Archive for: Polish courts

Criminal law, case XI W 1497/11/P

March 15th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The publisher of histmag.org website requested its users to donate money via PayPal or similar services, in order to raise funds for the functioning of this history site. An anonymous user made ​​a complaint to the former Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, now Ministry of Interior, claiming that this action constituted an illegal public money collection, which is prohibited according to the provisions of Article 56 § 1 of the Polish Code of Offences – PCO – (in Polish: Kodeks wykroczeń) of 20 May 1971, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 1971 No 12, item 114, with subsequent amendments.

Whoever, without the required permit or in violation of its conditions, organizes, or holds a public collection of donations, shall be subject to a fine.

According to the Polish Act of 5 March 1933 on Public Collections, any public collections of donations in cash or in kind, for a pre-determined goal, requires prior authorization from the authority. This permit should be granted as an administrative decision. The Regional Court in Kraków in its warrant ruling found the publisher guilty. The publisher filed objections to this judgment.

The Regional Court for Kraków-Podgórze in Kraków, Wydział XI Karny in its judgment of 6 February 2012 case file XI W 1497/11/P acquitted the publisher of any charges. The court ruled that the public collection was conducted by receiving direct wire transfers or via PayPal. The provisions of the PCO and the definition of public collection included in the Act on Public Collections refers to public collections of cash or in kind, and are not applicable to electronic transfers.

Copyright law, case III CSK 30/11

March 14th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

Helena Miazek is a well known Polish folk artist and creator of paper cuts that are based on the long tradition of Łowicz region. Wawel S.A. is a Polish manufacturer of sweets. The company used different graphics with folk elements on its products. Helena Miazek and Stowarzyszenie Twórców Ludowych in Lublin (The Folk Artists Association – a collecting society) sued Wawel for copyright infringement. The suit included a claim in which the Association demanded Wawel to provide information concerning the use of paper cuts on packaging products. Wawel argued that it has commissioned other artists to create these graphics. The District and the Appeallate Court dismissed the suit as unfounded. Both courts deemed the society as the entrepreneur which was obliged to prove that a particular copyrighted work was used without permission of the owner. The Association and Helena Miazek filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Court in its judgment of 17 October 2011 case file III CSK 30/11 repealed the contested decision and returned it to the Appellate Court for further reconsideration. The Court had to decide on the nature of information claim afforded in Article 105(2) of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631 with subsequent amendments.

Art. 105.
1. The collecting society shall be presumed qualified to carry out the administration and protection of rights in the areas of exploitation in which its administration is conducted, and to engage in judicial proceedings associated therewith. This presumption may not be invoked where two or more collection societys claim competence in respect of one and the same work or performance.
2. In the course of its activity the collecting society may demand that information be communicated to it and that documents that are essential for the calculation of the amount of remuneration and fees that it claims be delivered to it.

Earlier Supreme Court case law is not too rich when it comes to this issue. The Supreme Court in its judgment of 8 December 2000 case file I CKN 971/98 published in OSNC 2001/6/97, pointed out that the provision included in Article 105(2) of the ARNR is a legal norm of substantive law, and the right of collecting societies to protect authors rights and neighbouring rights, exempts it from the obligation to provide the authority to represent, both in the trial for payment, or in any trial for disclosure of information and documents. The Supreme Court in its order of 17 September 2009 case file III CZP 57/09 held that the proceedings for disclosure of information and documentation is a new legal tool. The Court ruled that in the doctrine of civil law, it is reasonably assumed that if the right is strictly defined and concretized in terms of its content and subject, and when this right is merged with the obligation of another entity, then such a legal norm is substantive in its nature and in case of evasion by the bounded entity from the performance of an obligation imposed on it, the right takes the form of a claim which may be enforced through the courts. For instance, the claim to disclosure of information has the auxiliary nature under the contractual relationship between the collecting society and the producers and importers of tape recorders, video recorders and other similar apparatus, or blank material for the recording of works with the aid of such apparatus for personal and private use, and also of reprographic apparatus who are obliged to pay remuneration fees, for the benefit of the creators and performers of the said works and of the producers of phonograms and videograms. These creators and performers are represented in such cases only by the collection society. Such informational claim, which addressed to the same bounded entities, was created to ensure the proper execution of the basic right to equitable remuneration. Information and documents obtained during the trail are the basis for determining the amount of the fees enjoyed by collecting society, regardless of whether the society intends to pursue these fees in court. The Supreme Court in the case of Helena Miazek and and Stowarzyszenie Twórców Ludowych in Lublin decided that the informational claim also applies to information concerning the use of certain works by a third party.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Personal interest, case III C 202/09

March 12th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

Arnold Buzdygan sued Agora S.A. the owner and publisher of kobieta.gazeta.pl website, claiming that the company infringed his personal interest by publishing an online article entitled “Trolls – Internet’s vexatious personas” in which his name was mentioned. The District Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 December 2011 case file III C 202/09 dismissed the complaint and ruled that the criteria of the infringement of personal interests should be based on objective rather than subjective circumstances that usually arise from the feelings of the person concerned. The objective response of public opinion is more important in such case. The Court noted that Mr Buzdygan is a public person whose opinions and statements were subject to criticism by other users. Such negative comments were directed to his activities and comments posted on the Internet, and not directly against him.

