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Archive for: Polish Supreme Administrative Court

Trade mark law, case II GSK 765/09

October 18th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 September 2010 case file II GSK 765/09 held that the view that the content and scope of rights as referred to in Article 153 of the IPL were an obstacle to a possible objection by the entities, which do not have rights, which they claim to protect, does not deserve the acceptance.

Article 153
1. The right of protection shall confer the exclusive right to use the trademark for profit or for professional purposes throughout the territory of the Republic of Poland.

2. The term of the right of protection shall be 10 years counted from the date of filing of a trademark application with the Patent Office.

3. The term of protection may, at the request of the right holder, be extended for subsequent ten-year periods in respect of all or of a part of the goods.

4. The request referred to in paragraph (3) shall be submitted before the expiration of a running protection period, however not earlier than one year before the expiration thereof. The request shall be submitted together with the payment of a due protection fee.

5. The request referred to in paragraph (3) may also be submitted, against payment of an additional fee, within six months after the expiration of a protection period. The said time limit shall be non-restorable.

6. The Patent Office shall make a decision on refusal to extend the term of protection for a trademark, where the request has been submitted after the expiration of the time limit referred to in paragraph (5) or the due fees referred to in paragraphs (4) and (5) have not been paid.

The legislature thus entails exclusive rights to the use of the trade mark for the profit or professional purposes and filing the opposition is not a form of use of the mark as shown above. The same conclusions may be reached while interpreting the provisions included in Article 296(2) of the IPL, in which the legislature combines the scope of trademark protection in the form of civil claims with the use of signs in business, while the opposition is not an action in the context of economic activity.

Article 296
2. Infringement of the right of protection for a trademark consists of unlawful use in the course of trade of:
(i) a trademark identical to a trademark registered in respect of identical goods,
(ii) a trademark identical or similar to a trademark registered in respect of identical or similar goods, if a likelihood of misleading the public, including in particular a risk of associating the trademark with a registered trademark, exists;
(iii) a trademark identical or similar to a renown trademark registered for any kind of goods, if such use without due cause would bring unfair advantage to the user or be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trademark.

Given those conditions, the exclusive rights of trademark protection does not cover the monopoly beyond the boundaries of economic activity or, in other words, use of the mark for the profit or professional purposes. The opposition remains outside the so-defined borders. This case concerned LORD R-88669 trade mark owned by REKORD S.A.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 691/09

October 5th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 14 October 2002, the Polish company BWS Polska Sp. z o.o. based in Zaczernie applied for the right of protection for VARNA Z-256235 trademark for goods in Class 33 such as wines. The Polish Patent Office informed the applicant that it cannot be granted a right of protection because VARNA is also a geographical name of the Bulgarian city of Varna, which is located in the eastern Black Sea region famous for producing high quality white wines. Due to the fact that the seat of the applicant is located on Polish territory, the sign may lead the potential buyers to confusion as to the origin of goods. In response, BWS noted that the sign does not contain any false information, while simultaneously indicating that it is an importer and distributor of wines from south-eastern Europe, including Bulgaria.

The PPO received also comments issued by BSG Poland Sp. z o. o. in which the company raised objection of lack of statutory requirements for the protection of the questioned trade mark. Comments were sent to BWS but the company has not agreed to these statements.

The Polish Patent Office refused to grant a right of protection. The PPO ruled that VARNA sign is information on the place of the origin of wine – the site of a wine-growing and processing, without informing the consumer about anything else. According to the PPO, the importer has the right to register its trade mark, but the choice that violates the rights of manufacturers who conduct business in the region of Varna – infringes on the principles of merchant’s honesty. A situation in which the Bulgarian wine producers could not provide the Polish consumer that the wine has been produced by them is not fair, because they were outrun by an entity whose relationship with Bulgaria is at least questionable.

BWS requested the retrial of its case. The company reduced the original list of goods to wines from Bulgaria. It argued also that, under a contract with the Bulgarian multi-vendor, which is located in Varna, it has exclusive rights to sell original bottled VARNA wine. BWS indicated that the packaging of imported wine, includes bottle shape and color and shape, color, composition and location of the graphic label and it is its own creation. The company pointed out that the Trade Mark Register includs other signs being the name of national and international cities, towns, and in its opinion, the registration of VARNA trade mark will not be the monopolization of the word, because the Varna city remains a geographical name, the name of the appellation of origin or possibly the name of the seat of the suppliers of wine.

