Polish IP & IT law – copyright trademark computer internet telecomm

Archive for: Art. 172 IPL

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 769/12

November 5th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

Red Bull GmbH requested the Polish Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the word-figurative trade mark TAURUS IR-604762 owned by Gablitzer Getrankeindustrie und Kaffeehandelsgesellschaft M.B.H. from Austria, and effectively registered on the Polish territory since 27 July 1993. Red Bull claimed that Gablitzer Getrankeindustrie und Kaffeehandelsgesellschaft was deleted from the registry of entrepreneurs in June 2001, and attached, as evidence, an excerpt from the register, which showed that the trade mark proprietor after the bankruptcy has been removed from the register of companies. Red Bull provided also a certified translation of the document.

IR-604762

The Adjudicative Board of the Polish Patent Office in its decision of 14 December 2011 case no. Sp. 286/10 ruled on the lapse of the right of protection as on 13 September 2007. Red Bull requested the PPO to correct an obvious mistake in the date of the lapse. The Company noted that the PPO made that mistake, because there was an error in translation into Polish of the extract from the Austrian register. Red Bull attached corrected translation from the German language, explaining the reasons for the correction. The PPO in its order of January 2012 ruled that the mistake was no committed by PPO, but by the translator. Thus, it was not subject to correction. Red Bull filed complaint against the decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 5 September 2012 case file VI SA/Wa 769/12 annulled the contested decision, and ruled it unenforceable. The VAC noted that the public authority is obliged to carry on the proceedings in the Polish language, both in oral actions and in order to keep the documentation of the procedure in Polish, and it’s a legal obligation to use in administrative proceedings translated documents. However, the Court held that the public authority, acting on the request of a party, cannot decline to investigate the content of the document along with its translation, as the results of this examination should be unambiguous, and failure to do so, constitutes a breach of the rules of administrative proceedings that may have a significant impact on the outcome of the case. The case-law of administrative courts generally accepted the rule that – regardless of the requirements of Article 5 of the Act on the Polish language – the evidence is the content of the document created in foreign language, not its translation. Translation does not a substitute a document written in a foreign language, but serves only to determine what is the content of that document.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 708/08

June 26th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On June 2007, the Polish Patent Office issued a decision in which it has invalidated the right of protection for the word-figurative trade mark Lech-Pol R-132854 that was registered with the priority date of 1998 for goods in Class 33 and owned by Mariusz Lech Przedsiebiorstwo Produkcyjno-Handlowo-Uslugowe LECH-POL from Lask. The right of protection was invalidated in part for alcoholic beverages except for wine. The request was filed by the Polish company Fabryka Wódek POLMOS LAŃCUT S.A. from Lańcut. The company from Lańcut proved that it had a legitimate interest to have standing in proceedings before the Polish Patent Office, based on the fact that on May 2005 Mariusz Lech filed before the PPO a request to invalidate the right of protection for the trade mark lech wódka R-145285.

According to Polmos Lancut’s arguments, Mariusz Lech used the disputed trade mark only for products such as strong fruit wines. He was not imposing this sign on all other alcoholic beverages in Class 33. Mariusz Lech argued that, since mid-2001, he began efforts to start the production of vodka under the disputed trade mark. As a potential market for these articles he considered the teritory of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. With this end in view, a design of bottles bearing these trade marks and labels were made. There were also discussions on the distribution of alcohol in Ukraine. However, with regard to the obstacles, the plan was not realized.

The PPO ruled that simply taking the preparatory steps which had no connection with a valid reason that could prevent the use of a trade mark, does not constitute the grounds for dismissal of a request for invalidation of the right of protection.

Mariusz Lech filed a complaint against this decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 5 February 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 2019/07 dismissed it. Mariusz Lech filed a cassation compalint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 16 April 2009 case file II GSK 708/08 dismissed it.

See also “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1042/08” with regard to issues of non-use and genuine use.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 668/08

March 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 25 January 2005, Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. applied to register the word trade mark CHOKELLA Z-290315 in Class 30, for goods such as: breakfast cereals, muesli, corn flakes, cereal bars, cereal flakes, cereal preparations, food products based on rice, flour or cereals, also in the form of ready-to-use meals. Nestlé was aware that there is a possiblity that the Polish Patent Office rejects the application because of the earlier registration of the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, registered with priority on 30 August 1993 for the Company Kelsen The International Bakery A/S from Norre-Snede, which during Nestle’s application was under the grace period based on the provisions of Article 132(1)(iii) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments.

