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Archive for: Art. 170 IPL

Trade mark law, case II GSK 839/10

January 17th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

Nufarm Australia Limited, the owner of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428 registered for goods in Class 5, requested the Polish Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for DUAL IR-0534713 owned by Syngenta Participations AG. Earlier before, Syngenta opposed the registratin of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428.

Syngenta requested the PPO to dismiss the request. The Company provided evidence of use of the trade mark DUAL IR-0534713. There were six copies of VAT invoices from the period from 2002 to 2006, of sale of goods bearing the sign “DUAL GOLD 960 EC”, and two newspaper articles concerning this product and the material safety data sheets of “DUAL GOLD 960 EC of August 2005.

The Polish Patent Office decided on the lapse of the right of protection for DUAL IR-0534713 and dismissed the opposition against the registration of the trade mark DUAL SALT TECHNOLOGY R-164428. Syngenta filed a complaint against this decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 19 March 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1807/09 dismissed it. Syngenta filed a cassation compliant.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 3 October 2011 case file II GSK 839/10 repealed the contested judgment and returned it to the VAC for further reconsideration. The SAC ruled that the cassation complaint can be based on the following grounds: a) the violation of substantive law by its erroneous interpretation or misuse, or the violation of proceedings rules, if it could affect the outcome of the case. The specific provisions of substantive law or procedural law, which were violated the court of first instance, should be indicated. Furthermore, it should be precisely explained What was the misapplication or misinterpretation – in relation to substantive law, or it should be demonstrated what was the significant impact of the violation of procedural law to decide the case by the court of first instance – in relation to the rules of proceedings. The Supreme Administrative Court cannot change or precise cassation complaints and their grounds, or otherwise correct them, due to limitations resulting from the mentioned rules. If the cassation complaint alleges violation of both substantive law and proceedings, as it was in the present case, the Supreme Administrative Court recognizes the allegation of violation of proceedings, in the first place.

The SAC decided the PPO has erred in its findings because it considered that the evidence submitted on, was from the years 2002-2006, while there was also an invoice from March 2007 on the case file, which was of the relevance to the case. It was a sales invoice of the preparation DUAL GOLD 960 EC 12 XI and DUAL GOLD 960 EC 4X 5 L. Surprisingly, the Supreme Administrative Court acknowledged, that the case facts showed that the trade mark DUAL GOLD lapsed on June 2006, so as a trade mark it ceased to exist on the market from that date (it was not registered). Since the trade mark DUAL GOLD ceased to exist in legal transactions after June 2006, the Polish Patent Office should examine whether this sign could be used in this situation, as indicated on the invoice of March 2007, or perhaps the invoice indicated the use of any other trade mark, for example, the trade mark DUAL, and therefore the Article 170 (1) of the IPL should be applied in this case.

Article 170
1. Subject to paragraph (2), the Patent Office shall dismiss a request for declaring the right of protection lapsed in the case referred to in Article 169(1)(i), if before the submission of the request genuine use of the mark has started or has been resumed.

2. Start or resumption of the use of the trademark after the expiration of an uninterrupted period of five successive years of non-use and within a period of three months preceding the submission of the request for declaring the right of protection lapsed, shall be disregarded, if preparations for the start or resumption of the use have been undertaken immediately after the right holder became aware of possible submission of such request.

3. Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply accordingly in the cases referred to in Article 169(7).

4. Loss of a right to use a sign or a symbol, referred to in Article 131(2) incorporated in a trademark shall not constitute a ground for non-making a decision declaring the right of protection for that trademark lapsed, if that sign or symbol ceased to be used in the trademark before a request for the declaration of the right of protection lapsed has been submitted.