See also “Computer crime, case V K 1595/08” and “Personal interest, case I ACa 949/09“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 1378/10

March 12th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Patent Office had refused to grant the right of protection for the word trade mark PUCHATEK CHOCO Z-321348 filed by Lubella Sp. z o.o. sp. kom. ak., for goods in Class 30. Lubella provided a letter of consent, which had been granted by Maspex Sp. z o.o., the owner of the prior-registered trade marks that include word element PUCHATEK. The PPO decided that it cannot consider the letter of consent, inter alia, for the reason that commercial relationships between the entities are not permanent. The use of a letter of consent in such a case could potentially cause problems when dealing with its withdrawal when the cooperation between the entities has ceased to exist. The PPO also remind that the Polish Industrial Property law provides for the institution of the letter of consent, only to signs whose protection lapsed. Lubella filed a complaint against this decision but it was dismissed by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 20 July 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 600/10. Lubella filed a cassation complaint.

R-159163

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 16 December 2011 case file II GSK 1378/10 upheld the questioned judgment. The Court agreed with the PPO that Lubella was a different legal entity from the right holder of earlier trade marks that were considered as similar. The Court noted that it should be always borne in mind that the task of a trade mark is to distinguish the goods of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. The trade mark has to fulfill the function of determination of origin. This function is expressed objectively by commodity/goods, to which the sign is assigned, and it provides the consumer an idea about the qualities of a particular product, and subjectively i.e. the trade mark belongs to a given undertaking based on the right of protection that was granted to him or her, and it lets for the identification of the goods with the source that is indicated abstractly or by name. The protected trade mark should prevent from the risk of confusion on the part of consumers, because on the one hand it protects the economic interests of entitled entrepreneur, on the other hand it is aimed at consumers, in order to distinguish the origin of the goods. The SAC also reminded after the VAC that the Polish Patent Office does not examine the way in which the trademark is used on the market, except for its reputation, notoriety or secondary meaning i.e. acquired distinctiveness. The examination of a trade mark application is carried out in abstracto, that is, in isolation from market conditions.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 72/11

February 29th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 25 May 2006, the Polish company AERECO Wentylacja Sp. z o.o. applied for the word-figurative trade mark HIGROSTEROWANIE Z-311192 for goods in Classes 07, 09, 11 and 35. The Polish Patent Office refused to grant the right of protection, claiming that the applied sign does not have sufficient level of distinctive character. The PPO pointed out this trade mark is built from the core “sterowanie” (in English: controling/steering) and the prefix higro (English: hygro) which indicates a semantic link to the humidity. The sign that is created from these two elements, although not listed in dictionaries, is not a fanciful term and simply means “to regulate humidity”.

Z-311192

AERECO filed a complaint against this decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 8 September 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1117/10 dismissed it, and ruled that both in the legal commentaries and the case law of administrative courts, it is considered in particular, that the descriptive sign is one that has the characteristics of the topical, concrete and direct descriptiveness. The topicality of the signs should be assessed on the objective basis and consist of examining whether from the perspective of current market conditions, a sign is useful for description of the goods and if as such it should be accessible to all participants. The rule of concrete descriptiveness states that a sign which indicates the specific characteristics of the product for which the designation is intended may be exempted from the registration as descriptive one. The direct descriptiveness occurs when a descriptive sign informs directly, clearly and unambiguously about the characteristics of a particular goods, so that characteristics may be interpreted directly, and not by associations.

The Court shared the position of the PPO, that the the questioned sign simply means “controling humidity” and thus explicitly indicates the characteristics of the designated goods and can not be appropriated to describe the products or services of one company. The VAC did not find anything fanciful in the figurative element of the HIGROSTEROWANIE trade mark. ARECO filed a cassation complaint but it was dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 29 February 2012 case file II GSK 72/11.

