on the basis of article 105 § 1 of the APC, it had to be discontinued.

Tomasz W. lodged a complaint with the Viovodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw. The complainant asked for annulment of the decision of first and second instance. Tomasz W. claimed the violation of the substantive law, i.e. article 6(1) of the PPD, through its improper interpretation, of article 32(1) pt 7 and 8 of that Act, by recognizing that Tomasz W. is not entitled to request cessation of the processing of his data and the right to object, and a breach of article 7 of the APC by not explaining all the relvant facts. Tomasz W. disagreed with the statement of the GIODO that questioned information about his person is not personal data within the meaning of the PPD. He stated that any information about an identified or identifiable individual is personal data. Furthermore, he argued that the claim of the GIODO that the data are available only for specific people – registered users of the portal is not acceptable, because nasza-klasa.pl has no mechanisms for verification of users identity, which makes the questioned data easily accessible for everyone. Moreover, Tomasz W. also argued that a registered user who does not know him would have some difficulty in identifying his person but such obstacles would not happen to a person who knows about Tomasy W., and is looking for additional information.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in a judgment of 3 March 2009 case file II SA/Wa 1495/08 ruled that the GIODO erred in its decisions, because information about the name and surname of Tomasz W., combined with information about the name and address of the primary school and the determination of the class to which he attended in 1978/79, even if it was thirty years ago, are personal data. According to the Court provisions of article 1 of the PPD introduced the principle of autonomy of human information, meaning the protection of information about human being. This provision is a kind of emanation of the general right guaranteed by the Polish Constitution in article 47, according to which “Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life”. This means that the protection of personal data is related to the protection of privacy rights. This follows from the wording of article 6 of the PPD, indicating that the personal data concern identified or identifiable natural or legal person and that the identifiable is a person is one whose identity can be determined. From wording of that provisions the VAC concluded that personal data are data that identify a person’s identity.

The VAC also relied on the content of recital 12 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, which emphasized the protection of all data relating to a person, and therefore also information about someones past.

(12) Whereas the protection principles must apply to all processing of personal data by any person whose activities are governed by Community law; whereas there should be excluded the processing of data carried out by a natural person in the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of records of addresses

However, in recital 26 of the abovementioned Directive states that data protection rules must apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable person. In order to determine whether a person is identifiable, all the means which can be used by the controller or any other person to identify a person, should be taken into the account. The rules of data protection do not apply to data rendered anonymously in such a way that a subject of the data can not be identified. The identification of a given person concerns also past information about a specific human being, by which information one can learn about such person’s identity. Accordingly, the VAC held that European law means the protection of personal data as the protection of all the facts concerning the past of a particular person, which corresponds with the content of article 6(2) of the PDP. So this means that such data would also be protected.

Referring to the foregoing facts of Tomasz W. case, the VAC ruled that that nasza-klasa.pl website published his image and name. In the opinion of the court these are the personal data which are protected by the PPD, because on their basis one is able to identify given person.

Nasza Klasa sp. z o.o. filed a cassation complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) challenging in entirety the judgment of the VAC. The Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment of 18 November 2009, case file I OSK 667/09, rejected the complaint. The SAC held that the primary issue arising in this case was whether a classmates’ picture that was taken thirty years ago, at which Tomasz W. is potrayed, in the circumstances of the case, can be analyzed to determine his identity without necessarily involving excessive resources or time, and therefore, whether the data disclosed in the photo in question, constitutes personal data within the meaning of article 6 of the PPD, and whether it should be protected.

The concept of “personal data” on the Polish law includes any information concerning an individual if it is possible to define its identity and its identification. Personal data is a set of messages about a particular person such integrated that it allows for its individualization. It includes at least information necessary for identification (name, surname, place of residence), but this is not restricted, because it also include further information, strengthening the degree of identification. Such information will also include pictures of the individual, even if they were taken in the past, allowing to identify a person. In a situation where such a photograph is presented with a name and surname of the person portrayed, in a place accessible to an unlimited number of entities, it must be considered that it constitutes personal data subject to protection under the PPD. Mainly, the objective evaluation criteria decides for the qualification of given information as personal data, but it also should comprise of all information, including extralinguistic (context), to which third party may have or has an access. A different approach to the presented issues would maginalize the importance of the laws and it would not relate to its designated function.

Thus it should be considered that the image of Tomasz W. portrayed at the photograph that was taken 30 years ago, affixed with the class, his name and surname, and then published at nasz-klasa.pl website constitutes personal data within the meaning of article 6(2) of the PPD, and the cassation complaint was not justified. The SAC also noted that the consent for the processing of personal data cannot be in any way implied.

The SAC also stressed the fact the Internet as a source of information is increasing on a unknown scale and importance. It provides an access to specific information to a vast number of persons and allows for any of its processing within the meaning of the PPD. At the same time there are not yet developed appropriate mechanisms for the protection of individual rights when those rights have been violated as a result of the disclosure of information on the Internet. Then, it is a great role of law enforcement bodies, including the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection in creating practice to comply with applicable laws also on the Internet. It is an unacceptablr situation in which the entity seeks to remove its image from a particular website, and the administration fails to take action to ensure the protection of civil rights. The image is one of the very personal property rights and lack of consent to its publication, if it is not a public person, is a sufficient reason to believe that regulations of the PPD apply, if the conditions set in the article 6(2) of the PPD have been met. There is a legal sequel to this story. See “Personal data protection, case II SA/Wa 1212/10“.

See also “Polish regulations on personal data protection” and “Polish case law on personal data protection“.

Polish regulations on pharmaceutical trade marks

February 1st, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

I. The law
The main sources of binding laws in the Republic of Poland are the Constitution of 2 April 1997, acts passed by the Parliament, ratified international treaties and regulations issued, for example, by the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers – Polish government. Regulations are issued for the purpose of implementation of acts.

I.A. Substantive law

  • The Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with later amendments, defines the requirements for obtaining trademark protection in the Republic of Poland. There are related regulations that are issued for the purpose of implementation of the IPL.
  • The Polish Act of 16 April 1993 on Combating Unfair Competition – CUC – (in Polish: ustawa o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 47, item 211, with later amendments.
  • The Polish Act on Pharmaceutical Law – PHL – (in Polish: ustawa prawo famraceutyczne) of 6 September 2001, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2008, No 45, item 271, with later amendments, defines pharmaceutical/medicinal product. Of course, there are several related regulations to the PHL and the case-law of Polish courts. The PHL is almost entirely based on EU principles.

I.B. Procedural law

  • Administrative Proceedings Code – APC – (in Polish: Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego) of 14 June 1960, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 30, item 168, consolidated text of 9 October 2000, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 98, item 1071 with subsequent amendments.
  • Act on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish:Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, with later amendments.
  • Civil Proceedings Code – CPC (in Polish: Kodeks Postępowania Cywilnego) of 17 November 1964, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 43, item 296, with later amendments.
  • Act on Patent Attorneys – APAT – (in Polish: ustawa o rzecznikach patentowych) of 11 April 2001, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 49, item 509, with subsequent amendments.

I.C. Case law
See “Polish case law on advertising of pharmaceuticals“.

I.D. EU law
Moreover, all EU regulations and the judgements of the Court of Justice (COJ) of European Union relating to pharmaceutical issues are directly applicable in the Republic of Poland.

II. National bodies and procedures concerning pharmaceutical trade marks
The right of protection for a sign being capable to be registered as a trade mark is granted by the Patent Office of the Republic of Poland (PPO), while the Polish Ministry of Health controls the registration process and approval procedure for medicinal products. Registration of signs for medicinal products is governed by the procedure and requirements set by the Office for Registration of Medicinal Products, Medical Devices and Biocidal Products (ORMP), a government agency competent for the evaluation of the quality, efficacy and safety of medicinal and biocidal products, as well as medical devices.

The Main Pharmaceutical Inspector (MPI) is the central organ of public administration, executing her/his duties with the assistance of the Main Pharmaceutical Inspectorate and the MPI is authorized to ensure compliance with pharmaceutical regulations in the context of advertising. Main Pharmaceutical Inspector is the appeal institution in matters connected with executing tasks and competences of Pharmaceutical Inspection (the institution of second instance with regard to decisions of the provincial pharmaceutical inspector). Appeals against MPI’s decisions are filed before the Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw. Further appeal should be brought in the form of a cassation complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC).

An entity seeking to produce or import medicinal products must file an application for approval with the Inspectorate. The application must specify the medicinal name of the product and any other commonly used names (INN).

See also “Administrative, civil and criminal proceedings in trade mark cases in Poland“.

III. Names of medicinal products and trademarks
A trade mark under the Polish law can be any sign capable of being represented graphically, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods of one undertaking from those of other undertaking. The following, in particular, may be considered as trademarks: words, designs, ornaments, combinations of colours, the three-dimensional shape of goods or of their packaging, as well as melodies or other acoustic signals. Rights of protection will not be granted for signs which are a subject of absolute or relative grounds for refusal.

A medicinal product is defined as a substance or mixture of substances presented as having properties for treating or preventing disease in humans or animals, or given to make the diagnosis or to restoring, improving or modifying physiological functions through the pharmacological, immunological or metabolic effect. The the provisions of the PHL also apply to products that meet the criteria for both medicinal product and another type of product, in particular dietary supplement or cosmetic (as defined by separate regulations).

Pharmaceutical trade marks not only need to comply with the provisions of the IPL, but also need to meet the requirements regarding names of pharmaceutical products contained in the PHL. Pursuant to these regulations, a pharmaceutical name can be:

  • an invented name, as long as it does not cause confusion with a common name (i.e., an international non-proprietary name (INN) recommended by the World Health Organization or, if such name has not been attributed to a given product, a common chemical name) or
  • a common, or scientific name accompanied by a trademark, a company name or the name of the marketing authorization holder.

Obtaining an authorization for the release of a medicinal product under a given name does not exempt an entity from liability if the name violates third-party trademark rights. Applicants must therefore also keep in mind the provisions of the IPL and the CUC.

