Polish IP & IT law – copyright trademark computer internet telecomm

Archive for: Polish Act on Telecommunications Law

Personal data protection, case I OSK 1666/12

August 26th, 2013, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company Promedica Care Sp. z o.o requested the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) to issue a decision that would order Agora S.A., the owner of gazeta.pl website, to disclose IP addresses of users who posted negative comments regarding Promedica24.pl website. The GIODO decided that Agora S.A. should disclose requested information, although, it also noticed that the provisions of Article 29 of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments, were repealed as of 7 March 2011.

1. The processing of data is permitted only if:
1) the data subject has given his/her consent, unless the processing consists in erasure of personal data,
2) processing is necessary for the purpose of exercise of rights and duties resulting from a legal provision,
3) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract,
4) processing is necessary for the performance of tasks provided for by law and carried out in the public interest,
5) processing is necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests pursued by the controllers or data recipients, provided that the processing does not violate the rights and freedoms of the data subject.

However, these regulations should be still applied to proceedings initiated before the entry into force of the Act that repealed the above mentioned provisions, and there was no obstacle to justify the refusal to provide the requested data according to the provisions of Article 30 of the PPD.

Article 30
The controller shall refuse the access to the personal data of the filing system to subjects and persons other than those referred to in Article 29 paragraph 1, if it would:
1) result in the disclosure of the information constituting a state secrecy,
2) pose a threat to national defence or security of the state, human life and health, or security and public order,
3) pose a threat to fundamental economic or financial interests of the state,
4) result in a substantial breach of personal interests of the data subjects or other persons.

The General Inspector did not agree with Agora S.A. that providing the requested data would infringe personal interests of the users of gazeta.pl website and its fora. The violation was only hypothetical, and was not supported by proper evidence. Agora S.A. argued that there are no legal instruments that would allow for monitoring the use of disclosed data, and this may lead to their use not only inconsistent with the purpose for which they were disclosed, but even to such use that is contrary to law. The GIODO noted that the absence of such instruments is not synonymous with the use of disclosed data contrary to the purpose for which it was made available. At the moment such data was disclosed, the Company will become the controller (administrator) as defined in the Article 7(4) of the PPD.

Article 7
Whenever in this Act a reference is made to any of the following, it shall mean:
4) controller – shall mean a body, an organisational unit, an establishment or a person referred to in Article 3, who decides on the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.

According to the GIODO, the processing of these data will be subject to the regulations provided in the provisions of the PPD, in particular the obligation not to undergo further processing of the data collected that would not be in accordance with the objectives of the disclosure (so-called principle of expediency/purposefulness), and the control of data processing in compliance with the provisions on personal data protection will be still the competence of the Inspector General. Agora S.A. argued that the provisions of Article 18 of the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204 with subsequent amendments, should be applied in its case, not the provisions of the PPD.

Article 18
1. The service provider may process the following personal data of the service recipient necessary for entering in, designing contents, amending or terminating legal relationship between them:
1) service recipient’s surname and names ,
2) his/her PESEL number (Personal Identification Number),
3) his/her permanent residence address,
4) his/her address for correspondence, if it is different than the address referred to in point 3,
5) data used for verifying the service recipient’s electronic signature ,
6) service recipient’s electronic addresses .
2. In order to effect contracts or other legal activity having been concluded with a service recipient, a service provider may process other data necessary due to nature (characteristics) of the service provided or way of its billing.
3. The service provider distinguishes and marks those data from among the data referred to in paragraph 2, as such being necessary for providing services by electronic means in accordance with art. 22 paragraph 1.
4. The service provider may process, upon consent of s service recipient and for the purposes set forth in art. 19 paragraph 2 point 2, other data concerning the service recipient, which are not necessary for providing service by electronic means.
5. The service provider may process the following data describing the way of using the service provided by electronic means by a service recipient (traffic data):
1) denotations identifying the service recipient assigned on the basis of the data referred to in paragraph 1,
2) denotations identifying the telecommunication network terminal or a teleinformation system, which have been used by a service recipient,
3) information about commencement, termination and a range of every usage of the service provided by electronic means,
4) information about using of the service provided by electronic means by a service recipient.
6. The service provider provides the information on data referred to in paragraphs 1 – 5 to the state authorities for the needs of legal proceedings carried on by them.