Personal interest, case IX GC 367/11

February 27th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The company Polska Wódka (in English: Polish Vodka) from Warsaw sued two other companies Wódka Polska sp. z o. o. and Wódka Polska sp. komandytowa from Lublin (both companies are lined with Stock Spirits, former Polmos Lublin) for the infringement of the company name based on the regulations included in the Polish Civil Code that provides that the company name of the entrepreneur should differ sufficiently from the company names of other entrepreneurs that carry on their activities on the same market. The company name may not be misleading, in particular as regards the entrepreneur’s person, the object of their activity, place of activity and supply sources, and the Polish Act on Combating Unfair Competition which treats the use of the designation of the undertaking in a way which may mislead customers in relation to its identity, based on the use of trade mark, name, emblem, letter abbreviation or another characteristic symbol already lawfully used to indicate another undertaking, as the act of unfair competition.

Polska Wódka claimed that it has the priority to its company name based on the entry in the Register of Business Entities in the National Court Register (KRS). The name of Warsaw’s company was entered in 2003, and the company names of Lublin’s entities were entered accordingly in 2005 and 2009. Polska Wódka argued that both sued companies act intentionally in order to mislead other market participants.

Both defendants did not agree with the suit and argued that they obtained the right to use their company names under final and binging decisions of the registration court, and noted that Polska Wódka does not proved that it performs any business activity under its company name because there are no annual reports in the KRS that would serve as proof of use.

The District Court in Lublin in its judgment case file IX GC 367/11 dismissed the suit as unfounded. The Court agreed that the company from Warsaw was the first one to start the use of the questioned name, however, it did not provided any evidence of its use in order to prove the confusion of other market participants. The Court also ruled that the protection if afforded to designation that are put in genuine use, not to these that were only registered in the KRS. Finally, the Court noted that the name Polska wódka (Polish vodka) is descriptive term related to a product name that is connected with a specific business activity, and it cannot be appropriated by single company. The Court ruled that Polish vodka is a designation that should be in the public domain, in order to be available for different entities which wish to use such name for their products. The judgment is not final yet.

E-proceedings, case II FZ 447/11

February 23rd, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Gdańsk in its order of 23 March 2011 case file I SA/Gd 916/10 rejected a complaint against a decision on leaving the applicant’s request for the relief for the payment of court fees from the complaints, without examination. The complaint was sent by post the day after the deadline, but the day before, the same letter has been sent by e-mail at 10:50 pm to the court. The VAC found the complaint to be void and rejected it. The applicant filed a complaint against such order.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 21 December 2011 case file II FZ 447/11 agreed with the applicant, and repealed the contested judgment and returned it to the VAC for further reconsideration. The SAC issued very precedential opinion. The Court held that despite the legal loopholes it is possible to bring the pleadings via e-mail correspondence with the courts. The court also held that the date of the filing is a real moment of delivery of the e-mail message, which will be communicated to the recipient in the appropriate e-mail program. The Court noted that information about the confirmation of data transmission, which includes the date of delivery, is provided in the header of each e-mail message and it decides on timely filing of the pleadings. The Court stressed that the party to the proceedings before the administrative courts cannot bear the negative consequences of failure to implement the Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts of the relevant provisions concerning the submission of documents by electronic means. After that judgment a party can effectively bring to the administrative court every pleading by electronic means, including the complaint or a cassation complaint, despite the lack of a formal legal basis. The only problem is that the document lacks of a formal signature. But there is no obstacle to supplement it after the call issued by the court. If the applicant will send a complaint via e-mail at the last moment, it will be deemed as the effective delivery and filing. It only has to be signed in person after the call from the court in a specified deadline.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 1033/10

February 22nd, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

This is another part of the saga of trade marks consisting of numerals. On March 2003, Agencja Wydawnicza TECHNOPOL Spółka z o.o. applied for the word trade mark 100 PANORAMICZNYCH Z-261876 for goods in Class 16 such as newspapers, charade magazines, booklets, brochures, flyers, calendars, posters, exercise books.

The Polish Patent Office decided that it cannot grant rights of protection for signs which cannot constitute a trade mark, or are devoid of sufficient distinctive character. The PPO reminded that the following are considered as being devoid of sufficient distinctive character (i) signs which are not capable of distinguishing, in trade, the goods for which they have been applied, (ii) signs which consist exclusively or mainly of elements which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, origin, quality, quantity, value, intended purpose, manufacturing process, composition, function or usefulness of the goods, (iii) signs which have become customary in the current language and are used in fair and established business practices. TECHNOPOL filed a complaint against this decision but it was dismissed by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 24 April 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 410/10. TECHNOPOL filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 8 November 2011 case file II GSK 1033/10 repealed the contested judgment and returned it to the VAC for further reconsideration. The SAC agreed with allegations of violation of administrative proceedings that was based on erroneous findings that the disputed trade mark could not acquire secondary meaning. The Court noted that when the PPO is assessing whether or not a sign has a sufficient distinctive character, any circumstances accompanying its use in marking the goods in trade should be taken into consideration. Grant of a right of protection under previously mentioned rules may not be denied in particular where prior to the date of filing of a trademark application with the PPO, the trademark concerned has acquired, in consequence of its use, a distinctive character in the conditions of the regular trade. This indicates the possibility of acquiring secondary meaning by descriptive signs. In principle, secondary meaning can only be acquired by signs that are devoid of any distinctiveness, including descriptive or generic designations. Thus, the mere fact that the sign is purely informational does not preclude the acquisition of secondary meaning. Descriptive signs refer to the qualities or characteristics that may affect goods from various manufacturers.