See also:
- “Trade mark law, case II GSK 210/06“.
- “Pharmaceutical trade marks, case VI SA/Wa 844/09“.
- “Pharmaceutical trade marks, case VI SA/Wa 1176/09“.

An announcement of the president of the ORMP issued on March 12 2008 gives further guidance on the process of naming medicinal products and the substitution of names that have already been granted. It sets out the following instructions:
- The new name of a medicinal product should differ from an earlier registered product name in at least three letters and the new name cannot include a sequence of more than two of the same letters. An applicant is required to provide a justified written statement when seeking a waiver from these rules.
- The new name cannot result in the likelihood of confusion (in print, spelling and pronunciation) with an earlier registered name.
- Signs such as ® and ™ cannot form part of the new name.
- The name of a medicinal product cannot contain personal names and surnames, including the name of the inventor. Further, it must not contain:
1. Names of abstract persons that are used together with scientific titles, aliases or pseudonyms.
2. Expressions which bring to mind religious, geographical or historical associations.
3. Names of natural objects.
4. Obscene words or words suggesting obscene content.
- The name of the medicinal product must also be placed on the packaging in the Braille system.

The evidence of registration of a medicinal product name with the ORMP can act as evidence of use of the sign as at that date when attempting to protect the name as an industrial property right.

IV. Parallel imports and repackaging
Parallel importation into Poland of a pharmaceutical product from other EU member states or members of the European Economic Area (EEA) is acceptable provided that it meets all of the following conditions:

  • The parallel-imported medicinal product must have the same active ingredient(s) as the product authorized for marketing in the territory of the Republic of Poland (i.e., the same indications at least up to the third level of the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) or the ATC veterinary.
  • The parallel-imported product must have the same strength and administration route as the authorized product, as well as the same or similar form. Slight differences in form cannot lead to any therapeutic differences between the products.
  • Where the product authorized for marketing in Poland is a brand name pharmaceutical, the parallel import must also be the brand name product. Similarly, where the authorized product is a generic, the parallel-imported pharmaceutical must also be a generic.

A parallel importation licence is available on application to the Polish Health Minister. The licence is issued on the basis of an assessment report prepared by the president of the ORMP. The application must include a sample of the packaging and the product information leaflets. A licence is granted for a period of five years.

According to article 21a(9) of the PHL, a parallel importer is allowed place the pharmaceutical product on the market in the Republic of Poland under:

  • the name used in Poland,
  • the name used in the EU/EEA member state of origin, or
  • the common name (INN) or scientific name together with the trademark or name of the parallel importer.

A parallel importer intending to put a medical product on the Polish market must inform the holder of the marketing authorization in Poland as to the expected date of entry onto the market at least 30 days before such date.

In order to place a product on the market, the parallel importer must alter the packaging thereof to adhere to local standards. The packaging must comply with that approved in the import licence. Polish authorities generally require the repackaging of parallel-imported medical products into new boxes that contain informational leaflets for patients in Polish. The informational leaflet must also be consistent with the parallel import licence.

The first parallel-imported medical products were placed on the Polish market in November 2005. As of the end of March 2008, over 200 parallel import licences had been granted in Poland.

The process of repackaging frequently causes disputes between parallel importers and mark owners. However, there is no case law in Poland with regard to this issue at present.

V. Anti-counterfeiting and enforcement
The responsibility for combating the trade and distribution of counterfeit medicines in Poland falls on the bodies responsible for the prosecution of crime – the Police, the Custom Service (detection and seizure of imported counterfeit medicines) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. According to the official data published by the Ministry of Finance, 1,356 counterfeit packages of medicine were seized at the Polish borders in 2007, while 1,700 packages were seized within the first three months of 2008. According to the Main Pharmaceutical Inspectorate, 99% of medicines offered for sale from illegal sources are counterfeit and are hazardous to life or health.

VI. Advertising of pharmaceutical products
The PHL sets out the requirements for advertising pharmaceutical products in Poland. The advertising of medicinal product has also to be made in accordance with the current Regulation of the Minister of Health on the advertising of medicinal products of 21 November 2008, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 210 item 1327. Advertising a medicinal product shall mean any activity consisting in informing about and encouraging to use the medicinal product, with the purpose of increasing the number of prescriptions, delivery, sale or consumption of the medicinal product.

Among others, the following activities are seen as advertising of pharmaceutical products:

  • Advertising of pharmaceutical products addressed to the public,
  • Advertising of pharmaceutical products addressed to individuals authorized to issue prescriptions or involved in the distribution of pharmaceutical products,
  • The visiting by sales or medical representatives of individuals authorized to issue prescriptions or involved in the distribution of pharmaceutical products,
  • The provision of pharmaceutical product samples,
  • Sponsoring promotional meetings for individuals authorized to issue prescriptions or involved in the distribution of pharmaceutical products
    and
  • Sponsoring scientific conferences, meetings and congresses for individuals authorized to issue prescriptions or involved in the trade of pharmaceutical products.

It should note that the Polish legislature did not apply the correct legislative techniques and thus the PHL includes different concepts with different contents of which makes a mess of the legal terminology. It is also the problem of the European legislator because the same problem also applies to article 86 of the Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use.

Pharmaceutical products may be advertised exclusively by the parties responsible for the products or by persons who have been commissioned by such parties.

An advertisement for a pharmaceutical product cannot be misleading. It should present the product objectively and inform about its rational use. Further, the following types of advertising are prohibited:

  • Advertising offering or promising any advantages in a direct or indirect manner in return for purchasing the product, or providing any evidence of having purchased the product.
  • Advertising addressed to children or containing any element which might be considered as being addressed to children.
  • Advertising of pharmaceutical products that have not been admitted for trade in the territory of Poland or contain information which is inconsistent with the officially approved pharmaceutical product description.

Special restrictions are also imposed on advertising directed to specialists and the public.

VII. Generic substitution
Generic substitution is allowed under Polish law. Generic drug names comprise the name of the company producing the medicine together with its INN or invented name.

VIII. Online issues – e-pharmacies, domain names
The market turnover of medicinal products takes place only under the terms and conditions laid down by the PHL’s regulations. Conducting the sale of medicines is reserved for “public pharmacies”. In addition, the right of the retail resale of certain drugs without a prescription and some prescription drugs is granted to “pharmacy points”. The sale of selected drugs without a prescription can be also conducted by the so-called “out-pharmacy market post”: herbal-medical shops, specialized medical supplies stores, pet shops, herbal/chemists shops/drugstores, and public shops – provided that the staff have appropriate qualifications. The law precisely regulates all features that the public pharmacy should have and the pharmacy point. It already implies the existence of the physical premises open to the public and intended to pursue the sale of drugs. The PHL authorized public pharmacies and pharmacy points to conduct the mail-order sale for public only for medicines purchased without a prescription (article 68 (3) of the PHL). Additionally, the term “pharmacy” is a reserved name that is legally protected under the PHL and criminal law, as well as unfair competition regulations. Any entity wishing to use the term “pharmacy” must meet strict regulatory requirements. Online operators that do not meet the conditions set by the regulations on pharmacies can neither use the term “pharmacy” nor trade in pharmaceutical products.

Where a domain name including a trade mark has been registered by an unauthorized third party, the mark owner can use mediation, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings or civil court action to obtain the cancellation or transfer of such domain. However, following a recent judgement of the Polish Competition and Consumer Protection Court of 26 December 2006, case act signature XVII AmC 170/05, ADR is unlikely to succeed if the disputed domain name is registered in the name of a natural person.

E-signatures in Poland

January 29th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

Current Polish legislation on e-signature include the Act of 18 September 2001 on Electronic Signature – ESA – (in Polish: ustawa o podpisie elektronicznym) Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 15 November 2001, No 130, item 1450, with subsequent amendments. The provisions of Article 3 of the ESA introduced two types of e-signature: “electronic signature”, which means data in electronic form which, together with other data, either attached thereto or logically associated therewith, are capable of identifying the signatory and the so-called “secure electronic signature”, which means electronic signature which is uniquely assigned to the signatory, is made using secure signature-creation device and signature-creation data that the signatory can maintain under his sole control, is related to the data to which it has been attached in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is recognizable.

According to article 5 of the ESA, the data in electronic form bearing a secure electronic signature verified by a valid qualified certificate shall be legally recognized as equivalent to documents bearing handwritten signatures. A secure electronic signature verified by a valid qualified certificate shall ensure the integrity of the data bearing the signature and unambiguous indication of the qualified certificate by assuring that any subsequent changes of the data and any subsequent changes of the indication of the certificate used to verify the signature are recognizable.

Recently, the Polish Ministry of Economy proposed amendments to the ESA. The draft provides new types of e-signatures that are consistent with the Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signature.

The draft provides 4 types of e-signature: normal, advanced, personal and certified. The normal one will be the same features as present “electronic signature” as defined in article 3 of the ASA and will primarily serve as a declaration of identity.

The advanced e-signature will have to meet the additional requirements for certification of the person using it. It will certify the data integrity and allow you to establish the identity of the signatory to both individuals and legal persons, such as when submitting electronic invoices.

The data in electronic form signed by a qualified (secure) electronic signature will have specific legal effects – the same as a handwritten signature for the data recorded on paper. Such data will be admissible as evidence in legal proceedings. The signature will be used to sign statements of knowledge and will.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 1111/08

January 13th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 24 July 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 237/08, dismissed Tiffany & Broadway Inc. Div. of Texpol Corporation’s appeals against the Polish Patent Office (PPO) decision of 19 March 2007, case files Sp. 68/04 and Sp. 69/04, regarding the invalidation of the right of protection for word-figurative trade marks: TIFFANY R-128063 and “Tiffany & Broadway Inc.” R-128064 which were registered in class 25 for shoes. The New York’s company argued inter alia that use of TIFFANY trade mark for goods such as footwear is a parasitic activity that uses another’s trade mark reputation and is bringing undue financial benefit to the holder of national registrations. The Company also stressed the fact that its trade mark is subject to protection under article 8 of the Paris Convention.

