Archive for: Regulation 40/94

Meta tags in Polish case law

October 8th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The French company Marin’s International brought a case before the Court for the Community Trade Marks and Community Designs, located in Warsaw (in Polish: Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie Wydzial XXII Sąd Wspólnotowych Znaków Towarowych i Wzorów Przemysłowych). The issue concerned the use of CTMs Marin’s and Lama by the Polish company Display Flash Poland sp. z o.o., within its website in NOSCRIPT tag. The Court in a judgment case file XXII GWzt 8/09, ruled that the use of someone else’s trademark in website’s metatags infringes trade mark rights of such person, and such behaviour may be also deemed as an unfair competition delict.

I know that I should mention the opinion of the Advocate General Poiares Maduro of 22 September 2009 in joined cases C‑236/08, C‑237/08 and C‑238/08, Google France, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Google France v. Viaticum, Luteciel and Google France v. CNRRH, Pierre Alexis Thonet, Bruno Raboin, Tiger, a franchisee of Unicis.

(1) The selection by an economic operator, by means of an agreement on paid internet referencing, of a keyword which will trigger, in the event of a request using that word, the display of a link proposing connection to a site operated by that economic operator for the purposes of offering for sale goods or services, and which reproduces or imitates a trade mark registered by a third party and covering identical or similar goods, without the authorisation of the proprietor of that trade mark, does not constitute in itself an infringement of the exclusive right guaranteed to the latter under Article 5 of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks.

(2) Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that a trade mark proprietor may not prevent the provider of a paid referencing service from making available to advertisers keywords which reproduce or imitate registered trade marks or from arranging under the referencing agreement for advertising links to sites to be created and favourably displayed, on the basis of those keywords.

(3) In the event that the trade marks have a reputation, the trade mark proprietor may not oppose such use under Article 5(2) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94.

(4) The provider of the paid referencing service cannot be regarded as providing an information society service consisting in the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’).

This is way more interesting if one realizes that almost month ago Google has announced that it doesn’t use the “keywords” meta tag in web search ranking.

Trade mark law, case I CSK 96/08

March 20th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

In the shade of the recent opinion of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston QC given to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in case C‑529/07, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v Franz Hauswirth GmbH, here is the story of couple of judgments decided in the recent suit brought against the Polish company Terravita by the Swiss company Chocoladenfabriken Lindt & Sprüngli, AG from Kilchberg in Switzerland.

Lindt's hare

Lindt & Sprüngli requested the Polish court to prohibit Terravita from offering, marketing or storage chocolate products with a characteristic shape of a seated hare, wrapped in metail foil with clearly marked drawings of nose, bandoline, eyes, ears and tail with bow placed on the neck. Lindt also asked the court to stop the defendant using or affixing “Terravita hare” or its image in advertising and commercial documents, and an order that the defendant withdraw the “Terravita hare” from the market, requiring the defendant to destroy all packagings, packaging designs and dies, molds and other devices intended to produce and direct wrapping the “Terravita hare”.

Terravita’s hareIn a judgment of 22 September 2005, the District Court in Warsaw (Community Trade Mark and Design Court) dismissed the action. The court held that the conditions set out in article 9(1)(b) of the CTMR were not met. In the court’s opinion “Goldhase”, “Lindt” and “Terravita” signs that appear on the respective products differentiated them significantly and hence there is no risk of consumer’s confusion. The average consumer of chocolate hares does not perceive the origin of the goods only on the basis of the shape of a hare, but also on the basis of other important and distinguishing elements, including the mark placed on the product, the color of the packaging, its price, the trade mark identifying the manufacturer. The average consumer sees the difference in colour of the packaging of chocolate hares, and these were different in this case. Lindt’s packaging of the hare has the color of gold, red and brown, and Terravita’s are in silver. In addition, the District Court indicated that according to article 159a(5) of the CTMR, the defendant has only the right to prohibit the use of a trade mark on the territory of the Republic of Poland.

Terravita's hare

Lind brought an appeal. The Appellate Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 6 July 2006 case file I ACa 616/07 dismissed the case. The Court held that the shape and the colour did not inform about the origin of the goods. The form of a sitting hare, Easter eggs or bells do not have a distinctive characteristic. The court similarly assessed the coloring of the aluminum foil placed on chocolate hares. The colour of silver and gold are typical for chocolate products. In this case, the only distinctive elements of both products were sings “Goldhase Lindt” and “Terravita” and they were dissimilar. Accordingly there was no risk of consumers confusion as regards the orgin of goods.

Lind brought a cassation complaint to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland. The Court, in its judgment of 13 April 2007, case file I CSK 16/07, ordered the Appellate Court to reconsider the case. The Supreme Court has interpreted the EU law, pointing to the need for a comprehensive assessment of similarity of the disputed signs. Only such an assessment would determine whether there is a risk of confusion.

The Court of Appeal, after rehearing the case, changed its judgment in favour of Lindt. The court found that the Golden hare was introduced by Lindt on the Polish market in 1997 (16 pieces), and 240 pieces in 1998. On March 1999, Terravita purchased in Germany the same form as the form used by Lindt and began producing and marketing of chocolate hares. Therefore the disputed hares share the same shape and size. Both are packaged in foil – gold, or silver, both have a ribbon tied to the neck in bow but Terravita’s is printed on the foil and there is no bell. The Court of Appeal stated that the condition for the likelihood of confusion has been met. The court stressed that Lindt’s Gold hare is well known among consumers of chocolate products. Therefore, there was no doubt to believe that Lindt’s hare has a huge recognition among consumers of chocolate products, especially if its presence on the market was established for more than nine years. With regard to the Terravita silver hare the Court of Appeal held that, although the latter figure was produced using the same form as used by the Lindt, and thus both hares are having the same shape and size but additional drawings and elements preclude similarities.