The provider is therefore obliged to provide information on all categories of data listed in Article 18(1-5) of the PSEM, to the State authorities for the purpose of the proceedings conducted by them. The Inspector General noted that the disclosed information should also be understood as such data. The GIODO said that the provision of Article 18(6) of the PSEM are constructed in general terms and do not indicate either the types of bodies that may request such information, or the types of proceedings: criminal, civil, administrative or enforcement. The Inspector General noted that the provision of Article 18(6) of the PSEM only requires the provider to disclose information to State bodies, and it should not be interpreted broadly as the legal norm that is prohibiting the disclosure of such information to other entities. The GIODO decided that if the legislature had the intention to limit the disclosure of the information referred to in Article 18(1-5) of the PSEM, only for the bodies referred to in Article18(6) of the Act, it would explicitly formulate this provision, for example, by using the phrase “only”, which is a legislative method of defining the closed circle of entities, as it was provided in other regulations, for instance in the Article 66g and Article 66j § 4 of the Polish Act of 17 June 1966 on Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, or in the Article 72(1) of the Polish Act 5 August 2010 on Protection of Classified Information and in Article 105(1) of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 Banking Law. The Inspector General noted that the legislature did not use the phrase “only” in the provisions of Article 218 of the Criminal Proceedings Code – CRPC – (in Polish: Kodeks Postępowania Karnego) of 6 June 1997, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 89, item 555, with subsequent amendments, in relation to an obligation to disclose, at the request contained in the order, to the court or the prosecutor any mail and packages and the data referred to in Article 180c and 180d of the Polish Act of 16 July 2000 on Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments.

Article 180c
1. The obligation referred to in Article 180a (1) shall cover the data necessary to:
1) trace the network termination point, telecommunications terminal equipment, an end user:
a) originating the call,
b) called;
2) identify:
a) the date and time of a call and its duration,
b) the type of a call,
c) location of telecommunications terminal equipment.
2. The minister competent for communications in agreement with the minister competent for internal affairs, having regard to the type of telecommunications activities performed by operators of a public telecommunications network or providers of publicly available telecommunications services, data specified in paragraph 1, costs of data collection and retention as well as the need to avoid multiple retention and storage of the same data, shall specify, by means of an ordinance:
1) a detailed list of data referred to in paragraph 1;
2) types of public telecommunications network operators or providers of publicly available telecommunications services obliged to retain and store the data.

Article 180d
Telecommunications undertakings shall be obliged to provide conditions for access and retention as well as to make available at their own cost the data referred to in Article 159 (1) (1) and (3) to (5), in Article 161 and in Article 179 (9) related to the provided telecommunications service and processed by them to authorized entities, to the court and to the prosecutor, under the terms and observing the procedures specified in separate provisions.

The Inspector General stressed that the legislature has indicated that only the court or the prosecutor is allowed to open the correspondence, mail and data, or order for their opening.

Article 218
§ 1. Offices, institutions and entities operating in post and telecommunications fields, customs houses, and transportation institutions and companies, shall be obligated to surrender to the court or state prosecutor upon demand included in their order, any correspondence or transmissions significant to the pending proceedings. Only the court and a state prosecutor shall be entitled to inspect them or to order their inspection.

The Inspector General also stressed that the above-cited provisions of the CRPC should not be applied in this case, because Promedica Care Sp. z o.o is not the authority conducting the proceedings in a criminal case, and the disclosed personal data will be used by it to initiate civil, not criminal proceedings. The GIODO indicated that Promedica may follow the procedure provided for in Article 29 of the PPD, and civil proceedings under the Civil Proceedings Code – CPC (in Polish: Kodeks Postępowania Cywilnego) of 17 November 1964, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 43, item 296, with subsequent amendments, regardless of actions taken under the criminal proceedings. Agora S.A. filed a complaint.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 8 March 2012 II SA/Wa 2821/11 repealed the contested decision, and held that according to the provisions of Article 18(6) of the PSEM, the only one empowered to obtain data collected by the service provider within the meaning of that Act, are the State bodies. The PSEM does not contain any other provision, which serve as the basis for disclosure of data to the entities other than state authorities. The court stated that if the legislature’s intention was to give permission to obtain operational data to entities other than state authorities, it would have included a clear regulation providing for such permission in the PSEM. Data protection is a general rule. The service provider may process personal and operational data only in the extent and on terms defined in the PSEM. Only in the absence of regulations provided in the PSEM such processing may be based on an appropriate application of the PPD. The disclosure of data to third parties – such as Promedica Care – is breaking of that protection and as an exception to the rule cannot be interpreted broadly. GIODO filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 August 2013 case file I OSK 1666/12 dismissed it. The SAC held that any company or individual has the right to request ISPs to disclose e-mail addresses and IP addresses that are associated with the offensive entries.