The VAC ruled that the application for the protection of the TIFFANY mark for goods in class 25 was contrary to the principles of social coexistence because it caused the risk of weakening the reputation of the trade mark. Given the fact that the shoes are cheap and readily available, there is a risk of dilution of the reputation of TIFFANY trade mark and it may lead to lose its attractiveness among the exclusive clientele of goods bearing this mark.

The SAC in a judgment of 8 July 2009, case file II GSK 1111/08 ruled that the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 31 January 1985, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with later amendments, do not explicitly provide for any special protection for unregistered reputed trade marks. However, the doctrine and the Polish case law have already accepted the concept, that such protection could be provided under article 8(1) of the TMA.

A trademark shall not be registrable if:
1) it is contrary to law or to the principles of social coexistence;

In particular looking at the circumstance of “a trade mark conflicting with the principles of social coexistence”, from the subjective perspective – it was commented that, the “contradiction/variance with the principles of social coexistence” may concerning the conduct/behavior of the applicant. On the basis of such conclusions, the registration of a sign for the goods of another kind, if the registration was intended to use the reputation of another’s trade mark or it was a threat of such reputation, was excluded. A trade mark application that was filed contrary to the principles of social coexistence, was an application made in bad faith. The absolute grounds/obstacles that are provided against the registration of the mark as defined in article 8(1) of the TMA do not directly refer to the relationship between the sign that was applied for and any other competing trade mark, however, in accordance with the accepted interpretation of that provision, in case of the infringement of the rules of social coexistence, the obstacle could be the inappropriate behavior on the applicant (its actions done in bad faith). The assessment of applicant’s actions, who was motivated by the desire to use another’s trade mark reputation, should therefore be also varied according to circumstances of its motivation and, not only related to the trade mark itself.

The application for the right of protection for a trade mark that was made with the intent to use another trade mark’s reputation should be judged as an application that was made with the breach of the rules of social coexistence (application made in bad faith), regardless of whether it concerns a reputed registered trade mark or unregistered reputed trade mark.

The Polish case law, for instance the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 9 May 2008, case file II GSK 506/07, that was previously reported in the post entitled “Trade mark law, case II GSK 506/07“, already established the rule that in a case of famous trade mark and its reputation, besides its recognition, it must be also characterized by the following characteristics:

  • market share/participation (both quantity and value of sold goods),
  • range and long-lasting of an advertisment of the product bearing a trade mark,
  • territorial and temporal range of use,
  • licences granted for trade mark use, quality of goods bearing a trade mark,
  • value of a given sign in assessment of an independent financial institution,
  • size and extent of expenditures spent on promotion of a mark,
  • the relationship on prices of substitute goods,
  • if (and to what extent) the mark is used by third party.

The SAC also noted that the Community case law provides several fundamental conditions for the recognition of a trade mark as a reputed one. These are:

  • knowledge of the trade mark by a significant group of customers,
  • the contribution of the trade mark in the market,
  • intensity and geographic scope of the use,
  • intensity matching of goods with the trade mark,
  • the size of expenditures on advertising and promotion of the trade mark.

The SAC cited inter alia the judgment of the Court of Justice of the UE of 14 September 1999 in case C-375/97, General Motors and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 13 December 2004 in case T-8/03, El Corte Ingles and the CFI’s judgment of 25 May 2005 in case T-67/04, Spa Finders.

It is also clear that the reputation of a trade mark must be assessed and established in the country in which the protection is sought. If one would like to qualify a given trade mark as a reputed one in the Republic of Poland, then the argument of the international reputation of a trade mark is not sufficient. The basic circumstance for the recognition of the reputation of a sign in a specific country is to show by a person who is invoking this argument, the market share in terms of both quantity and value of goods sold.

The SAC held that provisions of the First Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 do not preclude the possibility of granting the protection to unregistered reputed trade marks under the national law. Just to keep it in order, it is worth adding, that the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with later amendments, provides in article 132(2)(iii)

2) A right of protection for a trademark shall not be granted, if the trademark:
(iii) is identical or similar to a renown trademark registered or applied for registration with an earlier priority (provided that the latter is subsequently registered) on behalf of another party for any kind of goods, if it without due cause would bring unfair advantage to the applicant or be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trademark. The above provision shall apply to well-known trademarks accordingly.

for the protection of registered trademarks to the extent of the wording of article 4(4)(a) of the Directive. The trade mark application that was made in bad faith shall be rejected based on the absolute ground for refusal of protection based on provisions of article 131(2)(i) of the IPL.

2. A right of protection shall not be granted for a sign, if:
(i) it has been applied for protection with the Patent Office in bad faith,

The SAC ruled that the provisions of article 4(4)(a) of the Directive cannot be interpreted as the maximum limitation for the protection of famous marks in the national law and it would be difficult to follow the arguments that the First Directive 89/104 is an example of the so-called “complete harmonization” citing the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 9 January 2003 in case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie S. A.

According to the SAC, the court of first instance (VAC) wrongly assumed the bad faith of the applicant and it did not consider the fact that the applicant has conducted its business in Poland since 1990 with the use of the mark, and after about five years of its activity, the company applied for the registration of the mark. These circumstances certainly were not indifferent to assess the intentions and purposes of the applicant so the VAC should address them in the grounds of the appeal.

When deciding on the interpretation of article 8(1) of the TMA, which allows for the protection of not registered reputed trade marks in Poland, it should be also noted, that such protection have a special character because it applies to unregistered marks, and it is an exception to the principle of protecting industrial property rights by the registration process. This requires preserving much care, so that without proper justification, would not depreciate the importance of registering trade mark and it would not reduced the registration to a purely formal procedure that has no importance.

Therefore, the SAC annulled both questioned judgments of the Voivodeship Administrative Court and returned to the VAC for reconsideration in accordance with the conclusions reached and ordered the Polish Patent Office to pay Tiffany & Broadway Inc. Div. of Texpol Corporation 1200 PLN as reimbursement of costs of the cassation compliant.

See also “Trade mark law, case II GSK 1110/08” and “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 214/08

Polish case law on industrial designs

January 12th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

Below, you will find a list of judgments on industrial designs that were decided upon in administrative proceedings. Finding cases that are decided upon in civil proceedings is more problematic becasue they are rarely available to general public. You can find a more detailed discussion on each judgment under the link provided with the case file. All judgments are given in chronological order.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 4 October 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 736/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 3 October 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1339/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 20 September 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 852/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 13 September 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 922/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 13 September 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 921/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 23 June 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 505/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 16 June 2010, case file VI SA/Wa 134/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 27 May 2010, case file VI SA/Wa 506/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 19 May 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 2026/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 12 May 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 599/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 12 May 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 598/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 11 May 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 504/10.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 26 February 2010, case file VI SA/Wa 34/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 23 February 2010, case file VI SA/Wa 1038/09.

- The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 20 January 2010, case file II GSK 323/09.

- The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 16 December 2009, case file II GSK 238/09. This judgment was issued on the basis of the cassation complaint brought from the judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, of 11 December 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 1827/08.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 15 December 2009, case file VIII SA/Wa 332/09. This judgment is not yet final. A cassation complaint may be filed to the Supreme Administrative Court.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 14 December 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 1764/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 14 December 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 1727/09.

- The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 9 December 2009, case file II GSK 772/09.

- The Judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 4 December 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 1706/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 19 November 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 703/09. This judgment is not yet final. A cassation complaint may be filed to the Supreme Administrative Court.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 13 November 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 1376/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 9 October 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 189/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 29 September 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 211/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 19 August 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 664/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 10 June 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 498/09

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 21 July 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 518/09.

- The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 June 2009, case file II GSK 1034/08.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 8 June 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 536/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 2 June 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 502/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 4 April 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 109/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 4 February 2009, case file VIII SA/Wa 332/08.

- The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 27 January 2009, case file II GSK 612/08.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 11 December 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 1827/08. The cassation compliant bought before the Supreme Administrative Court was rejected in a decision of 16 December 2009, case file II GSK 238/09.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 21 November 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 710/08.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 4 November 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 1053/08.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 11 August 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 1088/08.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 10 June 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 543/08.

- The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 4 November 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 1054/08.

- The judgment of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber of 23 October 2007, case file II CKS 302/07.

- The judgement of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 11 October 2007, case file VI SA/Wa 1215/07.

- – The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 20 March 2007, case file II GSK 277/06, published in the electronic database LEX, under the no 321283.

- The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 18 January 2007 case file II GSK 206/06

See also “Polish regulations on industrial designs“.

Industrial design case, II CSK 302/07

January 8th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

I have to write about another important judgment I forgot to report two years ago. This time it is the judgment of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber of 23 October 2007, case file II CSK 302/07, published in the Jurisprudence of the Polish Courts (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich) of 2009, No 6, p. 451, together with the gloss by Maria Poźniak-Niedzielska at p. 455.

Some of my P.T. readres may be confused with regard to different courts deciding the same subject matter – in this case – designs and I need to explain that the administrative proceedings in designs’ cases, in general, concerns all decisions made or orders issued by the Patent Office of the Republic of Poland (the PPO takes decisions on granting, refusal to grant of a right in registration for an industrial design etc.) which are liable to complaint lodged to the Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw. Judgments made by the VAC may be a subject of a cassation complaint filed before the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC). However, cases with regard to infringement of a right in registration granted for an industrial design are decided in civil law proceedings. That was the reason the aforementioned case was decided at the last stage by the Supreme Court. See my post entitled “Administrative, civil and criminal proceedings in trade mark cases in Poland“.

The Supreme Court had to give an interpretion of provisions of article 104 and 105 of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with later amendments.

Article 104
1. An industrial design shall be considered to have individual character, if the overall impression it produces on the informed user differs from the overall impression produced on such a user by any design which has been made available before the date according to which priority is determined.

2. In assessing individual character, the degree of freedom of the designer in developing the design shall be taken into consideration.

Article 105
1. For an industrial design a right in registration may be granted.

2. The right in registration shall confer the exclusive right to exploit the industrial design for profit or for professional purposes throughout the territory of the Republic of Poland.

