The Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 28 June 2010 case file II GPS 1/10 held that provisions of Article 272 § 1 of the Act on the Law on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, with later amendments, serve as the basis for resumption of proceedings in administrative courts, whenever the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal on compliance of the provisions of substantive and procedural with the Constitution, international agreement or act, concerned a legislative act, which was applied or should be applied before the administrative court or public authority in a given case.
Archive for: Polish Act on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts
Procedural law, case II GPS 1/10
September 3rd, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiTrade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 839/09
August 28th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Voivodeship Administrative in its judgment of 5 August 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 839/09 decided on the complaint of the holder of the Polish trademark registration DSC R-82966 against the decision Sp. 2/98 of the Polish Patent Office of 28 January 2009 on invalidation of this trademark.
The VAC has not examined substantive issues of the matter because as it has stated the decision of the Polish Patent Office is too general and it does not specify documents on which the Polish Patent Office has based its findings. In the Court’s opinion the Polish Patent Office quoting his findings has only used the phrase “it results from the submitted documents that…”, instead of giving precise description of each relevant document, which prevents the Voivodeship Administrative Court from presenting its opinion on the correctness of the questioned decision. In view of above, the complaint has been accepted and the matter has been transferred to the Polish Patent Office for reexamination.
Trade mark law, case II GSK 495/09
August 10th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiOn 14 March 1994, Polish entrepreneur operating under the name Usługi Pogrzebowe “Hades” Włodzimierz Wasilewski from Częstochowa applied for the right of protection for HADES Z-130892 trade mark in class 45, funeral services. Another Polish entrepreneur operating under the name Nowak Tomasz Firma Pogrzebowa HADES from Łódź filed an opposition to a final decision of the Patent Office on the grant of the right of protection for HADES R-148641 trade mark.
Tomasz Nowak claimed that the Polish Patent Office ruled on the discontinuance of examination proceedings for HADES Z-130892 because of the failure to pay application fees and on 6 March 1999, he decided to file for the right of protection for word-figurative trade mark HADES Z-198798 in classes 26 31 39 42. On 26 September 2001 the PPO granted the right of protection for HADES R-132619 trade mark. Tomasz Nowak argued that the resumption of proceedings by the Patent Office on the application of HADES Z-130892 trade mark, which led to the granting of the right of protection, deprived him of part of the right acquired in good faith and the possibility to obtain the protection for the next sign. According to Tomasz Nowak the decision on the grant of the right of protection for HADES R-148641 trade mark, not only violates his right to earlier acquired trade mark, but most of all it violates the principle of certainty and security of legal transactions. It leads to a situation where the market will experience two identical trade marks, registered for identical goods, however, enjoyed by the various owners, which is contrary the rules of trade mark law of course.
The PPO dismissed the opposition and Tomasz Nowak filed a complaint against this decision of the PPO. He based its claims on provisions of article 8(1) and (2) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 31 January 1985, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.
Article 8
A trademark shall not be registrable if:
1) it is contrary to law or to the principles of social coexistence;
2) it infringes the personal or economic rights of third parties;
Tomasz Nowak also challenged the examination proceedings which led to the registration of the questioned trade mark.
The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 14 January 2009 case VI SA/Wa 1941/08 ruled that legal provisions invoked in the complaint cannot be applied to assess the legality of the registration proceedings conducted by the PPO. Accordingly, the request for invalidation of right of protection of HADES trade mark under these provisions was irrelevant. The provisions of the TMA, or the IPL does not provide in the course of the litigation proceedings lead by the PPO, the possibility to control the legality of the administrative proceedings that concerned the registration of the questioned trade mark. The Court ruled that the allegations of violation of the administrative procedure by the PPO could only qualify as a basis for annulment of the decision. Tomasz Nowak was required to bring such claims in the complaint, however he did not so. Tomasz Nowak filed a cassation complaint.
The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 June 2010 case file II GSK 495/09 dismissed the cassation complaint. The SAC ruled that the VAC could not review the decision on the grant of a right of protection for HADES R-148641 trade mark. The VAC had to decide within the scope of the complaint and shall be bound by the legal ground invoked by the requesting party. The SAC also expressed the view that the registration of the name of someone else’s company does not preclude the registration of a trademark but the right to a name of the company must be infringed, and the existence of such right has not been proven by Tomasz Nowak. The complainer has not demonstrated that he had the right to name of the company. Actually both entrepreneurs have the right to use HADES sign as their business name. The complainer also argued that the mere prior use of the sign and not in relation to the applicant, but in relation to the entitled to the right of protection, provides a sufficient argument that the questioned trade mark infringes personal or economic rights of third parties. The SAC ruled that this view is incorrect. It clearly refers only to infringement of personal or property rights.