Copyright law, case I A Cz 114/13

June 21st, 2013, Tomasz Rychlicki

The District Court in Białystok in its order of 27 December 2012 case file VII GCo 71/12 dismissed the request of a copyright owner to secure evidence and to order a Polish ISP to disclose information on the personal data (name and address) that was associated with IP addresses of computers that were identified by a requesting party, and from which, via online peer-to-peer applications, unknown persons have made available different audiovisual works.

The Appeallate Court in Białystok in its order of 7 February 2013 case file I A Cz 114/13 dismissed an appeal in this case. The Court noted that under Polish law there is no uniform procedure governing disclosure of personal data for the purposes of civil proceedings. The processing of personal data are governed primarily by the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments, the Polish Act of 16 July 2000 on Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments and the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204 with subsequent amendments. These regulations guarantee the protection of personal data where their processing (including their disclosure) is always an exception to the rules for their protection. The provisions of Article 80 of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631 with subsequent amendments that were introduced to the system of protection of intellectual property rights as a result of the implementation of Directive 2004/48/EC, are solutions distinct and relatively independent of regulation included in the PPD, TLA and PSEM.

The Court ruled that pursuant to Article 80 of the ARNR, an entity with a legitimate interest may request the competent court, among others, to secure evidence (Article 80(1) of the ARNR) and to oblige other person than the one that is infringing copyrights, to provide information that is relevant to future claims, if such a third party provides services used in infringing activities and such actions lead directly or indirectly to profit or other economic benefits (Article 80(1)(iii)(c) of the ARNR).

Article 80. 1.
The court competent to hear the cases of infringement of the author’s economic rights in the locality where the offender conducts its activity or where his economic is located, also prior to filing suit, shall consider, within no more than 3 days of filing, an application of a party with legal interest therein:
1) for securing evidence and securing claims related thereto;
2) for obliging the person who infringed the author’s economic rights to provide information and any documentation specified by the court and being material to the claims referred to in Article 79(1);
3) for obliging a person other than the infringing party to provide information material to the claim defined in Article 79(1) on the origin, distribution networks, volume and price of goods or services which infringe the author’s economic rights, provided that:
a) such person has been confirmed to have goods which breach the author’s economic rights; or
b) such person has been confirmed to benefit from services which breach the author’s economic
rights; or
c) such person has been confirmed to render services used in any acts which the breach author’s
economic rights; or
d) the person specified in letters (a), (b) or (c) indicated a person who participated in production, manufacturing or distribution of goods or rendering of services in breach of the author’s economic rights and the purpose of any of the above actions is to generate, directly or indirectly, profit or any other economic benefit, although it does not include any actions by consumers acting in good faith.
2. If it admits any evidence or considers any applications referred to in paragraph 1, the court ensures that the operator’s business secrets as well as all other secrets protected by law are kept confidential.

In this case, the request of the copyright owner included both legal instruments. In terms of the preservation of evidence, however, was it was worded incorrectly, because as noted previously, the applicant exclusively requested personal data that would allow him for identifying potential defendants in cases of copyright infringement. The Court ruled that these data do not constitute evidence for the purposes of the process. As a result, the Court decided on the obligation to provide relevant information as provided in the Article 80(1)(iii)(c) of the ARNR. The Court agreed with the opinion that the condition for the application of this provisions, as in the each case of temporary measures, is to authenticate the claim i.e. provide prima facie evidence that there is/was copyright infringement, and to describe its legal interest in obtaining the information. First, it is necessary to demonstrate a prima facie evidence of the claim that the applicant holds the copyright to the work. In this regard, “in favor” of the entity seeking legal protection speaks presumption provided in Article 15 of the ARNR according to which it shall be presumed that the producer or publisher is the person whose surname or the name is provided in the goods on which the work is embodied, or made public in any way in connection with the dissemination of the work. This provision implements the rule of presumption of authorship or ownership, as set out in Article 5 of the Directive 2004/48/EC. The applicant, who is a film producer, presented a printout from its website containing information about audiovisual works concerned. The Court assumed that the annotation “rights reserved”, justify the inclusion of the applicant presumption.

The dispute in this case focused on the probable circumstances of unauthorized use (dissemination) of copyrighted works, and about the legal consequences, escalating in electronic communication, the phenomenon of exchange and distribution of files (mostly music or video), using peer 2 peer software. As a rule, it is assumed in the legal doctrine and the Appellate Court agreed with this opinion that, due to the fact that when the file is downloaded from the Internet by a user of a peer-to-peer program it is also simultaneously made available for downloading for others, such action is not part of an allowed personal use referred to in Article 23 of the ARNR.