In light of this evidence, which were the facts of this case, where a detailed analysis could affect the outcome of the case, it was premature by the court of first instance to rule and to say that, in this case that the genuine use of the mark has not started or has not been resumed, and PPO in this case did not erred in law, because it has analyzed all the evidence gathered. Considering other procedural allegations, the SAC held that administrative courts are not required in justification of its judgments to refer to each decision of Polish or European courts, that were cited by the author of a complaint. Such obligation can not be inferred from any provision of the Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts. However, the administrative court should refer to these judgments, of which the applicant derives important arguments for the assessment of the case. In this case, the Court of first instance did not meet this requirement.

The SAC noted that the doctrine of law and case-law indicate that the trade mark proprietor may use its sign in an altered form in connection to the form of a sign that was registered. This alteration however, cannot apply to elements that decide on the distinctiveness of the sign, or may not lead to changes in represented form as a distinctive whole. See the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 May 2006 case file II GSK 70/06. The SAC confirmed the high degree of freedom to dispose of a trademark by its proprietor, and cited the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 June 2008 case file II GSK 251/08. See “Trade mark law, case II GSK 251/08“. The SAC found that the VAC has not sufficiently analyzed of all substantive rules in the context of this case. However, both situation where the violation of substantive law may happen, i.e., violation of substantive law by its incorrect interpretations or inappropriate use, refer only to cases where the facts of the case were established in no uncertain terms. Otherwise, the alleged breach of substantive law is at least premature. This situation took place in this case, because the author of the complainant cassation alleged in the first place the violation of the proceedings by the VAC. The violation of proceedings was based on the refusal by the court of first instance to repeal the decision issued by the Polish Patent Office, in a situation when that PPO did not adequately explain the facts of the case and did not examine in a comprehensive manner the whole of the evidence.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 668/08

March 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 25 January 2005, Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. applied to register the word trade mark CHOKELLA Z-290315 in Class 30, for goods such as: breakfast cereals, muesli, corn flakes, cereal bars, cereal flakes, cereal preparations, food products based on rice, flour or cereals, also in the form of ready-to-use meals. Nestlé was aware that there is a possiblity that the Polish Patent Office rejects the application because of the earlier registration of the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, registered with priority on 30 August 1993 for the Company Kelsen The International Bakery A/S from Norre-Snede, which during Nestle’s application was under the grace period based on the provisions of Article 132(1)(iii) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments.

2. A right of protection for a trade mark shall not be granted, if the trade mark is:
(iii) a trade mark earlier registered in the Republic of Poland, whose registration has terminated, provided that an interval between the date of lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark and the date on which a similar trade mark has been applied for by another party, is, subject to Article 133, no longer than two years.

On 3 February 2005, Nestle filed before the PPO a request for a declaratory decision which would affirm the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, because of its non-use. According to Nestle, the declaratory decision should be effective from the date when an event which involves the effect of the expiry occured, i.e., at the date when the 5-year time period of non-use of a trade mark expired.

On January 2006, The PPO, dismissed the proceedings on the grounds that it was pointless, since before the date of Nestle’s request the rights of protections for CHOKELLA trade mark expired on 30 August 2003, under the law, due to the failure to extend the protection for the next ten years. It was unacceptable for the PPO to decide on the lapse of the rights of protecion for a trade mark, which did not exist at the date of application for such declaration. The PPO indicated that Nestle’s request was filed almost two years after the expiry of the CHOKELLA trade mark, so dismissal of the proceedings was justified because of the lack of subject that would be suitable for a substantive judgment. The PPO ruled that the right of protection shall expire on the date of the decision with effect from the date of filing a request to declare the right of protection for the trademark lapsed. So the decision has a constitutive nature and is applicable ex tunc. The PPO did not agree with Nestle’s argument, and the construction and interpretation of the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL.

The Patent Office shall make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest therein.

The PPO decided that this prejudge the declaratory nature of the decision on the lapse of the rights of protection and it differs from the provisions afforded in the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

Article 25.
The right deriving from registration of a trade mark shall lapse:
(i) on expiry of the term of protection;
(ii) on relinquishment of the right by the person entitled under the registration of the trade mark;
(iii) on failure to use the mark;
(iv) on loss of sufficient distinctiveness of the trade mark;
(v) on termination of economic activity on the part of the owner of the right deriving from registration of the trade mark.