Consumer protection, case VI ACa 1179/11

February 20th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection in its decision of 29 August 2008 case DOK – 6/2008 ruled that two Polish collecting societies, the Association of Writers and Composers (Stowarzyszenie Autorów – ZAiKS) and the Polish Filmmakers Association (Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich – SFP), were involved in actions deemed as infringement of competition on the relevant market. This decision concerned the agreement on uniform rates of copyright remuneration that were collected from commercial users for the sale of audiovisual works on media intended for private use. The request to initiate antimonopoly proceedings was filed by the Polish Press Publishers Association (Izba Wydawców Prasy – IWP) based on the provisions of the Polish Act on Protection of Competition and Consumers – APCC – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów) of 16 February 2007 published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 50, item 331, with subsequent amendments.

IWP claimed that ZAiKS and SFP are competing entities because they are active on management and collecting in the same fields of exploitation of copyrighted works, and authors, creators and copyright owners can freely choose the collecting society they want to be represented by.

The President of the OCCP found that ZAiKS and SFP decided that the minimum remuneration rates for one copy of the media will be for a movie on DVD – 2 PLN, for a movie on VCD and VHS- 1,1 PLN, for a cartoon movie on DVD – 1.6 PLN, and for a cartoon movie on VCDs and VHS – 0,8 PLN. Minimum rates for a copy of audiovisual work on the media that are sold together with other products, including, in particular newspapers and magazines were set on an even lower level. For instance for a DVD that was put on the market before 1 July 2004 – 1 PLN, and from 1 July 2004, 0.60 PLN, There were also introduced discounts from 5% to 40% depending on the number of copies (from 100.000 to above 700.000 copies).

Members of IWP, who are press publishers, are also contractors of ZAiKS and SFP. The Press publishers add copies of DVD movies to their newspapers and magazines, as the so-called inserts. They are required under the provisions of Polish copyright law to pay appropriate remuneration for the reproduction of the audiovisual work on the copy for individual use. The remuneration fee is paid by the press publishers only through the collecting society. IWP argued that the remuneration of the authors for use of audiovisual works should be individualized, and the conditions of agreement to use the work should be negotiated. The collecting societies should negotiate different rates for different movies. Such actions would prove the real concern for the interests of every member of each collecting society, because the authors of a better movie should earn more. The rates covered by the agreement between ZAiKS and SFP did not include possible revenues from the use of audiovisual works, nor the specifics of this use. Thus, according to the IWP, the agreement of ZAiKS and SFP on the application of uniform rates, deprived commercial users the possibility to negotiatie the rates, and significantly restricted competition.

ZAikS and SFP filed complaints against the decision of the President of the OCCP. The Polish Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in its judgment of 8 July 2011 case file XVII AmA 23/09 dismissed them. The Appeallate Court in Warsaw in its judgment case file VI ACa 1179/11 dismissed the appeal.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 2041/11

February 15th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

Sfinks Polska S.A. requested the Polish Patent Office to invalidate the rights of protection for word-figurative trade mark CLEOPATRA R-153234 owned by Restauracja CLEOPATRA Bachar Aziz from Lublin. Sfinks Polska owns earlier registered word-figurative trade mark SPHINX R-105162.

R-153234

Sfinks claimed that the trade mark CLEOPATRA R-153234 is similar to its trade mark and argued that it has legal interest in this proceedings as there is a possibility of misleading customers based on the similarity of trade marks. This could be particularly applicable considering the fact that SPHINX trade mark is already known on the market and, therefore, it has a stronger distinctive ability. Sfinks also argued that Bachar Aziz filed its trade mark in bad faith with an intent to use the reputation of Sfinks’ trade marks by suggesting a common origin from a single entity.