However, the Court noted that the very presence of files (copyrighted works) in resources of a user of a peer to peer file sharing network cannot automatically lead to a conclusion as to its distribution (making available) for the purposes of copyright law. The Court was aware that there is a technical possibility to block other users’ access to resources on a hard disk, which results in the fact that at the time the file is downloaded via peer-to-peer, it only provides packages – pieces of work, to download for others, which does not allow for its replication. Secondly, in order to provide its resources in peer to peer networks, a user is required the run a proper computer program.

In this case, the Court agreed that all copyright works were made available beyond the allowed personal use (the concept similar to fair use). It has been proven that subscribers of the ISP have acquired copyrighted works (movies) via peer-to-peer networks (using programs such as µTorrent and BitComet), which were produced by the applicant. These movies were actually made available to other users, as it was testified by a witness. As a result, the Court has found the argument of a probable copyright infringement of audiovisual works owned by the applicant, as justified. There was no doubt also for the Court that the ISP is an entity referred to in the provisions of Article 80(1)(iii)(c) of the ARNR. The company provides commercial services that are used for public sharing of unauthorized copyrighted works – the ISP provides access to Internet for a fee, which is a forum of exchange and distribution of audiovisual files within the peer to peer networks. The Court agreed that the applicant had legitimate interest (locus standi) in obtaining relevant information. Such information would allow for identification/personalization of Internet users infringing copyrights, in order to properly initiate civil proceedings against them, and the proper preparation of a lawsuit. The Court noted that the information on the distribution networks, referred to in Article 80(1)(iii) of the ARNR, include, in principle, the data on entities (names and addresses) who unauthorized distribute works protected by copyright law and therefore infringe the copyrights of their owners. Consequently, pursuant to provisions of Article 80(1)(iii) of the ARNR the copyright owner of audiovisual works may require the ISP, to disclose personal data (name and address of residence) of entities who share and distribute audiovisual works protected by copyright in peer to peer networks.

On the basis of Article 8 of Directive 2004/48/EC, providing information that would be used for the protection of intellectual property rights is conditional, and it’s based on the proportionality of the request. The principle of proportionality expresses the idea of making only those activities that are essential and necessary to achieve a particular purpose and those that are appropriate in the circumstances of a case, i.e. they restrict the rights of others as little as it is possible. In this situation, it was necessary for the Court to consider whether in the circumstances of this case, the objective of protecting intellectual property rights justified the abandonment of the protection of personal data of entities who allegedly infringed copyrights. The guidance on the interpretation of these rules are provided in the Directive itself, and more specifically in the provisions its preamble. Namely, in section 14, the Community lawmakers have clearly indicated that the measures include in Article 8 section 1 of Directive need to be applied only in respect of acts carried out on a commercial scale.. The reason for this is certainly the fact that commercial activities are carried out for direct or indirect economic benefit on a large scale and thus significantly affect the property rights of the creators of works. The principle of proportionality provided in Article 8 of Directive 2004/48/EC is also incorporated in Article 80(1)(iii) of the ARNR, which means that the disclosure of information, and the subject of the data, in particular personal data, the Court should decide, taking into account the weight and the scale of the infringement of copyrights, especially from the perspective of the actions of persons violating the law, for profit.

According to the Appeallate Court, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the request for access to personal data of individuals is in line with the principle discussed. First of all, on the basis of the evidence materials, it could not be assumed that different users have made available audiovisual works for commercial purposes. Secondly, the attached evidence showed that the case was dealing with eight different users who with the help of peer-to-peer networks have shared with only one movie, so the scope of the alleged infringements of copyright applicant, was not significant.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Spam law, case II W 572/12

February 5th, 2013, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Regional Court in Dzierżoniów in its judgment of 9 January 2013 case file II W 572/12 sentenced a Polish citizen for the fine in a sum of 300 Polish złoty for sending unsolicited e-mail to two persons. This case was based on the indictment afforded for in the Article 24 of the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204 with subsequent amendments. Anyone, who transmits by electronic communications means unsolicited commercial information, should be liable to fine. The prosecution of this offence is conducted on the request of the harmed party. Recent amendments to the Polish Telecommunication law introduced also new anti-spam provisions to the PSEM. As of 22 January 2013, sending unsolicited commercial information addressed to the specified recipient, who is a natural person, by electronic communications means, in particular electronic mail is prohibited. These amendments made the ban on sending unsolicited commercial information on whether the spam recipient is a natural person. Previous provisions of the PSEM did not provide such prerequisite.