Telecommunications law, case I OSK 1079/10
August 3rd, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThis is the continuation of a story described in “Personal data protection, case II SA/Wa 1598/09“. The Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 15 July 2010 case file I OSK 1079/10 decided to stay the execution of the decision issued by the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) and ruled that the Polish Act of 16 July 2000, Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments, provides broader protection of personal data because of telecommunications confidentiality, than the provisions of the Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 29 October 1997, No. 133, item 883, unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments.
The Court held that the disclosure of IP addresses which enable identification of specific individuals, that was ordered during administrative proceedings initiated with regard to disclosure of such data, while such proceedings did not ended with judgment in force, may violate the provisions of Article 160 of the TLA.
Article 160.
1. An entity participating in the performance of telecommunications activities within public networks and entities cooperating with it shall keep the telecommunications confidentiality.
2. Entities referred to in paragraph 1 shall maintain due diligence, within the scope justified by technical or economic reasons, while securing telecommunications equipment, telecommunications networks and data collections from disclosing the telecommunications confidentiality.
3. A person coming into possession of a message not meant to be read by him/her when using radio or terminal equipment shall keep the telecommunications confidentiality. The provisions of Article 159 (3) and (4) shall respectively apply.
4. The recording of a message acquired in a manner described in paragraph 3 by a body executing control of telecommunications activities in order to document a violation of a provision of the Act, shall not be a violation of the telecommunications confidentiality.
While assessing the validity of the request to stay the execution of GIODO’s decision to disclose the requested IP address at this stage of proceedings, the Court agreed with the author of the cassation complaint, that the execution of the questioned decision at this stage makes it impossible to reverse the actions taken after the disclosure of the IP addresses, and such action should be seen as causing the effects that are difficult to reverse according to Article 61(3) of the Act on the Law on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, subsequent later amendments.
§ 1 Filing a complaint does not stay the execution of the act or actions.
(…)
§ 3 After the delivery of a complaint to the court, the court may issue at the request of the applicant, the order to stay the execution, in whole or in part of the act or actions referred to in § 1, if there is a risk of causing significant damage or cause to be difficult to reverse, with the exception of the provisions of local law which entered into force, unless the special Act excludes the stay of their execution. The refusal to stay the execution of the act or actions by the authority, does not deprive the applicant of action to the court. This also applies to acts issued or adopted in all proceedings conducted within the same case.
The SAC held that if the Supreme Administrative Court would agree with the cassation complaint filed against the judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 3 February 2010 case file II SA/Wa 1598/09, the effects of the execution of the questioned decision could not be reversed, because the IP address identifying a specific person is available to another participant in the proceedings. Accordingly, the court held that the correct solution at this stage of proceedings, is to stay the execution of the questioned decision also with a view to the impact of which its execution might result in, as well as the nature of the protection of personal data resulting from the relevant regulations such as, inter alia, the TLA.
See also “Polish regulations on personal data protection” and “Polish case law on personal data protection“.
Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 370/10
July 21st, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Voivodeship Administrative Court in its order 17 June 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 370/10 held that if the party did not act properly within a given period of time in court proceedings without its fault, the court may decide on the request, on the restoration of a deadline. The request for restoration shall be filed within the Court, in which the act was to be made within seven days from the time as the cause of transgression ceased. The request for restoration of a deadline to file a complaint must be filed through the court or authority. The restoration of a deadline has unique nature and can only occur if the party convincingly proves of the absence of its guilt. The lack of guilt means a situation in which circumstances that were impossible to overcome and that were independent from the party, have occurred , and these were the reasons that the deadline set by the law was exceeded (see the order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 11 April 2008 case file I OZ 246/08).
In assessing the occurrence of this condition, the Court has to adopt an objective “test of care”, which may be required from everyone duly taking care of its interests. The restoration is therefore not admissible if the party is guilty of even slight negligence. If the party is represented by a professional representative, while assessing the guilt of not preserving a deadline, the representative acts should be considered, adopting an objective test of care, which may be required from a professional legal representative duly caring for the interests of its client, with the reservation that negligence of people, whom such representative employs, burden the representative itself, and therefore do not release the party from the guilt in non-reserving a deadline.