This time, Terravita brought a cassation complaint to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland. The Court in its judgment of 3 October 2008, act signature I CSK 96/08 held that in the circumstances of this case, there is no doubt that disputed hares are not identical and only its shape is the same, since they are manufactured from the same form. However on the foil of both hares, in a prominent place, one may find adequately put signs “Lindt Goldhase” or “Terravita”, which in fact makes the likelihood of consumer confusion practically excluded.

The Supreme Court cited its earlier case law. In its judgment of 1 February 2001, act signature I CKN 1128/98 (published at OSNC 2001, No. 9, item. 136) The Supreme Court held that if word-figurative trade marks are used on the market then the word elements of such signs should have been attributed the distinvtice characteristics. In its judgment 8 April 2003, act signature IV CKN 22/01 (published at OSP 2004, No. 5, item. 61), the SC held that in case of word-figurative trade marks the word element has the distinctive characteristics because it determines the ease of assimilation and the perception by the public. In its judgment of 14 November 2003, act signature I CK 176/02 (unpublished) The Supreme Court excluded the risk of confusion in a situation where bottles used by the plaintiff and the defendant had the same shape (as in the facts of this case these bottles came from the same form), but were labeled with various word and images elements.

In conclusion, the Court held that in the case of two identical products, one of which concerns the Community trade mark, the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of article 9(1)(b) of CTMR does not exist, if the other characteristics of goods, in particular bearing the word or image, allow them to be clearly distinguished.

Typosquatting and trade mark infringement

October 15th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

There is this case pending Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc. et al., No. 07 CV 3371 (N. Dist. Ill. June 15, 2007). You’ll have all necessary documents available at justia.com website. Ben Edelman from Harvard University made the whole case much more worse to argue for Google.

Edelman and other lawyers have filed a class action lawsuit representing domain owners who claim the Google Adsense for Domains (AFD) program is assisting in violating trademarks. A hearing is scheduled for as early as next month in which Edelman will ask an Illinois federal judge to allow the case against Google to proceed.

When it comes to trade mark infringement and keywords then all I can say is that European trade mark lawyers are eagerly awaiting for the Court of Justice of the EC to answer couple of important questions. In case C-236/08, Google France and Google, French Cour de Cassation reffered the following questions.

1) Must Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks[1] and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark[2] be interpreted as meaning that a provider of a paid referencing service who makes available to advertisers keywords reproducing or imitating registered trade marks and arranges by the referencing agreement to create and favourably display, on the basis of those keywords, advertising links to sites offering infringing goods is using those trade marks in a manner which their proprietor is entitled to prevent?

2) In the event that the trade marks have a reputation, may the proprietor oppose such use under Article 5(2) of the directive and Article 9(1)(c) of the regulation?

3) In the event that such use does not constitute a use which may be prevented by the trade mark proprietor under the directive or the regulation, may the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000,[3] so that that provider cannot incur liability until it has been notified by the trade mark proprietor of the unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?

In case C-237/08, Google France, French Cour de Cassation reffered the following questions.

1) Must Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks[1] be interpreted as meaning that a provider of a paid referencing service who makes available to advertisers keywords reproducing or imitating registered trade marks and arranges by the referencing agreement to create and favourably display, on the basis of those keywords, advertising links to sites offering goods identical or similar to those covered by the trade mark registration is using those trade marks in a manner which their proprietor is entitled to prevent?

2) In the event that such use does not constitute a use which may be prevented by the trade mark proprietor under the directive or Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark,[2] may the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000, [3] so that that provider cannot incur liability before it has been informed by the trade mark proprietor of the unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?

In case C-238/08, Google France, French Cour de Cassation reffered the following questions.

1) Does the reservation by an economic operator, by means of an agreement on paid Internet referencing, of a keyword triggering, in the case of a request using that word, the display of a link proposing connection to a site operated by that operator in order to offer for sale goods or services, and which reproduces or imitates a trade mark registered by a third party in order to designate identical or similar goods, without the authorisation of the proprietor of that trade mark, constitute in itself an infringement of the exclusive right guaranteed to the latter by Article 5 of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988?[1]

2) Must Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks be interpreted as meaning that a provider of a paid referencing service who makes available to advertisers keywords reproducing or imitating registered trade marks and arranges by the referencing agreement to create and favourably display, on the basis of those keywords, advertising links to sites offering goods identical or similar to those covered by the trade mark registration is using those trade marks in a manner which their proprietor is entitled to prevent?

3) In the event that such use does not constitute a use which may be prevented by the trade mark proprietor under the directive or Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark,[2] may the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000, 3 so that that provider cannot incur liability before it has been informed by the trade mark proprietor of the unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?

I may presume that there will be another questions asked, and not only from France.

Trade mark law, case II SA 3446/01

August 10th, 2005, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 14 December 2001, case file II SA 3446/01 ruled that the English word “heritage” is not a generic term for the services it was registered for, nor does it inform about its properties, quality or usefulness. Therefore “heritage” word can be used as a trade mark.

The udgments of the Court of Justice of the EC in case C-3/03 P, Matratzen Concord GmbH vs. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), [2004] E.C.R. I-3657 and C-421/04, Matratzen Concord AG vs. Hukla Germany SA, [2006] E.C.R. I-2303, have been issued couple of years later.