R-105162

The Polish Patent Office dismissed the request and decided that the trade marks, in this case, are different in all aspects. Sfinks Polska S.A. filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 27 December 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 112/11 dismissed it. The Court held that the PPO correctly decided that there are visible differences in both signs. The VAC also ruled that the application for a trade in bad faith may occur in a situation in which the applicant is linked with the owner of the earlier sign with a special relationship of trust resulting, for example, from cooperation contracts or agreements. The trade mark can be filed in bad faith in order to acquire a financial extortion from the owner of an earlier sign, or to gain control of that entity, or to force the conclusion of the license agreement, etc. The trade mark can be also filed in bad faith with the intention to block the use of the prior sign or in order to acquire of the market position of the holder of the earlier mark. However, the allegation of bad faith trade mark application has not been proven by Sfinks Polska S.A.

See also “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 112/11“.

Trade mark law, case Sp. 500/11

January 30th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

On July 2008, Barbara Hildman requested the Polish Patent Office to invalidate the right of protection of the word-figurative trade mark BIKINI CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS R-175224 owned by Parfums Christian Dior from Paris, and registered for goods in Class 03 such as body and face care products. Barbara Hildman argued that BIKINI CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS R-175224 is similar to the trade mark BIKINI R-124158 registered with an earlier priority.

R-175224

Parfums Christian Dior admitted that the trade mark at issue was registered for similar range of goods, but the disputed sign has other distinctive elements such as CHRISTIAN DIOR and a colorful label, which proves that there is no risk of consumers’ confusion. Moreover, the Company argued that the contested mark containing the element CHRISTIAN DIOR is produced and marketed by the producer of luxury goods and it is basically identical to the well-known and reputable company name of the holder – Parfums Christian Dior. These products, as exclusive goods, are always sold at exposed places clearly marked with the company name “Christian Dior”, which reduces to zero the possibility of confusion with cosmetic products to other companies.

The Adjudicative Board of the Polish Patent Office dismissed the request. PPO decided that there is no likelihood of confusion, also, because the questioned trade mark is a carrier of the allure, prestigious image and aura of luxury. The combination of the weak trade mark BIKINI with a strong and recognizable sign CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS, completely eliminates the risk of confusion between the compared trade marks by the oriented and attentive consumer.

Barbara Hildman filed a complaint against this decision. She argued that merging of the word BIKINI with the words “CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS” and a graphic element, is like appropriation of someone else’s trade mark. The creation of trade marks by adding to them a company name and its seat distorts the nature and function of a trade mark, because each sign could be easily imitated, only adding a company name to such a sign, and in that case the registration of the earlier mark would be quite superfluous and without legal significance.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 13 May 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 41/11 repealed the contested decision and returned it to the PPO for further reconsideration. The Court ruled that the PPO did not properly examine the similarity of goods. There were no comparison on „which shelf” these identical goods are placed and who is their recipient, which in consequence it does not exclude the risk of association of the earlier trade mark with the later one. The Polish Patent Office did not consider that the necessary condition for the likelihood of confusion is at least the minimum similarity between compared trade marks. The lack of examination of this condition would mean that the company Christian Dior, or any other reputable or well-known company – due to its brand recognition, is granted the possibility to “append” to a recognizable name, or names – of any signs that are protected with earlier priority, and presenting it as their own. This would also mean illusory protection for an earlier trade mark in a situation where the reputable sign would build the family of marks, without prejudice to its recognition, just by adding a known company name or surname to any sign. In any of such cases, the appropriation by the prestigious brand of less known earlier trade marks, would show that their position and earlier protection do not apply and such protection has not been given any legal effect, and each of such a character – compared with the prestige trade mark, would have been assessed as having weak distinctive ability.

The Polish Patent Office in its decision of 19 January 2012 case Sp. 500/11 invalidated the right of protection for the trade mark BIKINI CHRISTIAN DIOR PARIS R-175224.

Polish patent attorneys, case II GSK 833/10

January 20th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 1 September 2011 case file II GSK 833/10 decided the cassation appeal that was filed by the National Council of Patent Attorneys in the case of the candidate for the patent attorney traineeship. The candiate did not agree with grades that she received during the entry exam. The SAC held that the cassation complaint was unjustified because of the lack of clarity in the rules of operation of the examination committee could cause significant differences in the assessments and grades that were issued by individual members of the committee. Grades that were issued for the same answer for the same question were so significantly different (4 and 10, 3 and 10) that it could indicate only that not all members of the committee acted in accordance with objective, reliable rules. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 11 February 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1713/09 correctly annulled the resolution of the National Council of Patent Attorneys, because the Council did not use clear criteria for assessing candidates for the patent attorney traineeship, thus giving rise to the recognition by the VAC that such resolution violated the requirements for reasons and justification of the administrative decision. The SAC held that the sufficient guarantee of proper operation of the committee would be, apart from the personal reliability of its members, formulation and disclosure of clear criteria for evaluation in all fields of the exam.