After reconsidering the matter, the Polish Patent Office upheld the contested decision. The PPO withdrew from contesting the trade as contrary to good merchant’s practice and public policy, pointing out also that the limited list of goods also been removed as an obstacle to the misleading nature of the sign. However, the PPO ruled that VARNA is the word trade mark, with no graphics, and indicates the origin of goods, therefore, it cannot be registered. The average consumer will read the sign as the Bulgarian city or geographic region on the Black Sea, famous for making wines. BWS filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 18 March 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 2098/08 held that the contested decision is the right. According to the Court the basic prerequisite for the grant of the right of protection is the distinctive character of a sign. The legal doctrine distinguishes between the so-called abstract distinctive ability and the concrete distinctive ability. The mark is characterized by the abstract distinctive ability, where a sign is examined abstractly (in isolation from the specific goods or services) capable of distinguishing the goods of one undertaking from those of another. The mark has concrete distinctive character when it is capable of distinguishing goods or services specified in the application to the Patent Office of goods or services of another company.

BWS filed a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 13 July 2010 case file II GSK 691/09 reversed the contested judgment and refered the case back for reconsideration. The SAC held that the VAC overlooked in its deliberations, the fact that the disputed word mark VARNA is not present in the Polish language as the name of the city in Bulgaria. This spelling of the city name does not occur in Bulgarian either (it’s Варна). However, in Polish language the city is known as Warna. Meanwhile the VAC in assessing the facts of the case stated that it was undisputed that the sign is the name of the VARNA city in Bulgaria and that by placing it on the goods (wines originating from Bulgaria) it will indicate the relevant public without difficulty and without no additional actions the origin goods. The Court had the duty to assess the legality of the contested decision of the Polish Patent Office even if the allegation was not raised in the complaint. The law requires that the assessment whether the mark is sufficiently distinctive has to be made individually for each sign. The VAC should also examine the issue whether a questioned sign due to the use of the first letter “V” and not “W” (as is correctly spelled in Polish) has sufficient distinctiveness, although phonetically the “V” and “W” letters sound the same in the Polish language. Of those grounds the SAC held that the VAC has not made an overall assessment of distinctive character of the sign in question, taking into account its visual, aural or conceptual elements, and therefore the VAC infringed on Article 113 §1 and Article 145 §1 point 1 C of the Polish Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, since it dismissed the case without adequate explanation of the matter. The SAC noted also that the BWS claimed that, under the earlier decisions of the PPO, it acquired rights of protection for trademarks, even though they were the names of cities (Melnik – a city in Bulgaria), Calama (a city in Chile), or Beverly Hills (a city in California), however, the VAC did not respond to such arguments. In light of the settled case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, the administration body can change its opinion on the content of the right conclusion, which should be issued in a specific type of cases, but it must carefully justify such a change, especially when changing the view of decisions taken in relation to the same applicant. The case-law of the administration may therefore be subject to change, if the authority demonstrates that there are reasonable grounds.

Personal data protection, case I OSK 592/10

September 21st, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights requested the Internal Security Agency (in Polish: Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego – ABW) to provide information on operational activities conducted in the form of operational control. The ABW refused to provide such information and argued that such information on operational control, without exception, and the distinction between statistical and other information, is a state secret and are marked “top secret”. The Foundation filed a complaint for failure to act.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 January 2010 case file II SAB/Wa 152/09 held that the ABW did not provide information as requested, nor has issued a proper refusal. therefore, the ABW failed to act properly, The VAC has committed the Head of the Internal Security Agency to proceed the application of Helsinki Foundation of 1 June 2009, either by providing relevant information or by issuing a decision to refuse, in accordance with Article 16(1) the Polish Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information – API – (in Polish: Ustawa o dostępie do informacji publicznej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 112, item 1198, with subsequent amendments, which will allow the Foundation to use legal means, including the right to bring an action in the courts because of the reason for the refusal.

Article 16. 1. The refusal to make the public information available and discontinuation of proceedings to make the information available in the case defined in Article 14, it. 2 by the body of public authority takes place by means of a decision.
2. In relation to the decision, defined in it. 1, the provisions of the Code of Administrative Proceedings shall apply, however:
1) the appellation from the decision is investigated within 14 days,
2) the justification of the decision on the refusal of making the information available includes also the names, surnames, and these persons’ functions, who took decision under the procedure on making the information available and marking the entities, in relation to whose goods, defined in Article 5, it. 2, the decision on the refusal to make information available was issued.