This means that the negligence made by administrative staff in activities necessary to preserve the procedural deadline, which was commissioned by a patent attorney who is a representative of a party, does not justify the restoration of a missed deadline.
Terravita Holding Establishment from Vaduz, Lichtenstein was a party who lost this case. See also “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 370/10“.
Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 503/10
July 20th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiIn January 2010, Polish company LMW sp z o.o. represented by a patent attorney filed via the Polish Patent Office (PPO) a complaint to the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, against the decision of the PPO on the refusal to grant a right of protection for LIBERTY MOTORS trade mark Z-315048.
In the Court’s order of 8 April 2010, a representative of LMW was asked to remedy the formal deficiencies of a complaint by submitting a power of attorney/proxy to act on behalf of the applicant before the voivodeship administrative court or before administrative courts and the document setting out the power to represent the applicant, i.e. the original or a certified copy of the full entry from the National Court Register, within 7 days from the date of service of summons under pain of dismissal of the action. This summons were served on 16 April 2010. The deficiencies were not removed.
The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its order of 31 May 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 503/10 rejected LMW’s complaint. The Court held that according to provisions of article 58 § 1 pt 3 of the Act on the Law on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270 with later amendments, the administrative court shall reject the complaint, if it was not compensated for the formal deficiencies, within the prescribed period of time.
Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 452/10
July 19th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiIn 2009, the Polish Patent Office declared that the right of protection for REAL trademark owned by real SB-Warenhaus GmbH from Germany, lapsed partially. The German company requested for the suspension of the contested decision. The request stated that the contested decision would cause a negative economic impact for real SB-Warenhaus GmbH, which, through a Polish subsidiary, uses lapsed trade mark continuously since 1997. The German company has made far-reaching financial investments to build market position of REAL trade mark, in Poland – around 10 million PLN. In addition, the public awareness of the brand position, has not only financial backing but also social, because the company built on Polish territory large-area markets, which are operated under the name REAL, therefore, renaming the company and its markets would also affect the 13,500 employees. Given the increasing competition in the market, other competitors, could in good faith (or intentionally) use this trade mark. There was therefore a real risk that, until final completion of this case, the distinctive character of REAL trade mark would be weakened.
The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 June 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 452/10 decided to stay the execution of the questioned decision and ruled that if the decision of the Patent Office has not been suspended, REAL trade mark used by the Polish subsidiary could not be used, and others could exploit the position of this trade mark. The Court also agreed that financial outlays made for the creation and operation of REAL’s supermarkets, were large, and the scale of employment in these supermarkets and the necessary change of the company name and the supermarket, could adversely affect the situation of workers.
See also “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 451/10“.
Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 451/10
July 17th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiIn 2009, the Polish Patent Office declared that the right of protection for REAL trademark owned by real SB-Warenhaus GmbH from Germany, lapsed partially. The German company requested for the suspension of the contested decision. The request stated that the contested decision would cause a negative economic impact for real SB-Warenhaus GmbH, which, through a Polish subsidiary, uses lapsed trade mark continuously since 1997. The German company has made far-reaching financial investments to build market position of REAL trade mark, in Poland – around 10 million PLN. In addition, the public awareness of the brand position, has not only financial backing but also social, because the company built on Polish territory large-area markets, which are operated under the name REAL, therefore, renaming the company and its markets would also affect the 13,500 employees. Given the increasing competition in the market, other competitors, could in good faith (or intentionally) use this trade mark. There was therefore a real risk that, until final completion of this case, the distinctive character of REAL trade mark would be weakened.
The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 June 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 451/10 decided to stay the execution of the questioned decision and ruled that if the decision of the Patent Office has not been suspended, REAL trade mark used by the Polish subsidiary could not be used, and others could exploit the position of this trade mark. The Court also agreed that financial outlays made for the creation and operation of REAL’s supermarkets, were large, and the scale of employment in these supermarkets and the necessary change of the company name and the supermarket, could adversely affect the situation of workers.
See also “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 452/10“.
Procedural law, case II GSK 643/09
July 12th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 11 June 2010 case file II GSK 643/09 clarified the rules for a cassation complaint. Accordingly, a cassation complaint may be based on the violation of substantive law. The violation is based on legal misinterpretation or improper application of the law. Misinterpretation is a false understanding of legal norms. The improper application is a wrong recognition that the factual scenario established in a given case is a subject to a specific rule of law. The improper application of law may also rely on non-application of the legal provision which should be used in a given case. The violation of the substantive law by the court of first instance (the Voivodeship Administrative Court) is always based on the wrong assessment of the application of substantive law by the Polish Patent Office. That is, either through the unfounded acceptance of an error in law that was made by the PPO or unjustified accusation of the PPO of such error. The SAC stressed that the allegation of infringement of substantive law can be effectively formulated only when the applicant who filed a cassation complaint agrees that the facts of the case had been established properly. Putting this plea in the case of challenging the factual findings is premature.