Copyright law, case IV CSK 133/11

January 18th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Court in its judgment of 21 October 2011 case file IV CSK 133/11 held that the respective remuneration for the culpable infringement as defined in Article 79(1) pt. 3 letter b of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631, with subsequent amendments, does not depend on proof of actual damage that was suffered by the rightholder.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 839/10

January 17th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

Nufarm Australia Limited, the owner of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428 registered for goods in Class 5, requested the Polish Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for DUAL IR-0534713 owned by Syngenta Participations AG. Earlier before, Syngenta opposed the registratin of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428.

Syngenta requested the PPO to dismiss the request. The Company provided evidence of use of the trade mark DUAL IR-0534713. There were six copies of VAT invoices from the period from 2002 to 2006, of sale of goods bearing the sign “DUAL GOLD 960 EC”, and two newspaper articles concerning this product and the material safety data sheets of “DUAL GOLD 960 EC of August 2005.

The Polish Patent Office decided on the lapse of the right of protection for DUAL IR-0534713 and dismissed the opposition against the registration of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428. Syngenta filed a complaint against this decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 19 March 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1807/09 dismissed it. Syngenta filed a cassation compliant.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 3 October 2011 case file II GSK 839/10 repealed the contested judgment and returned it to the VAC for further reconsideration. The SAC ruled that the cassation complaint can be based on the following grounds: a) the violation of substantive law by its erroneous interpretation or misuse, or the violation of proceedings rules, if it could affect the outcome of the case. The specific provisions of substantive law or procedural law, which were violated the court of first instance, should be indicated. Furthermore, it should be precisely explained What was the misapplication or misinterpretation – in relation to substantive law, or it should be demonstrated what was the significant impact of the violation of procedural law to decide the case by the court of first instance – in relation to the rules of proceedings. The Supreme Administrative Court cannot change or precise cassation complaints and their grounds, or otherwise correct them, due to limitations resulting from the mentioned rules. If the cassation complaint alleges violation of both substantive law and proceedings, as it was in the present case, the Supreme Administrative Court recognizes the allegation of violation of proceedings, in the first place.

The SAC decided the PPO has erred in its findings because it considered that the evidence submitted on, was from the years 2002-2006, while there was also an invoice from March 2007 on the case file, which was of the relevance to the case. It was a sales invoice of the preparation DUAL GOLD 960 EC 12 XI and DUAL GOLD 960 EC 4X 5 L. Surprisingly, the Supreme Administrative Court acknowledged, that the case facts showed that the trade mark DUAL GOLD lapsed on June 2006, so as a trade mark it ceased to exist on the market from that date (it was not registered). Since the trade mark DUAL GOLD ceased to exist in legal transactions after June 2006, the Polish Patent Office should examine whether this sign could be used in this situation, as indicated on the invoice of March 2007, or perhaps the invoice indicated the use of any other trade mark, for example, the trade mark DUAL, and therefore the Article 170 (1) of the IPL should be applied in this case.

Article 170
1. Subject to paragraph (2), the Patent Office shall dismiss a request for declaring the right of protection lapsed in the case referred to in Article 169(1)(i), if before the submission of the request genuine use of the mark has started or has been resumed.

2. Start or resumption of the use of the trademark after the expiration of an uninterrupted period of five successive years of non-use and within a period of three months preceding the submission of the request for declaring the right of protection lapsed, shall be disregarded, if preparations for the start or resumption of the use have been undertaken immediately after the right holder became aware of possible submission of such request.

3. Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply accordingly in the cases referred to in Article 169(7).

4. Loss of a right to use a sign or a symbol, referred to in Article 131(2) incorporated in a trademark shall not constitute a ground for non-making a decision declaring the right of protection for that trademark lapsed, if that sign or symbol ceased to be used in the trademark before a request for the declaration of the right of protection lapsed has been submitted.

In light of this evidence, which were the facts of this case, where a detailed analysis could affect the outcome of the case, it was premature by the court of first instance to rule and to say that, in this case that the genuine use of the mark has not started or has not been resumed, and PPO in this case did not erred in law, because it has analyzed all the evidence gathered. Considering other procedural allegations, the SAC held that administrative courts are not required in justification of its judgments to refer to each decision of Polish or European courts, that were cited by the author of a complaint. Such obligation can not be inferred from any provision of the Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts. However, the administrative court should refer to these judgments, of which the applicant derives important arguments for the assessment of the case. In this case, the Court of first instance did not meet this requirement.