The Head of the Internal Security Agency filed a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 7 July 2010 case file I OSK 592/10 held that the case-law of administrative courts presents the view that the complaint on the failure to act by the public authority during the proceedings for access to public information may be filed not only against the so-called “silence” of the authority, but also in a situation in which the dispute arose between the applicant and the addressee as to the nature of the information requested. However, the SAC was not able determine what is the nature of the information requested.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 626/09

September 6th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Swiss company Marquard Media, current publisher of the magazine “Przegląd Sportowy”, which since 1974 always includes a supplement entitled “Skarb Kibica” (in English: Fan’s Treasure), succeeded in registering SKARB KIBICA R-134960 at the Polish Patent Office.

In 2004, Profus Management requested the invalidation of the right of protection for the SKARB KIBICA trade mark. Profus claimed that this sign has informational nature rather than distinctive character. It provided an opinion written by professor Urszula Promińska to support its arguments with this regard. In 1992 Profus Management bought the weekly football magazine “Piłka Nożna” with “Skarb Kibica” column. Marquard Media filed a trade mark infringement suit.

In 2006, the PPO has decided on the invalidation of the right of protection. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 2 October 2006 case file VI SA/WA 791/06 reversed this decision, but only because of deficiencies in the proceedings and send it back to the PPO for reconsideration.

When examining the case after the judgment, the PPO in its decision of 25 February 2008 case file Sp. 213/07 dismissed Profus Management request. The PPO held that the mere use of the sign in question by different entities cannot deprive its distinctiveness. When the case went again in 2009 to the VAC, the owner of “Przegląd Sportowy” and “Skarb Kibica” was Axel Springer Poland. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 27 February 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 2219/08 dismissed Profus complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 31 August 2010 case file II GSK 626/09 upheld this decision. The SAC held that the mere use of this sign by different publishers at the date of its registration cannot deprive its distinctiveness. The distinctive character of such a sign is examined, of how it was perceived by readers interested in football and sport activities.

Procedural law, case II GPS 1/10

September 3rd, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 28 June 2010 case file II GPS 1/10 held that provisions of Article 272 § 1 of the Act on the Law on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, with later amendments, serve as the basis for resumption of proceedings in administrative courts, whenever the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal on compliance of the provisions of substantive and procedural with the Constitution, international agreement or act, concerned a legislative act, which was applied or should be applied before the administrative court or public authority in a given case.

Categories: Art. 272 §1 PBAC | Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts | Polish Constitutional Tribunal | Polish Supreme Administrative Court.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 607/09

August 31st, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

TRODAT POLSKA Sp. z o.o. from Warsaw applied for the right of protection for Pieczątka 2 Z-294822, Pieczątka 3 Z-294821, and Pieczątka 4 Z-294823 trade marks in class 13. Pieczątka means “stamp” in English. The Polish Patent Office in letters dated 27 March 2007 informed the applicant that these signs are not capable of serving as trade marks due to lack of sufficient distinctive character and urged Trodat to submit comment on this issue. The applicant did not respond to the letters sent by the PPO, in particular, Trodat did not take any position on the reported lack of sufficient distinctive character.

Z-294821

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 14 July 2010 case file II GSK 607/09 held that the burden of proof rests on those who seek for legal consequences from a particular fact for itself (the applicant), it results from a series of obligations incumbent on the applicant, including the obligation to provide explanations, to take an active part in the proceedings and to submit precise requests. These obligations are provided in Articles 145(2) and 152 of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments, in connection with Regulation of the Prime Minister of 8 July 2002 on filing and processing of trademark applications, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 115, item 998 with subsequent amendments.

Article 145
1. Subject to paragraph (2), where the Patent Office finds that the statutory requirements for the grant of a right of protection for a trademark have not been satisfied, it shall make a decision on refusal to grant the right.
2. Before the decision referred to in paragraph (1) is made, the Patent Office shall fix a time limit, within which the applicant is invited to react on the collected evidences and documents which imply the existence of grounds that may cause the right of protection to be denied.
3. Where the statutory requirements are found not to have been satisfied in respect to only certain goods, a right of protection for the trademark in respect of these goods shall be first to be refused by the Patent Office. On the respective decision becoming final the Patent Office shall grant a right of protection for the trademark in respect of the goods, for which it can be granted.