3. The holder shall enjoy the right to prevent any third party from making, offering, putting on the market, importing, exporting or using a product in which the design is incorporated or to which it is applied, or stocking such a product for those purposes.

4. The right conferred by the registration of an industrial design shall include any design which does not produce on the informed user a different overall impression. Article 104(2) shall apply accordingly.

5. The right conferred by the registration of an industrial design shall be limited to the kind of products, in respect of which the protection has been applied for.

6. Subject to Article 111, the term of a right in registration shall be 25 years counted from the date of filing of an industrial design application with the Patent Office, the said term being divided into 5-year periods.

Wzór Przemysłowy 6751

The SC held that the examination whether there was any infringement of the registered industrial design requires a comprehensive comparison of designs from the perspective of the person using (on a permanent basis) these items, which belong to specific group of goods, a person being oriented/informed in designs that originate from the creative freedom and to examine/assess whether the overall impression produced by the questioned design on such a person differs or not from the general impression caused by the registered design.

Legal commentators stressed the fact that the concept of “informed user” (oriented) was implemented in the IPL following the adjustment of Polish law to protection standards that exist within the EU law. The person being an informed user is a newcomer in the pantheon of fictional characters of industrial property rights, functioning as a certain pattern. In article 26(1) of the IPL already exists such character called “a person skilled in the art”.

1. An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.

The Polish commentators also noted and commented on foregin judgments such as Procter & Gamble Company v Reckitt Benckiser (UK) Ltd., [2007] EWCA Civ 936 and Woodhouse UK Plc v Architectural Lighting. Systems t/a Aquila Design and Urbis Lighting Ltd. [2005] ECPCC (Designs) 25, [2006] RPC 1 and OHIM Invalidity Division’s decisions such as Eredu S Coop v Arrmet SRL, ICD 24, 27 April 2004 and Honda Motor Company Ltd v Kwang Yang Motor Company Ltd, ICD 1006, 30 August 2006.

See also “Polish regulations on industrial designs” and “Polish case law on industrial designs“.

Trade mark law, case XXII GWzt 3/09

November 27th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The plaintiff in this case was Theatermogul ehf, owner of the CTM CAVEWOMAN no. 005051545 which was registered in Class 41 for services such as theatrical performances and orchestral services, production of radio and television broadcasts and programmes. The plaintiff also owned several Polish registrations, such as KOBIETA JASKINIOWIEC, JASKINIÓWKA, W OBRONIE KOBIETY–JASKINIOWCA, W OBRONIE JASKINIÓWKI, JASKINIOWIEC, and W OBRONIE JASKINIOWCA, which are mostly translations and variations of English signs. The defendant produced a show by Sigitas Parulskisa in an adaptation by Cezary Harasimowicz entitled CAVEWOMAN-Kobieta jaskiniowa, which was widely advertised and repeatedly shown in Poland and abroad.

The plaintiff argued that it had never allowed the use of its trade marks, and called for cessation of the infringement. However, the defendant only partially complied with this request, changing the title of the show to ‘Kobieta pierwotna’ but leaving in its advertising, tickets, and website a note that this show was previously called CAVEWOMAN-Kobieta Jaskiniowa. The defendant was also still using the website www.kobietajaskiniowa.pl.

The Court for the Community Trade Marks and Community Designs in its judgment of 4 June 2009 case file XXII GWzt 3/09 ruled that the defendant’s use infringed the CTM CAVEWOMAN and prohibited the use of all trade marks owned by Theatermogul ehf in the title or subtitle of the show, advertising and promotional materials, websites, or on tickets. The Court also ordered the defendant to withdraw from circulation and destroy all promotional and advertising materials and tickets containing the CAVEWOMAN and/or KOBIETA JASKINIOWA signs in the title or subtitle of the show. A public announcement of the judgment was ordered, this to be at the expense of the defendant, in the daily editions of national newspapers.

Trade mark law, case I ACa 16/10

October 8th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The French company Marin’s International brought a case before the Court for the Community Trade Marks and Community Designs, located in Warsaw (in Polish: Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie Wydzial XXII Sąd Wspólnotowych Znaków Towarowych i Wzorów Przemysłowych). The issue concerned the use of CTMs Marin’s and Lama by the Polish company Display Flash Poland sp. z o.o., within its website in NOSCRIPT tag. The Court in its judgment of 25 September 2009 case file XXII GWzt 8/09, ruled that the use of someone else’s trademark in website’s metatags infringes trade mark rights of such person, and such behaviour may be also deemed as an unfair competition delict.

I know that I should mention the opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 22 September 2009 in joined cases C‑236/08, C‑237/08 and C‑238/08, Google France, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Google France v. Viaticum, Luteciel and Google France v. CNRRH, Pierre Alexis Thonet, Bruno Raboin, Tiger, a franchisee of Unicis.

(1) The selection by an economic operator, by means of an agreement on paid internet referencing, of a keyword which will trigger, in the event of a request using that word, the display of a link proposing connection to a site operated by that economic operator for the purposes of offering for sale goods or services, and which reproduces or imitates a trade mark registered by a third party and covering identical or similar goods, without the authorisation of the proprietor of that trade mark, does not constitute in itself an infringement of the exclusive right guaranteed to the latter under Article 5 of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks.

(2) Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that a trade mark proprietor may not prevent the provider of a paid referencing service from making available to advertisers keywords which reproduce or imitate registered trade marks or from arranging under the referencing agreement for advertising links to sites to be created and favourably displayed, on the basis of those keywords.

(3) In the event that the trade marks have a reputation, the trade mark proprietor may not oppose such use under Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94.

(4) The provider of the paid referencing service cannot be regarded as providing an information society service consisting in the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’).

This is way more interesting if one realizes that almost month ago Google has announced that it doesn’t use the “keywords” meta tag in web search ranking.

Display Flash Poland filed an appeal complaint. The Appellate Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 14 July 2010 case file I ACa 16/10 dismissed it. The Court held that using as a keyword a word identical or similar to registered trade marks on the Internet does constitute infringement of the right of protection provided that the said act was committed without the consent of the holder and, in addition to the foregoing, the average Internet user experiences difficulty in determining whether the goods or services designated or found on the basis of a keyword are in fact assigned to the trade mark proprietor or a company commercially affiliated to it.

Tax law, case I FSK 1169/08

August 31st, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) in its judgment of 3 October 2009 case file I FSK 1169/08 did not share the views that the the Directive 112 provides the absolute obligation to keep copies of invoices in the same form in which they were sent. In the opinion of the SAC, the only thing that can be inferred from the Directive is that the copy of the invoice can be stored in paper or electronic form. It is also wrong to confuse the term “issue” and “send” with regard to invoices. The Polish legislator did not exactly implement standards resulting from the Article 27(2) of the Directive. The omission of the phrase “in which they were sent or issued”, leads to ambiguity in language interpretation of the law. There is no legislative impediment to the existence of “mixed” system for sending and storage of invoices. In addition, the SAC decided that the obligation to keep invoices on paper, where other methods of storage also enable the objectives of Article 246 Directive 112 to be fullfiled, is the excessive responsibility and violates the principle of proportionality.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 774/08

July 20th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

In June 2005, Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A asked the Polish Patent Office to make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for “3in 1″ R-90234 trade mark owned by “MOKATE” sp. z o.o. from Zory. The request was based on article 28(1) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 1985, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 1985 No 5, pos. 15, with later amendments.

The right deriving from registration of a trade mark shall expire if the person entitled has not used the mark within a period of three consecutive years in the Republic of Poland.

The request was also based on article 169(1) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo wlasnosci przemyslowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2001 No 49, pos. 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Dziennik Ustaw No 119, pos. 1117, with later amendments.

1. The right of protection for a trade mark shall also lapse:
(i) on failure to put to genuine use of the registered trade mark for the goods covered by the registration for a period of five successive years after a decision on the grant of a right of protection has been taken, unless serious reasons of non-use thereof exist,
(…)
2. In the cases referred to in paragraph (1), the Patent Office shall make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest therein.

The request was based on non-use of “3 in 1″ trade mark. Mokate filed a motion asking the PPO to reject Nestle’s request. The motion was based on the lack of legitimate interest on Nestle’s side. The PPO agreed with Mokate’s argument. Nestle filed a complaint to the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw. The VAC in its judgment of 3 December 2007, act signture VI SA/Wa 1036/07 rejected Nestle’s complaint. The company filed a cassation complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court. The SAC in its judgment of 12 March 2009, act signature II GSK 774/08 held that conditions of legitimate interest are based on two levels — procedural — because it is justifying the initiation of administrative proceedings in a particular matter and “substantive”, as it results from the provisions of the law that apply to certain rights and obligations of a person (legal or natural). Although the substantive law is the source for the legitimate interest but the legal interest as a condition that justfies the initiation of the procedure for declaration on the lapse of the right of protection for the trademark is primarily a category of administrative procedure – one of the principles of this proceedings as to its proper initiation. The cassation complaint was rejected.

The SAC ruled also that it was uncontested that the First Council Directive left Member States free to establish procedural rules. The requirement of legitimate interest included in article 169(2) the IPL only entitles a party to initiate the administrative proceedings on the lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark, but does not guarantee such applicant that the PPO will issue a decision that is favourable to him, because the PPO shall issue a decision on the lapse of the trade mark rights if it finds the fulfilment of the substantial prerequisites to the lapse, and not the infringement of the legitimate interest. Since then the provision of article 169(2) are only applicable only to a right to file a request for a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark for the reasons referred to in section 1 of article 169 being the substantial prerequisites, the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate interest can not be understood as an additional substantial prerequisite for deciding on the lapse of trade mark rights. Such assessment is not changed by the fact that, as the court already stated, the legitimate interest is the normative category of the substantive law.

In the Polish administrative law the legitimate interests requirement creates the concept of a proceedings party. This issue has been dealt similarly in the law of industrial property, including a prerequisite to request the Polish Patent Office to take a decision declaring the right of protection for the trade mark.