Procedural law, case II GZ 141/10
July 12th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 7 July 2010 case file II GZ 141/10 held that when examining the application for grant the right of assistance, a court does not undertake any action where the accurate data to allow the full assessment of the financial status and the applicant’s ability to pay are not known, because the applicant avoids to submit of relevant documents on this subject. The right of assistance covers the exemption from court fees and the establishment of the lawyer, tax advisor, or patent attorney. It is the interests of the party to demonstrate the merits of an application in the light of the statutory conditions for granting the right of assistance. See also “Procedural law, case FZ 165/04“.
Personal data protection, case I OSK 756/09
July 11th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiA former entrepreneur (natural person) requested a telecommunications company to remove his personal data that were used for marketing purposes. The company did not want to take into account the above-mentioned demands, arguing that the rights provided in Article 33 of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments, are not afforded for persons who perform or performed professional business activity (entrepreneurs).
Article 33
1. At the request of the data subject, within the period of 30 days, the controller shall be obliged to notify the data subject about his/her rights, and provide him/her with the information referred to in Article 32 paragraph 1 point 1-5a as regards his/her personal data, and in particular specify in an intelligible form:
1) the category of personal data contained in the file,
2) the means of data collection,
3) the purpose and the scope of data processing,
4) the recipients of the data and the scope of access they have been granted.
2. At the request of the data subject, the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be given in writing.
The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 March 2010 case file I OSK 756/09 held that provisions of Article 6 of the PPD does not differentiate the rights of individuals, depending on whether they are performing business activity or not. In this situation, there was no reason to exclude information about natural persons conducting business/economic activity from the protection guaranteed by the PPD.
Article 6
1. Within the meaning of the Act personal data shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.
2. An identifiable person is the one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
3. A piece of information shall not be regarded as identifying where the identification requires an unreasonable amount of time, cost and manpower.
See also “Polish regulations on personal data protection” and “Polish case law on personal data protection“.
Polish patent attorneys, case II GZ 224/09
June 28th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 18 May 2010, case file II GZ 224/09 ruled that the Act on the Law on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, with later amendments, did not afford a possibility of making a further appeal, or complaint from the judgments delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court. This means that the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court becomes final upon its publication. The administrative proceedings, as a general rule, is divided into two stages of jurisdiction. This principle is consistent with the articles 176(2) of the Polish Constitution.
Industrial design, case VI SA/Wa 134/10
June 27th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Voivodeship Administratve Court in Warsaw in its order of 16 June 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 134/10 held that the principle of filing a complaint in the administrative proceedings through a public authority/body means that in case of a complaint filed directly to the administrative court or through a public authority other than the one whose action or inaction is the subject of the complaint, that court or authority should hand on such complaint to the competent authority of public administration. The deadline to bring an action referred to in article 53 § (1-3) of the PBAC, is decided on the date when the complaint was delivered to the relevant court or public administration body by the public authority who received it first.
This judgment is not yet final. A cassation complaint may be filed to the Supreme Administrative Court.
See also “Polish regulations on industrial designs” and “Polish case law on industrial designs“.
Procedural law, case II FSK 153/09
June 11th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 May 2010 case file II FSK 153/09 held that the allegations made in the cassation complaint are key issues for identyfing the boundaries of a given case. The Supreme Administrative Court shall decide the case within the scope of a cassation complaint, examining ex officio only the invalidity of the proceedings. The legitimacy of cassation complaint shifts from the legitimacy of allegations that were raised in it, which should be demonstrated by appropriate justification. The exclusion by the Voivodeship Administrative Court of binding interpretation of law in a given case, that is based on article 153 of the PBAC, is a violation of law, in particular the democratic rule of law provided in article 2 of the Polish Constitution.
Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 370/10
May 21st, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Voivodeship Administrative Court in its order 14 April 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 370/10 held that the complaint to the Administrative Court must be filed through the authority, whose action or inactivity is the subject of the complaint within thirty days from the date of notification to the applicant of the decision. The principle filing a complaint through a public authority means that in case of complaint filed directly to the administrative court or through a public authority other than the one whose action or inactivity is the subject of the complaint, the court or authority should pass it on to the competent authority of public administration. The date when the complaint was passed on by the court (public body) decide on the preservation of the deadline for bringing an action. If the complaint is brought after the deadline to file it, it shall be rejected. Terravita Holding Establishment from Vaduz, Lichtenstein was a party who lost this case. See also “Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 370/10“.