Article 152
The Prime Minister shall, by way of regulation, determine the detailed requirements to be satisfied by a trademark application, the detailed rules and procedure to be applied in the course of examination of trademark applications including, in particular, the extent to which the relevant information may be disclosed to the public after the expiration of the period referred to in Article 143 and the manner in which it is made available, as well as the extent to which the Patent Office is authorised to make corrections in the list of goods and their classification. The requirements to be satisfied by trademark applications may not be determined in such a way as to encumber the applicant with excessive and unreasonable impediments.

The renunciation of the party – despite the invitation issued by the Polish Patent Office – to submit sufficient evidence, explanations, positions may not be of no importance in a situation where the party alleges that the PPO erred in its decision in this particular issue, as a result of breach of the obligation imposed on the PPO to clarify the circumstances of the case in accordance with Article 7 and 77 of the Administrative Proceedings Code – APC – (in Polish: Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego) of 14 June 1960, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 30, item 168, consolidated text of 9 October 2000, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 98, item 1071 with subsequent amendments.

Article 7
Public administration bodies shall uphold the rule of law during proceedings and shall take all necessary steps to clarify the facts of a case and to resolve it, having regard to the public interest and the legitimate interests of members of the public.

Article 77.
§ 1. The public administration body is required to comprehensively collect and examine all evidential material.
§ 2. At each stage of proceedings a body can amend, supplement or withdraw rulings made regarding the examination of evidence.
§ 3. An body conducting proceedings as a result of having been required to do so by the body having jurisdiction to settle the case (Article 52) may, on an ex officio basis or on application by one of the parties, hear new witnesses or experts on circumstances that form the objects of such proceedings.
§ 4. Universally accepted facts and facts known to the body ex officio do not require proof. Parties to proceedings should be informed of facts that are known to the body.

The SAC noted that the provisions of the IPL that provides the possibility to request the applicant by the PPO to submit comments or issue a statement, in fact, serve to define the limits of administrative case, such as defining what is to be examined by the PPO and to what extent this should occur. The PPO is required to make an invitation before taking a decision, therefore, before deciding on the matter. At this stage, it is possible to have the intervention of the parties, if, contrary to the intentions expressed in the request/application, the PPO, for example, does not cover by its activities of all elements of the case, or unreasonably restricts its borders.

Tax law, case II FSK 627/09

August 30th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 25 August 2010 case file II FSK 627/09 held that only a registered trade mark may be depreciated. The Court ruled according to Article 16b(1) pt. 6 of the Polish Act of 15 February 1992 on the Legal Entities’ Income Tax – LEIT – (in Polish: Ustawa o podatku dochodowym od osób prawnych) consolidated text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2000, No. 54, item 654 with subsequent amendments.

Art. 16b. 1. The following intangible assets, acquired and fit for commercial use as at the date of acceptance for use, shall be depreciated, subject to Article 16c:
1) the cooperative ownership right to an apartment;
2) the cooperative ownership right to commercial premises;
3) the right to a single-family house in a housing cooperative;
4) copyright or related proprietary rights;
5) licences;
6) rights to: inventions, patents, trademarks, designs;

The SAC noted although that the LEIT does not provide the definition of registered trade mark or trade mark itself. However, not the same “mark”, but right of protection to the trade mark, which must meet the criterion for classification as a property right (intangible assets), is subject to depreciation.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 746/09

August 10th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

This is the continuation of a story decribed in “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 2284/08” that concerned the trade mark HERITAGE FILMS. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 10 August 2010 case file II GSK 746/09 dismissed the cassation complaint brought by Zygmunt Piotrowski. The SAC held inter alia that the provisions of the TMA or the IPL do not provide in the course of the litigation proceedings lead by the Polish Patent Office, for the possibility to control the legality of the administrative proceedings that concerned the registration of a given trade mark. The legality of a decision granting the right of protection should be challenged in different proceedings.

Heritage

The Court noted that Mr Piotrowski confused the concepts of “invalidation of the registration right” or “invalidation of right of protection for a trade mark” with the annulment of the decision on the granting of the right. There are different grounds for such decisions and other procedures on their issuance, but in case of the breach of the provisions listed in Article 29 of the Trade Marks Act, those conditions may overlap, and only in this case they might be raised in the opposition proceedings. Consequently, the invaliditon of the protection right, although identical in its consequences, cannot be identified with the institution of the annulment of the decision on the granting of the right of protection.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 495/09

August 10th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 14 March 1994, Polish entrepreneur operating under the name Usługi Pogrzebowe “Hades” Włodzimierz Wasilewski from Częstochowa applied for the right of protection for HADES Z-130892 trade mark in class 45, funeral services. Another Polish entrepreneur operating under the name Nowak Tomasz Firma Pogrzebowa HADES from Łódź filed an opposition to a final decision of the Patent Office on the grant of the right of protection for HADES R-148641 trade mark.