The legitimate interest prerequisite has two grounds – procedural because it justifies the initiation of the administrative proceedings in a particular case and substantive, because it results from the provisions of substantive law that apply to certain rights and obligations of an entity. Although a source of the legitimate interests lays in the substantive law, the legal interest as a condition requesting the PPO to issue a decision declaring on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark lapsed is primarily a category of administrative procedure – one of the principles of this proceeding as to its proper initiation.

The issues on legal interest are both regulated in the procedural law (including the administrative proceedings that apply to trade mark cases) and these are also the normative category of the substantive law. The source of the legal interest is the substantive law. If the source is the substantive law then the Directive should apply. However the SAC consistently refuses to refer this matter to the Court of Justice.

See also “Trade mark law, case II GSK 309/07“.

Industrial design, case VI SA/Wa 498/09

June 18th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw in a judgment of 10 June 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 498/09, ruled that the document based on the industrial property rights is assigned to more serious legal consequences than a document issued on a different legal basis. It was the result of the erga omnes protection of intellectual property rights. The right in registration does not cover the appearance or characteristics of a design, which arise solely from a technical function, or those which are necessary to connect such a product. Nevertheless, in Court’s opinion that was based on the interpreation of the text of Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs, there is no reason to exclude the individual features (also these which are conditioned by technical functions they perform, so being excluded from protection) to assess the overall impression.

This case concerned the industrial design “Listwa osłonowa” (in English: lath curly), Rp-9605.

Wzór Przemysłowy 9605

See also my post entitled “Polish case law on industrial designs“.

Patent Attorneys, case C-564/07

June 13th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 11 June 2009, case C-564/07, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria.

1. Declares that, by obliging patent lawyers lawfully established in another Member State who wish temporarily to perform services in Austria to appoint an approved agent resident in Austria, the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 49 EC.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 503/08

May 6th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

In case of a request for invalidation of the right of protection to PLANTAGINIS R-105263 trade mark filed by Polish company Gemi from Karczew, the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 20 November 2008, case file II GSK 503/08 ruled that it is usually assumed that legitimate interest is the normative category of the substantive law and its source is the substantive law. On this basis the party of an administrative proceedings is entitled to request to specify his or her powers and duties or require an administrative court or body to perform an examination of a legal act or acts in order to protect him or her against violations that was made by this legal act or acts and to lead to a situation that it is consistent with the law.

The legitimate interest may also derive from legal norms not only belonging to the administrative law. The confirmation of legitimate interest is always due to the likely connection between the norm of the substantive law and the situation of legal entity to the effect that the act of application of this legal norm (eg, an administrative decision) may affect the legal position of this entity in the field of the substantive law. The SAC also agreed with the opinion of academics that there aren’t any universal definition of a legitimate interest in the field of industrial property law that would include complex situations to justify the submission of the request for invalidation of an exclusive right.

The SAC noted that the case law indicates article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997 as published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) No. 78, pos. 483.

A social market economy, based on the freedom of economic activity, private ownership, and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall be the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Poland.

The Court also pointed out to article Paragraph 6(1) of the Law on Freedom of Economic Activity (in Polish: ustawa o swobodzie dzialalnosci gospodarczej) corresponding to the content of article 5 of the Act of 19 November 1999 – Law of economic activity (in Polish: Prawo dzialalnosci gospodarczej), Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) No. 101, pos. 1178, as amended.

The assumption, conduct and termination of economic activity shall be free to all on an equal-rights basis, subject to conditions determined in provisions of law.
2. The public administration authority shall neither demand nor make its decision in the matter of the assumption, conduct, or termination of economic activity by an interested party conditional upon satisfaction by this party of additional conditions, including without limitation on the submission of documents or disclosure of information other than that set out in provisions of law.

These are the basis for deriving the legitimate interest for the party seeking for the standing in the proceedings for the lapse or invalidation of a right of protection for a trade mark.

When deriving the legitimate interest from the aforementioned legal regulations in case of the invalidation proceedings of a trade mark it is necessary to demonstrate why and how the right of protection for PLANTAGINIS R-105263 trade mark affect on the legal position of Gemi Company as an entrepreneur. Each entrepreneur has the right to a trademark if the right is not in conflict as to the form, and the period of validity of the previously acquired trade mark right of the same sign. It was necessary to demonstrate that the GEMI’s legitimate interest is relevant to its legal position, because it is current, real, direct and their own (these are the most common elements and features of the legitimate interest), such as verifiability of the legitimate interests and the possibility of obtaining specific benefits. In such cases it concerns the so-called “reflections right” which is creating the legal position of a party not directly, but by a decision of the Polish Patent Office which is “taking back” a right of protection for an earlier trade mark granted to another company.

The SAC dismissed the cassation complaint because it has found that GEMI company did not file its request for invalidation PLANTAGINIS R-105263 trade mark rights in order to obtain the right of protection for the disputed mark for its own. It also did not demonstrate the existence of any obstacles to conduct its business during the sale of goods marked with the disputed trade mark.

Personal data protection, case II SA/Wa 1495/08

March 30th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 3 March 2009, case file II SA/Wa 1495/08 decided on the protection of personal data and providing and operating online services such as websites about users’ classmates. The VAC ruled that in accordance with article 6(2) of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments, not only information on the current situation of an individual decide whether one is dealing with personal data, but also information relating to what a person did and who one was in the past. It means that such data are protected under the Act on Protection of Personal Data.

See also “Polish regulations on personal data protection” and “Polish case law on personal data protection“.

Trade mark law, case I CSK 96/08

March 20th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

In the shade of the recent opinion of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston QC given to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in case C‑529/07, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v Franz Hauswirth GmbH, here is the story of couple of judgments decided in the recent suits brought against the Polish company Terravita by the Swiss company Chocoladenfabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, AG from Kilchberg in Switzerland.

Lindt's hare

Lindt & Sprüngli requested the Polish court to prohibit Terravita from offering, marketing or storage chocolate products with a characteristic shape of a seated hare, wrapped in metail foil with clearly marked drawings of nose, bandoline, eyes, ears and tail with bow placed on the neck. Lindt also asked the court to stop the defendant using or affixing “Terravita hare” or its image in advertising and commercial documents, and an order that the defendant withdraw the “Terravita hare” from the market, requiring the defendant to destroy all packagings, packaging designs and dies, molds and other devices intended to produce and direct wrapping the “Terravita hare”.

The District Court in Warsaw, the Court for the Community Trade Marks and Community Designs (in Polish: Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie Wydzial XXII Sąd Wspólnotowych Znaków Towarowych i Wzorów Przemysłowych) in its judgment of 22 September 2005 dismissed the action. The court held that the conditions set out in article 9(1)(b) of the CTMR were not met. In the court’s opinion “Goldhase”, “Lindt” and “Terravita” signs that appear on the respective products differentiated them significantly and hence there is no risk of consumer’s confusion. The average consumer of chocolate hares does not perceive the origin of the goods only on the basis of the shape of a hare, but also on the basis of other important and distinguishing elements, including the mark placed on the product, the color of the packaging, its price, the trade mark identifying the manufacturer. The average consumer sees the difference in colour of the packaging of chocolate hares, and these were different in this case. Lindt’s packaging of the hare has the color of gold, red and brown, and Terravita’s are in silver. In addition, the District Court indicated that according to article 159a(5) of the CTMR, the defendant has only the right to prohibit the use of a trade mark on the territory of the Republic of Poland.

Terravita's hare

Lindt brought an appeal. The Appellate Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 6 July 2006 case file I ACa 616/07 dismissed the case. The Court held that the shape and the colour did not inform about the origin of the goods. The form of a sitting hare, Easter eggs or bells do not have a distinctive characteristic. The court similarly assessed the coloring of the aluminum foil placed on chocolate hares. The colour of silver and gold are typical for chocolate products. In this case, the only distinctive elements of both products were sings “Goldhase Lindt” and “Terravita” and they were dissimilar. Accordingly there was no risk of consumers confusion as regards the orgin of goods.

Lind brought a cassation complaint to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland. The Court, in its judgment of 13 April 2007, case file I CSK 16/07, ordered the Appellate Court to reconsider the case. The Supreme Court has interpreted the EU law, pointing to the need for a comprehensive assessment of similarity of the disputed signs. Only such an assessment would determine whether there is a risk of confusion.

The Court of Appeal, after rehearing the case, changed its judgment in favour of Lindt. The court found that the Golden hare was introduced by Lindt on the Polish market in 1997 (16 pieces), and 240 pieces in 1998. On March 1999, Terravita purchased in Germany the same form as the form used by Lindt and began producing and marketing of chocolate hares. Therefore the disputed hares share the same shape and size. Both are packaged in foil – gold, or silver, both have a ribbon tied to the neck in bow but Terravita’s is printed on the foil and there is no bell. The Court of Appeal stated that the condition for the likelihood of confusion has been met. The court stressed that Lindt’s Gold hare is well known among consumers of chocolate products. Therefore, there was no doubt to believe that Lindt’s hare has a huge recognition among consumers of chocolate products, especially if its presence on the market was established for more than nine years. With regard to the Terravita silver hare the Court of Appeal held that, although the latter figure was produced using the same form as used by the Lindt, and thus both hares are having the same shape and size but additional drawings and elements preclude similarities.

This time, Terravita brought a cassation complaint. The Supreme Court in its judgment of 3 October 2008, case file I CSK 96/08 held that in the circumstances of this case, there is no doubt that disputed hares are not identical and only its shape is the same, since they are manufactured from the same form. However on the foil of both hares, in a prominent place, one may find adequately put signs “Lindt Goldhase” or “Terravita”, which in fact makes the likelihood of consumer confusion practically excluded. The Court cited its earlier case law. The Supreme Court in its judgment of 1 February 2001, case file I CKN 1128/98, published at OSNC 2001, No. 9, item. 136, held that if word-figurative trade marks are used on the market then the word elements of such signs should have been attributed the distinvtice characteristics. The SC in its judgment 8 April 2003, case file IV CKN 22/01, published at OSP 2004, No. 5, item 61, held that in case of word-figurative trade marks the word element has the distinctive characteristics because it determines the ease of assimilation and the perception by the public. The Supreme Court in its judgment of 14 November 2003, case file I CK 176/02 (unpublished) excluded the risk of confusion in a situation where bottles used by the plaintiff and the defendant had the same shape (as in the facts of this case these bottles came from the same form), but were labeled with various word and images elements. In conclusion, the Court held that in the case of two identical products, one of which concerns the Community trade mark, the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of article 9(1)(b) of CTMR does not exist, if the other characteristics of goods, in particular bearing the word or image, allow them to be clearly distinguished.