Personal interest, case II C 626/11

April 27th, 2012, Tomasz Rychlicki

In 2007, for about 6 months, the Polish Central Anti-corruption Bureau collected telecommunications data, including billings and location data from Base Transceiver Stations, of a Polish journalist Bogdan Wróblewski. Mr Wróblewski sued the Polish State Treasury which according to the Polish law represents the Polish state in certain legal aspects..

The District Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 26 April 2012 case file II C 626/11 has confirmed that the Central Anti-corruption Bureau violated personal interests of a journalist by collecting his telecommunications data. The Court pointed out that privacy is a fundamental human right and its breach must be justified and proportionate. The permission is limited “objectively” to offenses of corruption and “qualitatively” – its condition should be determined by the fact that there are not available less invasive means of control which could be useful. The process of receiving of telecommunications data must take into account these limitations each time it is initiated.

Personal interest, case II SA/Wa 364/11

October 13th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

On January 2010, a couple of entries signed by the nick “arfulik” appeared on few Polish websites. The author wrote critically about the company Bavaria Consulting and a person who is a member of the board. It seemed that this unknown author conducted a competitive activity. Bavaria and Krystiana D. decided to sue for the infringement of personal interest. They needed personal data of a person who wrote questioned comments. Telekomunikacja Polska (TP), one of the largest ISPs, refused to provide such information, referring to the telecommunications confidentiality included in the Article 159 of the Polish Act of 16 July 2000 on Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments. Allegedly slandered filed a complaint to the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO). The GIODO ordered the disclosure the personal data but he overturned this decision after TP filed a request for reconsideration. The GIODO decided that such information is subject to the telecommunications confidentiality and found no reason to disclose it. The offended persons lodged a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 7 October 2011 case file II SA/Wa 364/11 dismissed it, and ruled that the intention of bringing action against the author of a forum post or comment is not a sufficient condition to disclose personal data. One has to file a suit for protection of personal interest. Only then, a court in order to avoid procedural deficiency, will summon the telecommunications operator to disclose personal data of the author of the questioned post.

Telecommunication law, case XVII AmA 62/08

August 27th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection in its decision of 20 December 2007 No. DOK-98/2007 decided that the market practice of Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. based on discriminatory lowering of IP traffic, by actions that lead to a reduction of the quality or the disabling of data transfer, is the practice of restricting competition. Telekomunikacja Polska appealed.

The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection in its judgment of 11 April 2011 case file XVII AmA 62/08 overturned the questioned decision in part. However, the Court did not argue with the President of the OCCP, that Telekomunikacja Polska was quilty of restricting competition.

Telecommunications law, case I OSK 1079/10

August 3rd, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

This is the continuation of a story described in “Personal data protection, case II SA/Wa 1598/09“. The Supreme Administrative Court in its order of 15 July 2010 case file I OSK 1079/10 decided to stay the execution of the decision issued by the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection (GIODO), and ruled that the Polish Act of 16 July 2000 on Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments, provides broader protection of personal data because of telecommunications confidentiality, than the provisions of the Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 29 October 1997, No. 133, item 883, unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments. The Court held that the disclosure of IP addresses which enable identification of specific individuals, that was ordered during administrative proceedings initiated with regard to disclosure of such data, while such proceedings did not ended with judgment in force, may violate the provisions of Article 160 of the TLA.

Article 160.
1. An entity participating in the performance of telecommunications activities within public networks and entities cooperating with it shall keep the telecommunications confidentiality.
2. Entities referred to in paragraph 1 shall maintain due diligence, within the scope justified by technical or economic reasons, while securing telecommunications equipment, telecommunications networks and data collections from disclosing the telecommunications confidentiality.
3. A person coming into possession of a message not meant to be read by him/her when using radio or terminal equipment shall keep the telecommunications confidentiality. The provisions of Article 159 (3) and (4) shall respectively apply.
4. The recording of a message acquired in a manner described in paragraph 3 by a body executing control of telecommunications activities in order to document a violation of a provision of the Act, shall not be a violation of the telecommunications confidentiality.

While assessing the validity of the request to stay the execution of GIODO’s decision to disclose the requested IP address at this stage of proceedings, the Court agreed with the author of the cassation complaint, that the execution of the questioned decision at this stage makes it impossible to reverse the actions taken after the disclosure of the IP addresses, and such action should be seen as causing the effects that are difficult to reverse according to Article 61(3) of the Act of 30 August 2002 on the Law on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270, subsequent amendments.

§ 1 Filing a complaint does not stay the execution of the act or actions.