R-148641

Tomasz Nowak claimed that the Polish Patent Office ruled on the discontinuance of examination proceedings for HADES Z-130892 because of the failure to pay application fees and on 6 March 1999, he decided to file for the right of protection for word-figurative trade mark HADES Z-198798 in classes 26 31 39 42. On 26 September 2001 the PPO granted the right of protection for HADES R-132619 trade mark. Tomasz Nowak argued that the resumption of proceedings by the Patent Office on the application of HADES Z-130892 trade mark, which led to the granting of the right of protection, deprived him of part of the right acquired in good faith and the possibility to obtain the protection for the next sign. According to Tomasz Nowak the decision on the grant of the right of protection for HADES R-148641 trade mark, not only violates his right to earlier acquired trade mark, but most of all it violates the principle of certainty and security of legal transactions. It leads to a situation where the market will experience two identical trade marks, registered for identical goods, however, enjoyed by the various owners, which is contrary the rules of trade mark law of course.

R-132619

The PPO dismissed the opposition and Tomasz Nowak filed a complaint against this decision of the PPO. He based its claims on provisions of article 8(1) and (2) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 31 January 1985, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

Article 8
A trademark shall not be registrable if:
1) it is contrary to law or to the principles of social coexistence;
2) it infringes the personal or economic rights of third parties;

Tomasz Nowak also challenged the examination proceedings which led to the registration of the questioned trade mark.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 14 January 2009 case VI SA/Wa 1941/08 ruled that legal provisions invoked in the complaint cannot be applied to assess the legality of the registration proceedings conducted by the PPO. Accordingly, the request for invalidation of right of protection of HADES trade mark under these provisions was irrelevant. The provisions of the TMA, or the IPL does not provide in the course of the litigation proceedings lead by the PPO, the possibility to control the legality of the administrative proceedings that concerned the registration of the questioned trade mark. The Court ruled that the allegations of violation of the administrative procedure by the PPO could only qualify as a basis for annulment of the decision. Tomasz Nowak was required to bring such claims in the complaint, however he did not so. Tomasz Nowak filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 June 2010 case file II GSK 495/09 dismissed the cassation complaint. The SAC ruled that the VAC could not review the decision on the grant of a right of protection for HADES R-148641 trade mark. The VAC had to decide within the scope of the complaint and shall be bound by the legal ground invoked by the requesting party. The SAC also expressed the view that the registration of the name of someone else’s company does not preclude the registration of a trademark but the right to a name of the company must be infringed, and the existence of such right has not been proven by Tomasz Nowak. The complainer has not demonstrated that he had the right to name of the company. Actually both entrepreneurs have the right to use HADES sign as their business name. The complainer also argued that the mere prior use of the sign and not in relation to the applicant, but in relation to the entitled to the right of protection, provides a sufficient argument that the questioned trade mark infringes personal or economic rights of third parties. The SAC ruled that this view is incorrect. It clearly refers only to infringement of personal or property rights.

Advertising law, case II OSK 1234/09

August 5th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

An entrepreneur has placed a large billboard without obtaining a permit for the construction work. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 29 July 2010 case file II OSK 1234/09 held that when dealing with an object, which must be built on a proper ground, this is a construction work that requires permits for construction.The fact that this structure can be moved does not change a fact that it is a construction fixed to the ground, requiring a building permit.

Categories: advertising law | Polish Supreme Administrative Court.

Telecommunications law, case I OSK 1079/10

August 3rd, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

This is the continuation of a story described in “Personal data protection, case II SA/Wa 1598/09“. The Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 15 July 2010 case file I OSK 1079/10 decided to stay the execution of the decision issued by the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) and ruled that the Polish Act of 16 July 2000, Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments, provides broader protection of personal data because of telecommunications confidentiality, than the provisions of the Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 29 October 1997, No. 133, item 883, unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments.

The Court held that the disclosure of IP addresses which enable identification of specific individuals, that was ordered during administrative proceedings initiated with regard to disclosure of such data, while such proceedings did not ended with judgment in force, may violate the provisions of Article 160 of the TLA.