The SAC noted that the doctrine of law and case-law indicate that the trade mark proprietor may use its sign in an altered form in connection to the form of a sign that was registered. This alteration however, cannot apply to elements that decide on the distinctiveness of the sign, or may not lead to changes in represented form as a distinctive whole. See the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 May 2006 case file II GSK 70/06. The SAC confirmed the high degree of freedom to dispose of a trademark by its proprietor, and cited the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 June 2008 case file II GSK 251/08. See “Trade mark law, case II GSK 251/08“. The SAC found that the VAC has not sufficiently analyzed of all substantive rules in the context of this case. However, both situation where the violation of substantive law may happen, i.e., violation of substantive law by its incorrect interpretations or inappropriate use, refer only to cases where the facts of the case were established in no uncertain terms. Otherwise, the alleged breach of substantive law is at least premature. This situation took place in this case, because the author of the complainant cassation alleged in the first place the violation of the proceedings by the VAC. The violation of proceedings was based on the refusal by the court of first instance to repeal the decision issued by the Polish Patent Office, in a situation when that PPO did not adequately explain the facts of the case and did not examine in a comprehensive manner the whole of the evidence.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 586/11

January 2nd, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Patent Office refused to grant the right of protection for the word-figurative trade mark @ @lfanet Z-331247 applied for by @ALFANET Marcin Małolepszy from Borowo Kolonia for for goods and services in Classes 09, 37, 38, 42 and 45.

Z-331247

The PPO decided that the applied trade mark is similar to the word trade mark ALFANET R-145012 registered with the earlier priority for the Polish company ALPHANET sp. z o.o. for services in class 38. The PPO did not agree with the applicant that ALFANET sign has weak distinctive character. Although the ending “net” is not distinctive for services related to the IT industry, but combined with the word “alpha”, it creates a neologism, which can be deemed as a fanciful sign.

Mr Małolepszy filed a complaint against the decision of the PPO, arguing that grant of a right of protection for a trade mark in respect of specific goods should not constitute an autonomous ground for refusal to grant a right of protection for a trade mark in respect of the goods identical or similar to those of another undertaking for a sole reason that the trade mark contains an identical or similar sign which refers to personal interests, in particular the owner’s name.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 24 June 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 586/11 dismissed the complaint and held that the argument that the applicant relied on is an exception to the rule of inadmissibility of the coexistence of similar signs, and as such can not be broadly interpreted, and it should be applied with caution, taking into account not only the ratio legis, but also the principles provided in the Polish Industrial Property Law, that relate to trade marks and their basic functions. Although the provisions of Article 135 of the IPL, in contrast to previous regulations, do not include the condition that the applied trade mark should not be misleading, but, in the opinion of the Court, the interpretation that would lead to the registration of two identical or similar trade marks for identical goods and/or services, could not be accepted.

Consumer protection, case XVII Amc 113/11

December 29th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The provision of the Rules of the Municipal Public Library in Słupsk stated that the Library may allow for reproductions or digital reproductions of one publishing volume sheet, which is approx. 22 pages of A4 format, of any documents protected by copyright law that are in the collection of the Library. However, such rules are contrary to the provisions of Article 23 of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631, with subsequent amendments.

Section 3
Lawful Use of Protected Works
Art. 23.-1. It shall be permissible, without the consent of the creator, to make use free of charge, of a work that has already been disclosed. However, this provision shall not authorize the construction of a building based on an architectural work or a work of urban architecture made by another person.
2. Personal use shall extend to use within a circle of persons who are personally related, in particular by blood or marriage, or who entertain social relations.

The Polish Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in its judgment of 9 December 2011 case file XVII AmC 113/11 held that such rule is prohibited and deemed as a wrongful contractual provision, as defined in the Article 3851 § 1 of the Civil Code – CC – (in Polish: Kodeks Cywilny) of 23 April 1964, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 16, item 93, with subsequent amendments.

Article 3851. § 1. Provisions of a contract concluded with a consumer, which have not been individually agreed with him, shall not be binding thereupon, if his rights and duties have been stipulated in conflict with public decency and in flagrant violation of his interest (wrongful contractual provisions). This shall not relate to the provisions which specify basic performances of the parties, including the price and remuneration if determined explicitly.
§ 2. Where the provision referred to in paragraph 1 is not binding upon the consumer, the parties shall be bound by the remaining provisions of the contract.
§ 3. The provisions not agreed individually shall be such provisions of the contract over which the consumer had no actual influence. It shall concern, in particular, the provisions of the contract taken over from the model form of contract offered to a consumer by a contracting party.
§ 4. The burden of evidence to prove that the provision has been agreed individually shall be borne by the party who claims so.