Press law, case VI Ka 409/07

January 14th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

Facts and legal dispute
A Polish TV channel, TVN, in its show entitled UWAGA broadcast footage that criticised the work of a debt collector, Wojciech D., who held office in a Pomeranian town of Bytów. Internauts were prompt to comment on his work. This boiled down mostly to offensive statements, some of which are provided below:

I suggest we lynch the guy, if legal methods failed. It seems that we’ll have to fight impudence with impudence! Citizens!!! This goes out to you.

How about we settled it ourselves, people? We could take him to the woods, take away his clothes and throw him out onto the streets, that would be fun!!!

I was lucky enough not to have anything to do with this guy. I am surprised with those, who had so much trouble with him, though. If he sold my apartment or broke my mum’s hand I would spare some change and call the boys from the hood. They would have known what to do with him ;)

Hang the collector by the balls in the centre of the town, shove a pound or two of drawing pins and broken glass into his ass, but on the other hand he might enjoy that … and let him see what suffering is … the struggle continues….

Fill him with carbide and add some water. Oh, that would be so nice for him, damn bureaucrat. When he fills up with gasses, light him up. A nice effect, only shreds would remain. Still, it’s just wishful thinking, he can be seen no-where around the town. We can’t get him.

The comments were published mainly on the GazetaBytowska. pl (Bytów Newspaper) website, also accessible at gby.pl. The authorities (police and prosecutor) addressed Leszek Szymczak, the administrator of the website, and asked him to hand over particulars of the commentators. The authorities intended to charge those persons with punishable threats addressed at the collector. Leszek Szymczak did not, however, provide the data. The police called the comments “press material” and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Bytów recognised that the administrator of the website was responsible for the comments published on the gby.pl forum. The Public Prosecutor’s Office also maintained that a website is a daily newspaper, by virtue of which under the press law it needed to be registered. Following the line of reasoning of the prosecutor, Leszek Szymczak ran the gby.pl website (i.e. he published a daily newspaper) without proper registration. The prosecution charged Mr Szymczak with the first accusation – the infringement of Article 45 of the Polish Act of 26 January 1984 on Press law2 – APL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo prasowe), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 24, with later amendmets.

Anybody who publishes a daily newspaper or a periodical without registration or with registration suspended is subject to a fine penalty or the restriction of liberty

This was made in connection with article 7(2) pt. 2 of the APL.

A daily is a general-information periodical print or a message transmitted via sound or sound and image published more frequently than once a week.

The manner of registration of dailies and periodicals is provided in article 20 of the PLA.

1. Publishing a daily newspaper or a periodical necessitates registration with a voivodeship court having jurisdiction in the seat of the publisher, hereinafter referred to as ‘the registrar body’. In such cases the regulations of the Code of Civil Procedure on nonlitigious proceedings, together with amendments resulting herefrom, shall apply.
2. A registration application mentioned in section 1 hereof shall include:
1) the title of a daily newspaper or a periodical together with the seat and an exact address of the editorial office,
2) particulars of the editor-in-chief,
3) specification, seat and exact address of the publisher,
4) the daily newspaper’s or the periodical’s frequency of publishing.
3. A registrar court shall substantiate the decision to register a daily newspaper of a periodical only upon a motion.
4. A daily newspaper or a periodical can be published if a registrar body failed to decide upon the application for the registration within 30 days from the day of the submission of the application.
5. Should the information mentioned in section 2 hereof be altered, the registration body shall be immediately noticed.

The prosecution also alleged that Leszek Szymczak published press material featuring criminal content that publicly incited its readers to commit offences. For that reason the prosecution pressed the second charge. Under article 49a of the PLA

An editor who unintentionally published press material that featured criminal content mentioned in article 37a hereof, shall be subject to a fine penalty or the restriction of liberty.

Under article 255 of f the Criminal Code3 – CRC – (in Polish: Kodeks Karny) of 6 June 1997, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 88, item 553, with later amendments

1. A person who publicly calls for committing an offence of a fiscal crime shall be subject to a fine penalty, the restriction of liberty or imprisonment for up to two years.
2. A person who publicly calls for committing a crime shall be subject to the restriction of liberty for up to three years.
3. A person who publicly praises the commitment of a crime shall be subject to a fine penalty amounting to up to 180 daily rates, the restriction of liberty or imprisonment for up to one year.

Article 37a of the APL reads

If a person is sentenced for a crime committed by publishing a press material, the court may adjudicate an additional penalty constituting in the forfeiture of the press material.

The prosecution maintained that Leszek Szymczak committed the crime of the nonfeasance of duties. The prosecution did not, however, establish what actually was meant by lynching, or at whom the comments were directed (the collector’s name was not even once mentioned on the gby.pl website).
It is noteworthy that Leszek Szymczak had registered a daily newspaper entitled Gazeta Bytowska when it was published in print4. In the period pointed at in the indictment, that is from April 13, 2004 to January 9, 2006, the court did not pass a decision that would make the registration invalid.

The Regional Court Słupsk in its judgment of 7 March 2007 case file II K 342/06 (with Judge Tadeusz Stodola presiding) held that the first charge was legitimate, but owing to the minor social harm it remitted proceedings in the case. As for the second charge, the court held that posts of an internet forum indeed constitute press material and as such should be revised by editors and if they encounter inappropriate material, they should delete it. The court failed, however, to point to a specific law regulation that would necessitate Leszek Szymczak to delete any posts from his forum. Also this charge was dismissed. The court focused on the interpretation of the notion of “press material” and in this venture interpreted it correctly. The rub, though, remains in the fact that in this case the utmost importance should have been attached to the interpretation of the notions of a “daily newspaper” and a “periodical” since only those two kinds of press need to be registered with a court. Both parties appealed Leszek Szymczak appealed to overrule the judgment and dismiss the charge punishable under article 45 of the APL. He substantiated his appeal with, first of all, article 17(1)2 of the Criminal Proceedings Code owing to the fact that under the law in effect publishers did not have to register websites in the register of daily newspapers and periodicals. Secondly, he also claimed that the regulations that impose such an obligation are too unclear to be a source of criminal liability according to the principle nulla poena sine lege certa et stricta (no punishment unless there is certain and strict law). Leszek Szymczak also appealed to change the sentence by acquitting the defendant from the offence provided in article 49a of the PLA owing to the fact that the defendant did not know about the illegal nature of the information (posts were uploaded/written by internauts) that the prosecution drew upon in the offence description. Because of that, his argument continued, the defendant could not be criminally liable, that is under article 14 (1) of the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means5 – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204, as amended, and article 14 of the Directive 2000/31/EC6. Leszek Szymczak also appealed to completely overrule the abovementioned sentence and send the case back to the court of first instance for reconsideration.

The prosecution appealed against the judgment on the grounds of a mistake in factual findings that formed the basis for the judgment. It argued that the court was wrong to assess the social harm of the offence described in article 45 of the APL as minor (publishing an internet daily newspaper gby.pl without proper registration) and to discontinue proceedings with respect to this charge. Still further, a correct analysis of the subjective and objective features of the offence, particularly the legal interests undermined by the offence and the conduct of the defendant, all lead to other conclusions, the prosecution reasoned.

The prosecution also maintained that the court made another mistake in the factual findings forming the basis for the decision. The court allegedly was wrong to assess the social harm of the offence described in article 49a of the APL as minor (unintentional publishing of press material with criminal content) and to discontinue proceedings with respect to this charge. A correct analysis of both subjective and objective features of the offence, including legal interests undermined by the offence and negative consequences experienced by the aggrieved party, especially in the party’s life and professional situation, the gravity and manner of the violation of obligations resting with the defendant, including the considerable time period of publication of the criminal content on the gazetabytowska.pl website and the conduct of the defendant after having acquainted himself with the content, all lead to the conclusion that social harm of the acts performed by the defendant cannot be described as minor, the reasoning continued.

The District Court in Słupsk asked the Prosecutor’s Office to delegate to the court the case of posts published on the website. The court observed that when the Prosecutor’s Office asked the administrator of the website to hand over information about the posts of possibly criminal nature, he indeed handed it over. Afterwards the Office discontinued the proceedings–having found no features of a prohibited act–but then pressed charges and indicted the editor.

The District Court in Słupsk in its judgment of 7 February 2008 case file VI Ka 409/07 held that managing an internet website necessitates registration. In consequence, running a website without registration violates the law. The court held that the reasoning of the Regional Court was correct and, similarly to the Regional Court, it discontinued the proceedings (at the same time ascertaining that the act had caused minor social harm). If it was not for that decision of the court, taking the face value of those sentences, anybody could be put on trial for running a website without registration. In this part the case ends with a discontinuance of the case for a year. The District Court in its decision on appeal made some controversial statements. In particular, the court decided that publishing information on the internet with the use of sound and image depends on the publisher, so any soundless publication still complies with the definition of a daily newspaper/a periodical.

As concerns the second charge, the District Court overruled the former sentence and delegated the case for another hearing to the Regional Court. Following gby.pl, the court stated that a web portal, as a press title, needs to be registered: the District Court also suggested that

in a subsequent examination of the indictment, the Court should entertain upon sending case files back for pretrial proceedings due to its considerable shortcomings.

This might mean (the Regional Court still has to determine it) that the posted messages (posts) published on the forum might not have constituted an offence.