§ 3 After the delivery of a complaint to the court, the court may issue at the request of the applicant, the order to stay the execution, in whole or in part of the act or actions referred to in § 1, if there is a risk of causing significant damage or cause to be difficult to reverse, with the exception of the provisions of local law which entered into force, unless the special Act excludes the stay of their execution. The refusal to stay the execution of the act or actions by the authority, does not deprive the applicant of action to the court. This also applies to acts issued or adopted in all proceedings conducted within the same case.

The SAC held that if the Supreme Administrative Court would agree with the cassation complaint filed against the judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court of 3 February 2010 case file II SA/Wa 1598/09, the effects of the execution of the questioned decision could not be reversed, because the IP address identifying a specific person is available to another participant in the proceedings. Accordingly, the court held that the correct solution at this stage of proceedings, is to stay the execution of the questioned decision also with a view to the impact of which its execution might result in, as well as the nature of the protection of personal data resulting from the relevant regulations such as, inter alia, the TLA.

Internet domains, case I ACa 272/06

February 8th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Appellate Court in Katowice in its judgment of 16 June 2006 case file I ACa 272/06 ruled that it is pointless to talk about the “ownership” of Internet domains, because the civil law sets the property rights in Article 140 of the Civil Code, which only refers to tangibles, and domains are not such things, and further, due to the closed list of property rights in intangibles (the so-called numerus clasus of IP rights – the principle that the system of estates allows only a limited number of property rights available in a legal system), there are no regulations in the Polish law, which suggests that the effect of registering Internet domain names is, to acquire by the subscriber, the right to use and dispose of the domain. The agreement between the subscriber and the Internet domain registrar is a contract to provide telecommunications services within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Polish Act of 16 July 2000 on Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments. The subscriber may transfer his or her claims (contractual claims against the registrar) to another entity, if it comes with the assumption of debt from subscriber fees.

I realize that this differs significantly from the US law. Easpecially if you read Kremen v. Cohen, 335 F.3d 1035, (9th Cir. 2003).

The parties do not dispute that domain names are a kind of property. This proposition appears to be consistent with California’s broad definition of “property.” See Cal. Civ.Code §§ 654 & 655(property includes “all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual delivery”). The parties disagree, however, whether a domain name like sex.com is the kind of intangible property that can support a claim for conversion. At issue is whether such intangible property constitutes a sufficiently definite right and whether such intangible property must also be merged into a document or other writing.

Same opinions were issued in Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002), Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.Com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000) or In re Larry Koenig & Assoc., 2004 WL 3244582 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2004). But there are also different judgments such as Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999), Zurakov v. Register.com, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 176, 760 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dep’t 2003), Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc., 259 Va. 759, 529 S.E.2d 80 (2000) and the latest I know which is Palacio del Mar Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. McMahon, — Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2009 WL 1668294 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. June 16, 2009). The Court ruled that a domain name registration is not property, but merely supplies the intangible contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period of time. Does it sound familiar to you?

See also “Polish case law on domain names“.

Personal data protection, case I OSK 174/08

September 26th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The biggest Polish telecommunication company – Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. posted on its website an offer to sell its databases. This offer was addressed to research and telemarketing companies, BTL advertising agencies, insurance companies and banks. TP proposed a disclosure of private telephone numbers of its subscribers as part of the database. Through this service the company was preparing a database of phone numbers compatible with the order placed and then it passed the database on a CD for a client with a protocol of receipt. The phone numbers could be selected or sorted according to geographical criteria.

The Inspector General for Personal Data Protection ordered not to disclose of personal data of subscribers of Telekomunikacja Polska’s who are consumers within the meaning of Article 22¹ of the Civil Code – CC – (in Polish: Kodeks Cywilny) of 23 April 1964, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 16, item 93, with subsequent amendments, to third parties in the future.

Article 22¹
The consumer shall be deemed to be any natural person who performs acts in law which are not directly connected with his economic or professional activity.

The prohibition was not allowed without fulfilling one of the conditions of Article 23(1) of the Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of October 29, 1997, No. 133, item 883, unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of July 6, 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments.

Article 23
1. The processing of data is permitted only if:
1) the data subject has given his/her consent, unless the processing consists in erasure of personal data,
2) processing is necessary for the purpose of exercise of rights and duties resulting from a legal provision,
3) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract,
4) processing is necessary for the performance of tasks provided for by law and carried out in the public interest,
5) processing is necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests pursued by the controllers or data recipients, provided that the processing does not violate the rights and freedoms of the data subject.

The GIODO held that according to Article 159(1) of the Polish Act of 16 July 2000 on Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with subsequent amendments, phone numbers are deemed as the telecommunications secrecy. Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 November 2007 case file II SA/Wa 1252/07 dismissed this case and TP S.A. decided to file a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 26 January 2009 case file I OSK 174/08 dismissed the cassation and held that Article 159(1) TLA provides for stronger data protection than the provisions of Article 23 of the PPD and therefore it will be used as a basis for legalizing the processing of telecommunications secrecy.