2. A right of protection for a trade mark shall not be granted, if the trade mark is:
(iii) a trade mark earlier registered in the Republic of Poland, whose registration has terminated, provided that an interval between the date of lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark and the date on which a similar trade mark has been applied for by another party, is, subject to Article 133, no longer than two years.

On 3 February 2005, Nestle filed before the PPO a request for a declaratory decision which would affirm the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, because of its non-use. According to Nestle, the declaratory decision should be effective from the date when an event which involves the effect of the expiry occured, i.e., at the date when the 5-year time period of non-use of a trade mark expired.

On January 2006, The PPO, dismissed the proceedings on the grounds that it was pointless, since before the date of Nestle’s request the rights of protections for CHOKELLA trade mark expired on 30 August 2003, under the law, due to the failure to extend the protection for the next ten years. It was unacceptable for the PPO to decide on the lapse of the rights of protecion for a trade mark, which did not exist at the date of application for such declaration. The PPO indicated that Nestle’s request was filed almost two years after the expiry of the CHOKELLA trade mark, so dismissal of the proceedings was justified because of the lack of subject that would be suitable for a substantive judgment. The PPO ruled that the right of protection shall expire on the date of the decision with effect from the date of filing a request to declare the right of protection for the trademark lapsed. So the decision has a constitutive nature and is applicable ex tunc. The PPO did not agree with Nestle’s argument, and the construction and interpretation of the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL.

The Patent Office shall make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest therein.

The PPO decided that this prejudge the declaratory nature of the decision on the lapse of the rights of protection and it differs from the provisions afforded in the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

Article 25.
The right deriving from registration of a trade mark shall lapse:
(i) on expiry of the term of protection;
(ii) on relinquishment of the right by the person entitled under the registration of the trade mark;
(iii) on failure to use the mark;
(iv) on loss of sufficient distinctiveness of the trade mark;
(v) on termination of economic activity on the part of the owner of the right deriving from registration of the trade mark.

Article 26.
In those cases referred to in section 25, items ii) to v), the Patent Office shall cancel the right deriving from registration of the trademark.

Article 30.
(1) Any person having a legitimate interest may submit a request for confirmation of lapse or a request for annulment of the right deriving from registration of a trade mark.

In the PPO’s opinion the provisions of article 169(2), beside different nomenclature of institutions (i.e. registration rights in the TMA and the rights of protection in the IPL), are identical and, even if the TMA did not indicate the date on which the lapse of registration rights or rights of protection, the legal doctrine and the case-law have established a method of calculating such date based on a specific event, for which it is considered the date of filing the request before the Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark.

Nestle filed a complaint before the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, and argued that, contrary to the PPO findings, the IPL quite differently regulates the rules of declaration on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark. The Office shall issue a decision on the lapse of the rights of protection for trade mark and the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL indicates clearly that the decision is a declaratory act with a constitutive effect, that is, the decision itself, does not abolish the rights, but merely states that the right is expired under the law, which has effect for third parties from the time it was decided.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 December 2007 case file VI SA/Wa 791/07 dismissed the complaint. The Court agreed with the PPO’s findings. Nestle filed a cassation complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 January 2009 case file II GSK 668/08 annulled the ruling of the Voivodeship Administrative Court. First, the Court noted that the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 23 April 2008 case file II GPS 1/08 held that according to the provisions of Article 169(1)(i) of the IPL, the date of lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark is set on the last day of a period of five successive years, counting from the first date of non-use. See also “Trade mark law, case II GPS 1/08“. The SAC ruled that aforementioned judgment can not be excluded from the examination of the matter of Nestle’s complaint. According to the Court, it is accurate and consist of compelling arguments that are sufficient to answer the question formulated in Nestle case. The Court held that the similarity of the nature of “industrial property” within the meaning of property in the civil law context is in the exclusive use of goods that are understood as property, the beneficial use and disposal of such goods. However, the industrial property differs because its formal nature that is resulting from the relationship with a decision on granting the rights of protection, invalidation and the lapse of rights of protection. The decision to grant the rights of protection for a trade mark mark is clearly a constitutive act creating the legal status for a person. Declaratory decisions can not determine the occurrence of the new legal situation, but must refer to another fact or event occurring earlier in time and combine them with the rights or duties of the entity (legal or natural person). The vague regulations of the TMA encouraged the formulation of views on the constitutive nature of the decision on the lapse of the registration rights of a trade mark under article 26 and 30 of the TMA. The SAC did not agree with two separate opinions issued by judges who were appointed to decide in case II GPS 1/08 and article written by professor Ryszard Skubisz and Marcin Trzebiatowski in which the authors provided examples on declaratory and constitutive nature taken from family law or labour law. According to the Court, the difficulties arise when the vague provisions of formal law create the need for an interpretation if, in connection with the answer to the question of when and on what basis (fact, event, operation), the decision has constitutive or declaratory nature. It was incomprehensible for the SAC to give the examples of judgments of nullity of marriage or fatherhood, the effects of which can not be transferred by the declaratory act on the life of the party in the family and the society. The Court held that similarities between industrial property and the instutution of the property taken from the civil law (property and ownership of tangible goods) should be taken into account to justify the recognition of decision on the lapse of the rights of protection as declaratory one instead of the principles of family law. The Court analyzed the nature of such decision in the scope of the property law rules i.e. the acquisition of property (perpetual use of the property or servitude of the ground) is decided by the declaratory ruling of the civil court following the expiry of the last day of the period when such possession is required by the formal law. The SAC also stated that the day of filing the application for declaration on lapse of the rights of protection does not affect the date of expiry of the right, because it is initiating administrative action on the request of the parties. Whether and when the rights of protection shall lapse should be declared by the findings made during the proceedings for the purposes of the law.