Discussion
If we go as far as to admit that in the light of the definition provided in article 7(2) pt. 1 of the APL a website (such as gby.pl) is indeed “press”, considerable doubts still remain whether such a website is a “daily newspaper” or a “periodical”. Both definitions refer to the notion of “print” but also go further to encompass more media by providing that is might convey “sound or sound an image information”. Owing to the general lack of sound in internet websites, it is hard to deny that this regulation does not describe such a publishing medium. Article 7(2)(2) of the APL provides

1) press shall be defined as periodical publications that do not form a single and complete whole, are published at least once a year and bear a constant title or a name, a number and a date, in particular: daily newspapers and periodicals, news agencies bulletins, constant telex messages, bulletins, radio and television broadcasts, film chronicles; press shall also be understood as any and all existing and emerging in the course of technological advancement means of mass media, including broadcasting stations and television and radio broadcasting systems installed in facilities that distribute periodically publications via print, image, sound or any other broadcasting means; the press shall also encompass teams of people and individuals that deal with journalism,
2) a daily newspaper shall be a general-information periodical print or a sound or sound and vision message published more frequently than once a week,
3) a periodical shall be a periodical print published at least once a year but not more frequently than once a week; this regulation shall apply also to messages broadcast by means of sound or sound and vision and any other means than those described in section 2.

Similar Polish case law
Let us turn to Polish judicature concerning similar cases. The Appellate Court in Rzeszów ruled that an internet website cannot be recognised as a “daily newspaper” or a “periodical” as understood by the APL7. In another case, the Appellate Court in Warsaw recognised a teletext service not as a daily newspaper but as a text message as understood by article 4(9) of the Polish Act on Broadcasting8 – LOB – (in Polish: Ustawa o radiofonii i telewizji) of 29 December 1992, Journal of Law (Dziennik Ustaw) of 1993, No 7 item 34, consolidated text of 19 Novemver 2004, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 253 item 2531, with later amendments. The press law provides the definition of “press material”. Article 7(2)4 of the Act reads

press material shall be any informative, journalistic, documental or other text or image already published or provided to the publisher and intended for publication in press, irrespective of the means of transmission, type, form, destination or authorship of the material.

The decision of the Supreme Court the criminal Chamber of 28 September 20009 in the case of “traditional media” reads as follows

reader’s letters constitute press material as understood by article 7 (2) 4 of the Press Law of 26 January 1984 (Dz. U. 1984 No. 5 pt. 24 as amended) under the condition that the letters have been sent to the editorial office with the intention to be published. The editor-in-chief is responsible for their publication. A reader’s letter can be, therefore, published after the information contained in the letter has been cautiously and diligently verified as provided for by article 12 (1) of the Press Law. Publishing a reader’s letter does not constitute quotation of another individual’s statement. In view of that the editor-in-chief is still responsible for its publication.

The Supreme Court’s (Customs Chamber’s) decision of December 7, 199310 reads as follows:

Article 24 (1) together with article 23 of the Criminal Code and article 37 of the Press Law of 26 January 2984 provide the basis for a non-property claim of the violation of personal interests in a press material. The claim may be filed against a publisher.

The authors also need to mention that the Republic of Poland is a civil law country and there are no binding precedents. Also, the Supreme Court’s resolution is only binding for the court that referred with a specific question but in practice Polish courts often apply rules that were interpreted by the Supreme Court.

Different European jurisdictions
The decision11 of the Appellate Court in Berlin (Landgericht) of May 31, 2007 is an apt example of a similar case in German jurisdiction. The case revolved around the responsibility of a moderator of a website for posts made by third persons and the theory of the so-called “impartial internaut”. The court held that a moderator of an online portal is burdened with no general obligation to review (oversee) posts uploaded by third parties. The case involved a dispute between the administrator of the meinprof.de portal, a website used to evaluate professors of colleges and universities, and one of the evaluated professors who was dubbed on meinprof.de a “psycho” and “the bottom one”. Even though the moderator, having received a notice, did remove the posts, the professor filed a complaint with the court. The court held, however, that in this case the posts boiled down merely to airing one’s opinion. The justification of the ruling reads as follows

Under the press law, any publisher Verbreiter can be seen as an offender (Prinz/Peters, Medienrecht, 1999, Rn, 35). The publisher is anybody who, as in this case, contributes to the distribution of a statement. (BGH NJW 1986, 2503 (2504)–Ostkontakte).

Any third parties that (having been viewed objectively) by their actions support (financially) illegal actions that infringe legally protected interests cannot be liable for the infringement in civil cases. The condition for actual liability as an offender is the default of the obligation of review and control. The specific circumstances of a given case should decide if and to what extent the control is or might be compulsory. The decision should also depend on the determination of the function and tasks of the person charged with infringement and that person’s responsibility. The defendant, being an administrator of a platform for exchanging views, did not infringe the obligation of such review/control. Individuals who administrate online portals do not have to control all their content. Owing to the immense amount of content, such control would be unfeasible12.

Even the condition that in the rules of the website the defendant did reserve the right to delete illegal posts does not lead, contrarily to the assertions of the plaintiff, to the recognition of a general obligation to control content. Content control is obligatory only when a person, the personal interests of whom have been violated, brings an accusation in the form of a written notice. The notice should contain a detailed description of the violated personal interests with respect to a specific part of the content. In such a case the administrator of a portal does not have to conduct extensive searches at high personal and technological expense. The administrator will only have to check if the post that the accusation concerns can be described (from the perspective of an objective internaut) as conforming with the law. The defendant, dissimilarly to the administrator of a portal in the case decided upon by the BGH that the plaintiff evoked, did not violate the obligation of control. The administrator of the portal, upon the reception of a message from the plaintiff that centred upon the slanderous post, immediately deleted the post from the forum13.

No crime where there are doubts
In the Polish law, the regulations of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic Means, for example article 14(1), provide that

A person who gives access to the contents of a network IT system to a customer, where the customer stores data, is not aware of the illegal features of the data or activity connected with the data and upon receiving an official notification or credible information about the illegal features of the data or activity connected with it, immediately bars access to the data, shall not be responsible for the data.

Chapter 3 of the PSEM, entitled “Exemption of responsibility of the service provider for providing E-services”, includes, as the title itself suggests, a number of other exemptions. The chapter concludes with a regulation in article 15 that reads

Any company that renders services described in article 12-14 shall not be required to verify the data described in article 12-14 that is transmitted, stored or made available by that company.

Having reviewed the above regulations, it seems there are two that actually collide with each other–one from the PL and the other from the PSEM. The modus operandi should be drawn entirely from provisions of the law. Having determined it, only now can we turn to the analysis of regulations such as, for example, article 25(4) of the APL, which reads

The editor-in-chief shall bear the responsibility for the content of the material prepared by the editorial team and the organizational and financial issues of the company within the frames set up in the articles of association or relevant regulations. The editor-in-chief is also responsible for safeguarding linguistic correctness of press materials and counteracting their vulgarization.

Another article of the APL, already mentioned above, article 54b (included in Chapter 8, “Proceedings in press cases”) reads

Provisions on legal responsibility and proceedings in press cases shall be applied to the infringement of law connected with the transmission of human thought via means designed to distribute information, irrespectively of the technology of transmission, especially nonperiodical publications and other print, vision and sound products, other that press.

All criminal cases should be decided on in the scope of the principle nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a law). The aforementioned cases are indeed riddled with doubts. The authors can hardly adhere to the claim that this clause might mean legal liability for the lack of registration of press other than a “daily newspaper” or a “periodical”, also because of the fact that the regulation covers mass media other than the press. In the authors’ opinion, the gby.pl website can be recognised as “press” but is neither a “daily newspaper” nor a “periodical”.

The legal basis is Article 414 of the Criminal Proceedings Code.

1. After the court proceedings have been instigated, if circumstances precluding prosecution or information substantiating conditional discontinuance of the proceedings are recognized, the court may decide to discontinue the proceedings or discontinue the proceedings conditionally. However, if circumstances provided in article 17(1) 1 and 2 are recognized, the court may issue an acquitting judgement, unless the offender at the time of the offence was non compos mentis

and article 66 (with subsequent ones) of the Criminal Code

The court may conditionally discontinue penal proceedings if the guilt and social harm of the illegal act are nor considerable, circumstances of the act are doubtless and the attitude of the offender that has not been punished for an intentional crime, the offender’s personal conditions and former lifestyle substantiate the speculation that the offender will obey the rule of law and especially that will not commit another crime…

Conclusion
Since the gby.pl is neither a daily newspaper nor a periodical, by discontinuing the proceedings in the case the courts apparently did not recognise that “the act was not committed or there was a lack of information sufficiently substantiating the suspicion of its committal” or that “the act did not bear the features of an illegal act or the law provided that the offender did not commit a crime”.

The Polish Act on Providing Services by Electronic Means was to implement into the Polish legislation the European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31 of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (Directive on electronic commerce) and the European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)14. The way Poland incorporated those two Directives into a single domestic legal act stirred considerable criticism15.

Many individuals pointed out that the implementation of the Directives boiled down mainly to the literal translation of their content into Polish, which was then put into a single legal act. In consequence, the Act draws on inconsistent terminology, for instance in some of the regulations the Polish Act uses the term “an information recipient” and in others “a service recipient”. Another problematic issue is the fact that the Act refers to other regulations provided in other domestic legal acts (e.g. the Telecommunications Law Act of 21 July 200016). What is even more, the regulations of the Polish Act do not explicitly set out if a service provider is exempt from civil liability or also criminal liability resulting from rendering e-services. Even further, the European Council reminded Poland that it had implemented the Directive 2000/31 only partially17. As a result, Poland initiated another legislative process that aimed at full implementation of the Directive, especially with regard to the implementation of the “country of origin” rule and the rule of the freedom of providing e-services.