Article 160.
1. An entity participating in the performance of telecommunications activities within public networks and entities cooperating with it shall keep the telecommunications confidentiality.
2. Entities referred to in paragraph 1 shall maintain due diligence, within the scope justified by technical or economic reasons, while securing telecommunications equipment, telecommunications networks and data collections from disclosing the telecommunications confidentiality.
3. A person coming into possession of a message not meant to be read by him/her when using radio or terminal equipment shall keep the telecommunications confidentiality. The provisions of Article 159 (3) and (4) shall respectively apply.
4. The recording of a message acquired in a manner described in paragraph 3 by a body executing control of telecommunications activities in order to document a violation of a provision of the Act, shall not be a violation of the telecommunications confidentiality.

While assessing the validity of the request to stay the execution of GIODO’s decision to disclose the requested IP address at this stage of proceedings, the Court agreed with the author of the cassation complaint, that the execution of the questioned decision at this stage makes it impossible to reverse the actions taken after the disclosure of the IP addresses, and such action should be seen as causing the effects that are difficult to reverse according to Article 61(3) of the Act on the Law on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, subsequent later amendments.

§ 1 Filing a complaint does not stay the execution of the act or actions.

(…)

§ 3 After the delivery of a complaint to the court, the court may issue at the request of the applicant, the order to stay the execution, in whole or in part of the act or actions referred to in § 1, if there is a risk of causing significant damage or cause to be difficult to reverse, with the exception of the provisions of local law which entered into force, unless the special Act excludes the stay of their execution. The refusal to stay the execution of the act or actions by the authority, does not deprive the applicant of action to the court. This also applies to acts issued or adopted in all proceedings conducted within the same case.

The SAC held that if the Supreme Administrative Court would agree with the cassation complaint filed against the judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 3 February 2010 case file II SA/Wa 1598/09, the effects of the execution of the questioned decision could not be reversed, because the IP address identifying a specific person is available to another participant in the proceedings. Accordingly, the court held that the correct solution at this stage of proceedings, is to stay the execution of the questioned decision also with a view to the impact of which its execution might result in, as well as the nature of the protection of personal data resulting from the relevant regulations such as, inter alia, the TLA.

Industrial design and trade mark law, case II GSK 481/09

July 14th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

This is the continuation of the history described in “Industrial design and trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 710/08“. Rosinski Andrzej Rosinski Michal Rosinska Joanna Zaklad Produkcji Opakowan Rosinski i S-ka, Sp. J. decided to file a cassation complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court, hoping the Court would clarify the interpretation of article 117(2) of the IPL.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 May 2010, case file II GSK 481/09 ruled that there is no issue of wrong implementation of article 11 of the Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs. The Court noted that even the preamble of Design Directive explicitly states that Member States should remain free to fix the procedural provisions concerning registration, renewal and invalidation of design rights and provisions concerning the effects of such invalidity. Therefore, there is no need to refer a question to the Court of Justice of EU for a preliminary ruling. The SAC did not agree with arguments that the issue of finding that the exploitation of the industrial design infringes third parties’ personal or author’s economic rights shall be decided by civil court and not by the PPO. The question of similarity of the questioned design and 3D trade mark should also be decided by the PPO. The Court did not follow arguments presented by the General Court in its judgment of 12 May 2010 in case T-148/08, Beifa Group Co. Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market, Schwan-Stabilo Schwanhaüßer GmbH & Co. KG. However, the SAC did agree with the Polish company that facts of the case were not handled properly by the Voivodeship Administrative Court. Therefore, the SAC annulled the questioned judgments and returned the case to the VAC for reconsideration and ordered the Polish Patent Office to pay the Polish company a reimbursement of costs of the cassation compliant.

The Court noted also that if the trade mark that was used as a basis of the application for invalidation of the industrial design, is a sign that was registered with an earlier priority in Germany, which is not identical with the Community design that was questioned in the aforementioned application, is similar to this design, the law of the Member State (in this case § 14 section 2 pt 2 of Markengesetz, similar to Article 296 of the IPL) affords Unilever, the proprietor of the mentioned trade mark, the right to prohibit use of this sign in a later design only if because of the similarity of the design to the said trade mark and identical or similarity of the goods or services, which relate to the trade mark and the later design, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 608/09

July 13th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 19 March 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 1888/08 ruled that the consequence of the transfer of trade mark rights to another party, is that its previous owner is not allowed to continue to invoke the claims of the infringement of these trade marks. However, such a possibility is not excluded if the assignment of the trade mark rights will include appropriate provisions authorizing the previous owner of the trade mark to continue proceedings in which it claimed it has rights to assigned trade marks.