Press law, case VI Ka 409/07

January 14th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

Facts and legal dispute
A Polish TV channel, TVN, in its show entitled UWAGA broadcast footage that criticised the work of a debt collector, Wojciech D., who held office in a Pomeranian town of Bytów. Internauts were prompt to comment on his work. This boiled down mostly to offensive statements, some of which are provided below:

I suggest we lynch the guy, if legal methods failed. It seems that we’ll have to fight impudence with impudence! Citizens!!! This goes out to you.

How about we settled it ourselves, people? We could take him to the woods, take away his clothes and throw him out onto the streets, that would be fun!!!

I was lucky enough not to have anything to do with this guy. I am surprised with those, who had so much trouble with him, though. If he sold my apartment or broke my mum’s hand I would spare some change and call the boys from the hood. They would have known what to do with him ;)

Hang the collector by the balls in the centre of the town, shove a pound or two of drawing pins and broken glass into his ass, but on the other hand he might enjoy that … and let him see what suffering is … the struggle continues….

Fill him with carbide and add some water. Oh, that would be so nice for him, damn bureaucrat. When he fills up with gasses, light him up. A nice effect, only shreds would remain. Still, it’s just wishful thinking, he can be seen no-where around the town. We can’t get him.

The comments were published mainly on the GazetaBytowska. pl (Bytów Newspaper) website, also accessible at gby.pl. The authorities (police and prosecutor) addressed Leszek Szymczak, the administrator of the website, and asked him to hand over particulars of the commentators. The authorities intended to charge those persons with punishable threats addressed at the collector. Leszek Szymczak did not, however, provide the data. The police called the comments “press material” and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Bytów recognised that the administrator of the website was responsible for the comments published on the gby.pl forum. The Public Prosecutor’s Office also maintained that a website is a daily newspaper, by virtue of which under the press law it needed to be registered. Following the line of reasoning of the prosecutor, Leszek Szymczak ran the gby.pl website (i.e. he published a daily newspaper) without proper registration. The prosecution charged Mr Szymczak with the first accusation – the infringement of Article 45 of the Polish Act of 26 January 1984 on Press law² – APL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo prasowe), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 24, with subsequent amendmets.

Anybody who publishes a daily newspaper or a periodical without registration or with registration suspended is subject to a fine penalty or the restriction of liberty

This was made in connection with article 7(2) pt. 2 of the APL.

A daily is a general-information periodical print or a message transmitted via sound or sound and image published more frequently than once a week.

The manner of registration of dailies and periodicals is provided in Article 20 of the APL.

1. Publishing a daily newspaper or a periodical necessitates registration with a voivodeship court having jurisdiction in the seat of the publisher, hereinafter referred to as ‘the registrar body’. In such cases the regulations of the Code of Civil Procedure on nonlitigious proceedings, together with amendments resulting herefrom, shall apply.
2. A registration application mentioned in section 1 hereof shall include:
1) the title of a daily newspaper or a periodical together with the seat and an exact address of the editorial office,
2) particulars of the editor-in-chief,
3) specification, seat and exact address of the publisher,
4) the daily newspaper’s or the periodical’s frequency of publishing.
3. A registrar court shall substantiate the decision to register a daily newspaper of a periodical only upon a motion.
4. A daily newspaper or a periodical can be published if a registrar body failed to decide upon the application for the registration within 30 days from the day of the submission of the application.
5. Should the information mentioned in section 2 hereof be altered, the registration body shall be immediately noticed.

The prosecution also alleged that Leszek Szymczak published press material featuring criminal content that publicly incited its readers to commit offences. For that reason the prosecution pressed the second charge. Under article 49a of the APL

An editor who unintentionally published press material that featured criminal content mentioned in article 37a hereof, shall be subject to a fine penalty or the restriction of liberty.

Under Article 255 of the Criminal Code³ – CRC – (in Polish: Kodeks Karny) of 6 June 1997, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 88, item 553, with subsequent amendments

1. A person who publicly calls for committing an offence of a fiscal crime shall be subject to a fine penalty, the restriction of liberty or imprisonment for up to two years.
2. A person who publicly calls for committing a crime shall be subject to the restriction of liberty for up to three years.
3. A person who publicly praises the commitment of a crime shall be subject to a fine penalty amounting to up to 180 daily rates, the restriction of liberty or imprisonment for up to one year.