Procedural law, case II FPS 8/09
March 23rd, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 15 February 2010 case file II FPS 8/09 held that if the reasons of the judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court do not include a position as to the facts adopted as the basis for the contested decision, it may constitute an independent basis for the cassation appeal.
Personal data protection, case I OSK 633/08
March 11th, 2010, Tomasz RychlickiThe Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 3 July 2009 case file I OSK 633/08 held that the processing/storage/retention of personal data in backup copies of bank’s IT system is nothing but the processing of these data, and such processing is possible only in all cases defined by the provisions of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments. In case, where the credit agreement was not concluded, the processing of personal data in backup copies has no justification in the provisions of the PPD and there is no such situation as referred in Article 26 of the PPD.
Article 26
1. The controller performing the processing of data should protect the interests of data subjects with due care, and in particular to ensure that:
1) the data are processed lawfully,
2) the data are collected for specified and legitimate purposes and no further processed in a way incompatible with the intended purposes, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 below,
3) the data are relevant and adequate to the purposes for which they are processed,
4) the data are kept in a form which permits identification of the data subjects no longer than it is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed.
2. The processing of data, for the purpose other than intended at the time of data collection is allowed provided that it does not violate the rights and freedoms of the data subject and is done:
1) for the purposes of scientific, didactic, historical or statistical research,
2) subject to the provisions of Article 23 and Article 25.
The SAC also ruled that such processing is also not justified by the provisions of the Act on Banks Law.
See also “Polish regulations on personal data protection” and “Polish case law on personal data protection“.
Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1144/08
October 17th, 2009, Tomasz RychlickiThe Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 25 September 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1144/08, published in LEX under the no. 513878, held that the descriptive character of a trade mark is the fact that the sole and direct information presented is information which indicates the characteristic of the goods. These signs that only by an indirect way of inference can be deemed as a designation of such characteristics do not have the descriptive character. This case concerned the examinations proceedings of “telepizzeria” Z-284471 trade mark that was applied for by BONO A. MAZUREK Spółka Jawna.
Trade mark law, case II GSK 1022/08
September 11th, 2009, Tomasz RychlickiThe Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 19 June 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 278/08 dismissed a complaint on the decision of the Polish Patent Office on the refusal to grant the right of protection for “clim PUR” Z-270334 trade mark applied for the goods in class 3. VALEO SERVICE société par actions simplifiée filed a cassation complaint.
The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 3 June 2009 case file II GSK 1022/08 held that the Court is not alone entitled to precise (supplement or refine) of the allegations included in the cassation complaint, or making hypotheses in this regard, sanctioning so to say its deficiencies. The interpretation of the scope and direction of a complaint is also not permissible, because the cassation appeal should be drafted in a such way that there would be no questions of its interpretation.
Trade mark law, case II GSK 896/08
May 31st, 2009, Tomasz RychlickiThe Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 28 April 2009 case file II GSK 896/08 held that the question of similarity or dissimilarity of trade marks does not belong to the realm of substantive law, but is decided based on the regulations on administrative proceedings, because it involves questions of the facts, not law. From the viewpoint of the risk misleading the customer to confusion as to the origin of the goods, in principle, the whole sign, not its individual elements are examined.
The Court ruled that during the proceedings of this case the company was trying to protect its trade mark “VANILA FASHION Izabella Kowalska” R-164202 based on the provision of Article 132(2)(ii) and not Article 132(2)(iii) of the IPL.
2. A right of protection for a trademark shall not be granted, if the trademark:
(ii) is identical or similar to a trademark for which a right of protection was granted or which has been applied for protection with an earlier priority date (provided that the latter is subsequently granted a right of protection) on behalf of another party for identical or similar goods, if a risk of misleading the public exists, in particular by evoking associations with the earlier mark,
(iii) is identical or similar to a renown trademark registered or applied for registration with an earlier priority (provided that the latter is subsequently registered) on behalf of another party for any kind of goods, if it without due cause would bring unfair advantage to the applicant or be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trademark. The above provision shall apply to well-known trademarks accordingly.
The SAC noted that the protection afforded to in Article 132(2)(ii) of the IPL is weaker in comparison to a renown mark.