Article 26.
In those cases referred to in section 25, items ii) to v), the Patent Office shall cancel the right deriving from registration of the trademark.

Article 30.
(1) Any person having a legitimate interest may submit a request for confirmation of lapse or a request for annulment of the right deriving from registration of a trade mark.

In the PPO’s opinion the provisions of article 169(2), beside different nomenclature of institutions (i.e. registration rights in the TMA and the rights of protection in the IPL), are identical and, even if the TMA did not indicate the date on which the lapse of registration rights or rights of protection, the legal doctrine and the case-law have established a method of calculating such date based on a specific event, for which it is considered the date of filing the request before the Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark.

Nestle filed a complaint before the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, and argued that, contrary to the PPO findings, the IPL quite differently regulates the rules of declaration on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark. The Office shall issue a decision on the lapse of the rights of protection for trade mark and the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL indicates clearly that the decision is a declaratory act with a constitutive effect, that is, the decision itself, does not abolish the rights, but merely states that the right is expired under the law, which has effect for third parties from the time it was decided.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 December 2007 case file VI SA/Wa 791/07 dismissed the complaint. The Court agreed with the PPO’s findings. Nestle filed a cassation complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 January 2009 case file II GSK 668/08 annulled the ruling of the Voivodeship Administrative Court. First, the Court noted that the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 23 April 2008 case file II GPS 1/08 held that according to the provisions of Article 169(1)(i) of the IPL, the date of lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark is set on the last day of a period of five successive years, counting from the first date of non-use. See also “Trade mark law, case II GPS 1/08“. The SAC ruled that aforementioned judgment can not be excluded from the examination of the matter of Nestle’s complaint. According to the Court, it is accurate and consist of compelling arguments that are sufficient to answer the question formulated in Nestle case. The Court held that the similarity of the nature of “industrial property” within the meaning of property in the civil law context is in the exclusive use of goods that are understood as property, the beneficial use and disposal of such goods. However, the industrial property differs because its formal nature that is resulting from the relationship with a decision on granting the rights of protection, invalidation and the lapse of rights of protection. The decision to grant the rights of protection for a trade mark mark is clearly a constitutive act creating the legal status for a person. Declaratory decisions can not determine the occurrence of the new legal situation, but must refer to another fact or event occurring earlier in time and combine them with the rights or duties of the entity (legal or natural person). The vague regulations of the TMA encouraged the formulation of views on the constitutive nature of the decision on the lapse of the registration rights of a trade mark under article 26 and 30 of the TMA. The SAC did not agree with two separate opinions issued by judges who were appointed to decide in case II GPS 1/08 and article written by professor Ryszard Skubisz and Marcin Trzebiatowski in which the authors provided examples on declaratory and constitutive nature taken from family law or labour law. According to the Court, the difficulties arise when the vague provisions of formal law create the need for an interpretation if, in connection with the answer to the question of when and on what basis (fact, event, operation), the decision has constitutive or declaratory nature. It was incomprehensible for the SAC to give the examples of judgments of nullity of marriage or fatherhood, the effects of which can not be transferred by the declaratory act on the life of the party in the family and the society. The Court held that similarities between industrial property and the instutution of the property taken from the civil law (property and ownership of tangible goods) should be taken into account to justify the recognition of decision on the lapse of the rights of protection as declaratory one instead of the principles of family law. The Court analyzed the nature of such decision in the scope of the property law rules i.e. the acquisition of property (perpetual use of the property or servitude of the ground) is decided by the declaratory ruling of the civil court following the expiry of the last day of the period when such possession is required by the formal law. The SAC also stated that the day of filing the application for declaration on lapse of the rights of protection does not affect the date of expiry of the right, because it is initiating administrative action on the request of the parties. Whether and when the rights of protection shall lapse should be declared by the findings made during the proceedings for the purposes of the law.