The Court held that the Library cannot decide on limits of copying of any of the library collections. Copying books without limitation of the maximum number of pages is legally permissible. The provisions of the ARNR do not indicate any limits. Such a judgment come as no surprise, because every person who is in possession of any reprographic devices and conducts economic activities within the scope of reproduction of works for the personal use of third parties, is according to the provisons of article 201 of the ARNR obliged to pay, through a Collection Society, fees at up to 3% of proceeds generated from such activities, to authors and publishers, unless the reproduction is done on the basis of a contract signed with a rightholder. Such fees are paid to authors and publishers in equal parts.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 723/11

December 28th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

In 2007, the Polish Patent Office registered the word-figurative trademark citibank handlowy R-190720, for the American company Citibank, N.A., a National Banking Association. In 2008, Citigroup Inc. applied for the word trade mark CITI HANDLOWY Z-337716.

R-190720

The Polish Patent Office refused to grant the right of protection, despite the fact that Citibank N.A. is the sole shareholder of the Citigroup Inc., and Citigroup Inc. provided a letter of consent from its parent company. The PPO decided that both signs would mark very similar goods and services and are directed to the same audience. There is also visuall similarity, caused by common elements. The PPO noted that it is not obliged to take into account the letter of consent issued by Citibank, N.A. Citigroup Inc. filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 9 December 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 723/11 dismissed it. The Court held that the PPO correctly examined all evidence and properly decided on the similarity of signs. The VAC noted that that letters of consent may be evidence in proceedings, but they do not bind the PPO. The VAC pointed to the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 20 December 2007 case file II GSK 279/07. The SAC held that a letter of consent cannot be used as ground to register a trade mark since the Republic of Poland did not implement Article 4(5) of the First Council Directive 89/104.

Personal data protection, case II SA/Wa 1009/11

December 28th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

A Polish farmer who owns an agriculture tourism farm and is advertising his services and business on a personal website, has found negative comments about his services at one of the Internet forum websites. He asked the administrator of the forum to remove his personal data. Some posts have been removed, but the farmer has demanded the removal of all statements and comments, and the access to personal data of forum’s users. He requested the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) to order the forum administrator to remove all comments and to disclose all necessary personal data. The GIODO refused to issue such a decision and ruled that the farmer himself published such information as his name and address on his website in connection to the conducted economic activity. According to the GIODO, the processing of information on the farmer’s name on the Internet forum website, has its justification in Article 23(1)(v) of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments.

1. The processing of data is permitted only if:
1) the data subject has given his/her consent, unless the processing consists in erasure of personal data,
2) processing is necessary for the purpose of exercise of rights and duties resulting from a legal provision,
3) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract,
4) processing is necessary for the performance of tasks provided for by law and carried out in the public interest,
5) processing is necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests pursued by the controllers or data recipients, provided that the processing does not violate the rights and freedoms of the data subject.

According to the GIODO, the purpose of the legitimate interests is based on providing a service that allows for posting on the internet forum. The dissatisfied farmer filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 16 November 2011 case file II SA/Wa 1009/11 dismissed it and decided that personal data published on a website that advertises agritourism services, are closely related to his business activities, and therefore subject to much weaker protection. These services may be subject to different assessments of people using them, there may be also some negative comments. The Court noted that the farmer could file a civil suit for the infringement of his interests against persons who wrote such comments.

Access to public information, case II SAB/Wa 295/11

December 18th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Association of Leaders of Local Civic Groups (SLLGO) requested the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to disclose the correspondence, including e-mails, of members of the Council of Ministers and their assistants, that concerned the revision of the Polish Act of 6 September 2001 on Access to Public Information – API – (in Polish: Ustawa o dostępie do informacji publicznej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 112, item 1198, with subsequent amendments. The Prime Minister refused, arguing that e-mails are not public information, because it is internal correspondence. The SSLGO filed a complaint for failure to act.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 1 December 2011 case file II SAB/Wa 295/11 agreed with the SSLGO and decided that e-mail correspondence in this case was not private, but it should be deemed as public information and properly disclosed as it was requested by the Association, because it concerned the amendment to the API. The Court noted that such e-mails related to public affairs, this issue was previously mentioned by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 16 January 2004 case file II SAB 364/0.

Press law, case SK 42/09

December 16th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 14 December 2011 case file SK 42/09 held that criminal sanctions for failure to register a daily newspaper or a periodical, as provided in Article 45 of the Polish Act of 26 January 1984 on Press law – APL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo prasowe), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 5, item 24, with subsequent amendments, are unconstitutional.

Anybody who publishes a daily newspaper or a periodical without registration or with registration suspended is subject to a fine penalty or the restriction of liberty.

This judgement indicates that the Polish legislator should consider a separate regulation for a printed press, and other rules for periodicals published, in particular, in the Internet. The Court pointed out not only the issue of criminal sanctions for the publication of press without registration, but also the issue of the obligation to register the press, which is still available in the APL.

See also “Press law, case IV KK 174/07“, “Press law, case II K 367/08” and “Press law, case VI Ka 409/07“.