Trade mark law, case Sp. 220/08

October 28th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Patent Office in its recent decision of 12 September 2008 act signature Sp. 220/08 applied the interpretation issued by the Polish Supreme Administrative Court in judgment of 23 April 2008, case file II GPS 1/08. See also “Trade mark law, case II GPS 1/08“. The PPO had to decide a motion to declare the expiration of TORNADO R-65213 trade mark registered for Reckitt Benkiser N.V. The motion was filed by Henkel KgaA which applied for word trade mark TORNADO Z-339055 on 2 April 2008. The disputed trade mark was applied for on 11 April 1989 in class 3 and the right of protection was granted by the Polish Patent Office on 30 October 1990. However, during the proceedings started by Henkel, the holder did not defend his rights, he did not provide any evidence that the mark was ever used in Poland. The PPO set the expiry date of protection rights of the disputed mark on the date of 31 October 1995. The period of 5 years of non-use of a trade mark was set from the day following the date of registration of that mark.

Trade mark law, case file II GSK 138/07

September 10th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 19 March 1998, with the notification of 17 September 1996, the Austrian company Red Bull GmbH has received the right of protection for its word trade mark based on the international registration IR-641378 A, in almost all classes (3, 5, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39,41 and 42). On March 2004, the Polish company Przedsiebiorstwo Produkcji Lodów “KORAL” applied for the registration of the word trade mark RED BLUE Z-277694 in Class 30 for goods such as ice creams and other products. However, the Polish Patent Office recognized earlier priority of Red Bull’s trade mark and rejected the application.

Koral requested a motion to declare the expiration of Red Bull’s trade mark rights in Class 30, claiming that the Austrian company failed to put to genuine use of the registered trade mark for the goods covered by the registration for a period of five successive years. The PPO agreed with “Koral” and declared the expiration of Red Bull’s trade mark in its decision of 30 October 2005 case file Sp. 199/04. Red Bull’s evidences of use that were based on the fact that Austrian company has put its trade mark on boxes with sweets which were later sent during different occasions to customers and business partners were found insufficient. The date on which five years period ended was set by the PPO on 9 July 2004 (the date on which the request for invalidation was filed). Both parties filed a complaint against this decision. The Polish company did not agree with PPO’s findings as regards trade mark rights’ expiration date, and the Austrian company claimed that PPO should consider reputation of its trade mark.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 7 September 2006 case file VI SA/Wa 557/06 held that reputation is not taken into account during proceedings for lapse of a right of protection. Arguments that Koral company has no standing were rejected by the Court because both parties were also involved in unfair competition proceeding before civil court. Once again, both companies filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 11 September 2008 case file II GSK 138/07 ruled that the reputation of a trade mark is irrelevant when there are the invalidation proceedings. This is not the proper stage. The reputation could be taken into account during the application proceeding for Koral company’s trade marks. A single fact of non-used Red Bull’s trade mark being an obstacle for registration was a sufficient condition for declaring its expiry. Koral has also called into question the date of expiry of the right of protection. It was the reason for the Court to discuss this issue in the extended chamber. The Supreme Administrative Court in its opinion of 23 April 2008 case file II GPS 1/08 gave a very detailed explanation of that problem. See also “Trade mark law, case II GPS 1/08“.