R-149940

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 13 May 2010 case file II GSK 608/09 epealed the contested judgment and returned it to the VAC for further reconsideration. The SAC held that at both the opposition proceedings as referred to in article 246 of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments, that served as the basis for the decision to refuse to grant a right of protection, and subsequent proceedings before the Polish Patent Office under litigation for invalidation of a right of protection, due to the recognition by the proprietor of a trade mark that the opposition is to be unfounded, the applicant who wants to support the opposition does not have to show the legal interest.

Article 246
1. Within six months from the publication in “Wiadomości Urzędu Patentowego” of the mention of the grant of a title of protection, any person may give reasoned notice of opposition to a final decision of the Patent Office on the grant of a patent, a right of protection or a right in registration.

2. The opposition referred to in paragraph (1) may be filed on the same grounds, on which a patent, a right of protection or a right in registration may be invalidated.

This case concerned the invalidation proceedings of the trade mark CARLO BOSSI R-149940 that was registered for goods in Class 3 by KIVI Dr Krzysztof Słoń from Izabelin Laski.

Broadcasting law, case II GSK 741/09

July 13th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment case file II GSK 741/09 held that the Polish Act on Broadcasting – LOB – (in Polish: Ustawa o radiofonii i telewizji) of 29 December 1992, Journal of Law (Dziennik Ustaw) of 1993, No 7 item 34, consolidated text of 19 Novemver 2004, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 253 item 2531, with later amendments, does not provide grounds to prohibit broadcasting at the same time, various local content in the concession decision on transmission of local bands. The opinion of The National Broadcasting Council on the prohibition of fission of broadcasts shall not serve as the basis for justification of the decision.

Categories: broadcasting law | National Broadcasting Council | Polish Act on Broadcasting | Polish institutions | Polish Supreme Administrative Court.

Procedural law, case II GSK 643/09

July 12th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 11 June 2010 case file II GSK 643/09 clarified the rules for a cassation complaint. Accordingly, a cassation complaint may be based on the violation of substantive law. The violation is based on legal misinterpretation or improper application of the law. Misinterpretation is a false understanding of legal norms. The improper application is a wrong recognition that the factual scenario established in a given case is a subject to a specific rule of law. The improper application of law may also rely on non-application of the legal provision which should be used in a given case. The violation of the substantive law by the court of first instance (the Voivodeship Administrative Court) is always based on the wrong assessment of the application of substantive law by the Polish Patent Office. That is, either through the unfounded acceptance of an error in law that was made by the PPO or unjustified accusation of the PPO of such error. The SAC stressed that the allegation of infringement of substantive law can be effectively formulated only when the applicant who filed a cassation complaint agrees that the facts of the case had been established properly. Putting this plea in the case of challenging the factual findings is premature.

Categories: Art. 141 §4 PBAC | Art. 84 APC | Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts | Polish Administrative Proceedings Code | Polish Supreme Administrative Court.

Procedural law, case II GZ 141/10

July 12th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 7 July 2010 case file II GZ 141/10 held that when examining the application for grant the right of assistance, a court does not undertake any action where the accurate data to allow the full assessment of the financial status and the applicant’s ability to pay are not known, because the applicant avoids to submit of relevant documents on this subject. The right of assistance covers the exemption from court fees and the establishment of the lawyer, tax advisor, or patent attorney. It is the interests of the party to demonstrate the merits of an application in the light of the statutory conditions for granting the right of assistance. See also “Procedural law, case FZ 165/04“.

Categories: Art. 184 PBAC | Art. 245 PBAC | Art. 246 §1 PBAC | Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts | Polish Supreme Administrative Court.

Personal data protection, case I OSK 756/09

July 11th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

A former entrepreneur (natural person) requested a telecommunications company to remove his personal data that were used for marketing purposes. The company did not want to take into account the above-mentioned demands, arguing that the rights provided in Article 33 of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments, are not afforded for persons who perform or performed professional business activity (entrepreneurs).