Apart from the imprecise PSEM and the 1984 Press Law Act, which is a legal act originating practically in another era18, the only legal act that directly refers to internet publications is the Access to Public Information Act of September 6, 2001. The Act introduced an “official teleinformation publishing system” in the form of a “unified webpage system” (article 8). The only Polish legal act that suggests how to create websites (for public institutions to comply with the obligation to publish public information) is the Minister’s of Interior and Administration Regulation of January 18, 2007 on the Public Information Bulletin (BIP). Under article 9(2) of the Regulation

Where a subject, referred to in article 4(1) and (2) of the Act, owns an internet website, the subject’s own BIP website shall be created as a part of the website by placing a link with the BIP logotype that shall give direct access to the subject’s BIP website.

Apart from the imprecise definition of the Public Information Bulletin, which functions on the basis of the aforementioned Access to Public Information Act, there can also be the socalled “own website” which, even though provided for in the Regulation, is not defined therein. In consequence, while creating websites, public administration bodies are bound by no other rules than those existing in the “outer world”. Having recognised that, the authors put forward a statement that since in Leszek Szymczak’s case the charges (publishing a periodical without a registration) were not dropped owing to the lack of features of a prohibited act, the same charges (publication of internet websites without proper registration) can be brought against the highest public institutions in Poland. The authors asked the Chief Police Officer on May 8, 2007 the following: do these “own” internet websites (of public institutions) exist legally? The answer was that the Polish police does not register their internet websites with a registration court.

In a democratic country observing the rule of law, the situation of a public institution, which under art.7 of the Polish Constitution “functions on the basis and within the limits of the law”, differs from the situation of a subject functioning on the basis of economic freedom. Apart from publishing a BIP bulletin, Polish public institutions can also publish daily newspapers and periodicals (which is allowed under article 8 of the APIA)

The publisher can be a legal entity, a natural person or a different organizational entity, even if it is not a legal entity. In particular a publisher can be a public institution, a staterun company, a political organization, a labour union, a cooperative, a selfgovernment body and other social organization, a church or any other religious organization.

If this is the case, public administration institutions should also fulfil legal conditions on the publication of such a newspaper or a periodical. The current practice shows, nevertheless, that the public administration massively creates internet websites and does not register it with registration courts. The Chief Officer of the Police answered the authors19.

The Act of 28 January 1984, the Press Law, does not recognize internet websites as daily newspapers or periodicals.

The first President of the Supreme Court, Lech Gordocki, made a similar statement, later published in the press20.

I am not going to apply to the Regional Court for the registration of the website of the Supreme Court since the Act does not provide such an obligation.

Neither the President of the Republic of Poland, nor the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection, the Prime Minister of Poland and none of the Polish ministries and state agencies registered their own websites, which functionally do not differ from news websites. Then, if a court held that an individual who published a periodical without proper registration brought minor social harm, the court could rule otherwise if the charged entities were the police, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ombudsman or even the President, who apart from BIP bulletins all publish news websites without registering them with registration courts21.

As already mentioned, the only normative suggestion concerning internet websites in Poland comes in the form of executive regulations relating to the Access to Public Information Act. These regulations do not differentiate between “websites”, “portals”, “vortals”, etc. Generally we do not know what a “portal”, a “vortal” or a “blog” are. However, Polish courts pass judgments in which judges try wrongly to differentiate between those terms22. If there is no difference between publishing a periodical necessitating proper registration and publishing a blog, then perhaps we should also scrutinise the publishing activities of Marek Siwiec, a Vice-President of the European Parliament, who has been publishing his ruminations at http://mareksiwiec.blog.onet.pl also without registration with a registration court since 2007.

Recent press releases in Poland induced several individuals to apply to registration courts for the registration of blogs as daily newspapers and periodicals (as understood by the Polish Press Law). In some of those applications courts decided to enter names of the blogs to the Register of Daily Newspapers and Periodicals. This, however, under the Polish law, does not mean that in Poland you need to register a blog with a registration court. First of all, such an application should be filed before publishing has started, but that, again, makes it impossible for a court to decide if a given activity necessitates registration. Secondly, courts cannot deny registration if an individual or an organisation files for the registration of something that is neither a daily newspaper nor a periodical. Under article 21 of the APL

A registrar body shall deny the registration if:
[1] the application does not contain data that the Act describes (the daily newspaper’s or the periodical’s title, the seat of the publisher and the exact address of the editorial office, the particulars of the editor-in-chief, the particulars of the publisher, the frequency of publishing of the daily newspaper or the periodical) and

[2] if granting registration would constitute infringement of the right to the legal protection of an existing press title.

Owing to the above, Polish registration courts did enter the names of blogs provided by their applicants23.

In the case of Leszek Szymczak, the defence asked the Polish Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection to apply for a revocation of the sentence (it can be applied for only by the Commissioner and the Prosecutor General). By the end of June 2008 the defence also filed a constitutional complaint (see the website of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights24).

P.S.
On 16 December 2008, the Regional Court in Słupsk issued a judgment in which Leszek Szymczak was acquitted from charges of “publishing press material featuring criminal content that publicly incited its readers to commit offences”. I recommend you to read my post entitled “Press law, case II K 367/08“.

Footnotes
1. Case file VI Ka 409/7.
2. Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No.5, pos. 24, with later changes (APL).
3. Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No.88, pos. 553, with later changes (the PC).
4. On the basis of the decision of the Voivodeship Court in Slupsk Ns-Rej.Pr 8/91 of September 12, 1991.
5. Ustawa z dnia 18 lipca 2002 r. o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczna, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of September 9, 2002, No.144, pos.1204, with amendments.
6. Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) [2000] OJ L178/1-16.
7. Case file I ACa 277/05.
8. Case file I ACa 601/98. Broadcasting Act, Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 r. o radiofonii i telewizji, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2004, No. 253 item 2531.
9. Case file V KKN 171/98.
10. Case file III CZP 160/93.
11. Az. 27 S 2/07.
12. Decision of December 7, 2006, Az. 10 W 106/06; BGH NJW 2004, 3102.
13. J. Kurek, Comment available at http://prawo.vagla.pl/node/7341#comment-4526 [Accessed November 10, 2008].
14. [2002] OJ L 201/37-47.
15. G. Raczka, Ochrona Uslugobiorcy uslug elektronicznych (Torun 2007), p. 63, W. Iszkowski, X. Konraski, “Elektroniczne uslugi”, Rzeczpospolita newspaper, March 4, 2003.
16. Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001, no.73, pos. 852, as amended.
17. Commission of the European Communities, First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), Brussels, November 21, 2003, COM(2003) 702 final, p. 19.
18. It is noteworthy that August 17, 1991 is a symbolic date recognised as the inception of the Polish internet, i.e. the first time when via an IP protocol the Physics Department of the Warsaw University sent data to the Computer Centre of the Copenhagen University.
19 Letter of June 19, 2007 regarding the answer of the spokesman of the Chief Officer of the Police concerning websites run by the police. See http:// prawo.vagla.pl/node/7329 [Accessed November 10, 2008].
20. In a Polish daily newspaper, Rzeczpospolita, on September 6, 2007.
21. See http://www.president.pl, http://www.kprm.gov.pl/english, http:// www.rpo.gov.pl/index.php?s=3 [Accessed November 10, 2008].
22. See Judgment the district court in Warsaw (IV Civil Division) of June 9, 2008, case file Act IV C 806/07.
23. See http://olgierd.bblog.pl/wpis,moj;nowy;organ;prasowy,7042.html [Accessed November 10, 2008].
24. See http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/precedens/pl/aktualnosci/sprawa-gazety-bytowskiej-w-tk.html [Accessed November 10, 2008].

This article was originally published under the title Polish Courts Say Websites Should Be Registered As Press in the Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, C.T.L.R. 2009, 15(1), 9-14.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1524/08

December 26th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Patent office invalidated the right of protection for NIZOPOL R-152880 trade mark owned by Zakłady Farmaceutyczne “POLFA-ŁÓDŹ’ Spółka Akcyjna. The request was filed by Johnson and Johnson Company who owns NIZORAL R-57978 trade mark. The PPO held that both signs are similar and share at the beggining the same 4 letters NIZO.

The Voivodeship Administratve Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 26 November 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1524/08 invalidated the questioned decision and ordered its re-examination. Although the Court shared the view of the PPO that during the examination of the questioned word marks in the aural apect, the more attention should to be paid to the first letters and syllables, and a very small role of the endings of words should be recognized, citing J. Piotrowska, Renomowane znaki towarowe i ich ochrona (in English: Reputed trade marks and their protection), Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2001, p. 131, however, according to the VAC, the PPO did not consider at all the issues related to the degree of public attention. According to the VAC, even the ordinary and final recipient (and not only the professional) when during the purchase of products such as pharmaceuticals or cosmetic can be extremely careful in selecting the correct product because the product purchased is not the regular goods, but one that will (or may) have some consequences for his health. The recipient will also be a more likely with a similar purchase to seek and take into consideration the advice of an expert. A prudent consumer should pay particular attention to the name (and thus the mark) when purchased.

The PPO did not also made in this case, any assessment of other important factors affecting the risk of confusion, namely, did not address the issues related to the alleged occurrence in the course of trade any other similar signs/designations containing the prefix “nizo”. The PPO have to respond to arguments and the circumstances showed by the Polish company, since it is argued the legal doctrine, that the use of the same or similar trade mark by third parties could lead to a weakening of the impact of such sign, and thus – to reduce the risk of confusion, citing R. Skubisz, Prawo znaków towarowych. Komentarz (in English: Trade mark law. Commentary), Warszawa 1997, p. 91.

In this situation – according to the Court – it must be assumed that the PPO during the re-examination of the case should first consider the question of the similarity of the goods. The VAC noted that according to settled case-law, the assessment of the similarity between the goods or services should take into account all relevant factors relating to those goods or services. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary, citing T‑420/03, El Corte Inglés, SA v. OHIM.

In the opinion of the Court when re-considering the issue again with regard to the risk of misleading consumers, the Patent Office will be obliged to consider how the risk of confusion is likely to affect the power of the effectiveness (common knowledge) of the opposed earlier mark, in the light of the model of the average consumer that was established in the Community case-law. In this situation the PPO should also consider the issue of the possible risk of confusion, taking into account the intened use of both signs.