Article 33
1. At the request of the data subject, within the period of 30 days, the controller shall be obliged to notify the data subject about his/her rights, and provide him/her with the information referred to in Article 32 paragraph 1 point 1-5a as regards his/her personal data, and in particular specify in an intelligible form:
1) the category of personal data contained in the file,
2) the means of data collection,
3) the purpose and the scope of data processing,
4) the recipients of the data and the scope of access they have been granted.
2. At the request of the data subject, the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be given in writing.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 March 2010 case file I OSK 756/09 held that provisions of Article 6 of the PPD does not differentiate the rights of individuals, depending on whether they are performing business activity or not. In this situation, there was no reason to exclude information about natural persons conducting business/economic activity from the protection guaranteed by the PPD.

Article 6
1. Within the meaning of the Act personal data shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.
2. An identifiable person is the one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
3. A piece of information shall not be regarded as identifying where the identification requires an unreasonable amount of time, cost and manpower.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 496/09

July 2nd, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Patent Office has refused to recognize the right of protection for a trademark PREMIUM DE-LUXE NEMIROFF IR-802093 registered for Nemiroff Intellectual Property Establishment because of its similarity to a series of earlier trade marks owned by the Pokish Company Wyborowa S.A. This series included word trade mark PREMIUM R-71602, PREMIUM VODKA R-82601, GOLD PREMIUM R-108603 and many others. Nemiroff filed a request for reconsideration claiming that the word “Premium” with respect to alcohol is often used to describe more accurately its class and quality and in this connection it has no distinctive character. Consumers are choosing alcohol based on its quality and the name of the manufacturer.

IR-802093

The Patent Office upheld the contested decision. The PPO explained that the most exposed part of the questioned trade trade is the word PREMIUM, because of its location, size and bright color in contrast to the soothing white-blue-gray color of the rest of the sign.The PPO stated that the word “Premium” is easy to remember, but it has rather poor degree of distinctive character, which are often used to denote exceptional quality. The figurative elements of the mark in such a situation may not be sufficient to exclude the likelihood of misledading the purchasers as to the origin of the goods, in particular, it will not help to exclude the associations between characters. Although the PPO agreed with the position of the parties as to the universality of the word “Premium” in trade, however, the PPO also noted that in the strict sense it may be a distinctive sign in Poland, and it is the most exposed element in questioned trade mark. The broad and long-term use of it in the form of trade marks used by Wyborowa S.A. allowed it to acquire a secondary meaning. Given the above, the Patent Office found that in normal economic turnover PREMIUM DE-LUXE NEMIROFF may mislead the public as to the origin of the goods, as well as infringe the rights of protection of the owner of the opposed trade marks.

Nemiroff filed a complaint. The Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw in its judgment of 27 November 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1583/08 sided with PPO’s opinion. The VAC held that the Office properly decided that the questioned trade mark is similar to a series of earlier registered trade marks, all including the distinctive word element „Premium”, which created the risk of the public being misled.

Nemiroff filed a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 23 March 2010 case file II GSK 496/09 repealed the contested judgment and returned it to the VAC for further reconsideration. The SAC held that the VAC erred in assessing the similarity between the opposing trade marks by focusing only on one element – the word “Premium”, without trying to explain its distinctive character as a designation of exceptional quality of a product. Then it would be difficult to talk about the fact that the earlier registered trade marks with the word “Premium” come from one source. The owner of a sign that has weak distinctive character must often tolerate the coexistence of the similar trade marks.

See also “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1133/10“.

Polish patent attorneys, case II GZ 224/09

June 28th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 18 May 2010, case file II GZ 224/09 ruled that the Act on the Law on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, with later amendments, did not afford a possibility of making a further appeal, or complaint from the judgments delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court. This means that the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court becomes final upon its publication. The administrative proceedings, as a general rule, is divided into two stages of jurisdiction. This principle is consistent with the articles 176(2) of the Polish Constitution.

Procedural law, case II FSK 153/09

June 11th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 May 2010 case file II FSK 153/09 held that the allegations made in the cassation complaint are key issues for identyfing the boundaries of a given case. The Supreme Administrative Court shall decide the case within the scope of a cassation complaint, examining ex officio only the invalidity of the proceedings. The legitimacy of cassation complaint shifts from the legitimacy of allegations that were raised in it, which should be demonstrated by appropriate justification. The exclusion by the Voivodeship Administrative Court of binding interpretation of law in a given case, that is based on article 153 of the PBAC, is a violation of law, in particular the democratic rule of law provided in article 2 of the Polish Constitution.

Categories: Art. 153 PBAC | case law | Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts | Polish Supreme Administrative Court.