Article 37a of the APL reads

If a person is sentenced for a crime committed by publishing a press material, the court may adjudicate an additional penalty constituting in the forfeiture of the press material.

The prosecution maintained that Leszek Szymczak committed the crime of the nonfeasance of duties. The prosecution did not, however, establish what actually was meant by lynching, or at whom the comments were directed (the collector’s name was not even once mentioned on the gby.pl website).
It is noteworthy that Leszek Szymczak had registered a daily newspaper entitled Gazeta Bytowska when it was published in print⁴. In the period pointed at in the indictment, that is from April 13, 2004 to January 9, 2006, the court did not pass a decision that would make the registration invalid.

The Regional Court Słupsk in its judgment of 7 March 2007 case file II K 342/06 (with Judge Tadeusz Stodoła presiding) held that the first charge was legitimate, but owing to the minor social harm it remitted proceedings in the case. As for the second charge, the court held that posts of an internet forum indeed constitute press material and as such should be revised by editors and if they encounter inappropriate material, they should delete it. The court failed, however, to point to a specific law regulation that would necessitate Leszek Szymczak to delete any posts from his forum. Also this charge was dismissed. The court focused on the interpretation of the notion of “press material” and in this venture interpreted it correctly. The rub, though, remains in the fact that in this case the utmost importance should have been attached to the interpretation of the notions of a “daily newspaper” and a “periodical” since only those two kinds of press need to be registered with a court. Both parties appealed Leszek Szymczak appealed to overrule the judgment and dismiss the charge punishable under article 45 of the APL. He substantiated his appeal with, first of all, Article 17(1)2 of the Criminal Proceedings Code owing to the fact that under the law in effect publishers did not have to register websites in the register of daily newspapers and periodicals. Secondly, he also claimed that the regulations that impose such an obligation are too unclear to be a source of criminal liability according to the principle nulla poena sine lege certa et stricta (no punishment unless there is certain and strict law). Leszek Szymczak also appealed to change the sentence by acquitting the defendant from the offence provided in article 49a of the PLA owing to the fact that the defendant did not know about the illegal nature of the information (posts were uploaded/written by internauts) that the prosecution drew upon in the offence description. Because of that, his argument continued, the defendant could not be criminally liable, that is under Article 14(1) of the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204 with subsequent amendments, and Article 14 of the Directive 2000/31/EC⁶. Leszek Szymczak also appealed to completely overrule the abovementioned sentence and send the case back to the court of first instance for reconsideration.

The prosecution appealed against the judgment on the grounds of a mistake in factual findings that formed the basis for the judgment. It argued that the court was wrong to assess the social harm of the offence described in article 45 of the APL as minor (publishing an internet daily newspaper gby.pl without proper registration) and to discontinue proceedings with respect to this charge. Still further, a correct analysis of the subjective and objective features of the offence, particularly the legal interests undermined by the offence and the conduct of the defendant, all lead to other conclusions, the prosecution reasoned. The prosecution also maintained that the court made another mistake in the factual findings forming the basis for the decision. The court allegedly was wrong to assess the social harm of the offence described in article 49a of the APL as minor (unintentional publishing of press material with criminal content) and to discontinue proceedings with respect to this charge. A correct analysis of both subjective and objective features of the offence, including legal interests undermined by the offence and negative consequences experienced by the aggrieved party, especially in the party’s life and professional situation, the gravity and manner of the violation of obligations resting with the defendant, including the considerable time period of publication of the criminal content on the gazetabytowska.pl website and the conduct of the defendant after having acquainted himself with the content, all lead to the conclusion that social harm of the acts performed by the defendant cannot be described as minor, the reasoning continued.

The District Court in Słupsk asked the Prosecutor’s Office to delegate to the court the case of posts published on the website. The court observed that when the Prosecutor’s Office asked the administrator of the website to hand over information about the posts of possibly criminal nature, he indeed handed it over. Afterwards the Office discontinued the proceedings–having found no features of a prohibited act–but then pressed charges and indicted the editor.

The District Court in Słupsk in its judgment of 7 February 2008 case file VI Ka 409/07 held that managing an internet website necessitates registration. In consequence, running a website without registration violates the law. The court held that the reasoning of the Regional Court was correct and, similarly to the Regional Court, it discontinued the proceedings (at the same time ascertaining that the act had caused minor social harm). If it was not for that decision of the court, taking the face value of those sentences, anybody could be put on trial for running a website without registration. In this part the case ends with a discontinuance of the case for a year. The District Court in its decision on appeal made some controversial statements. In particular, the court decided that publishing information on the internet with the use of sound and image depends on the publisher, so any soundless publication still complies with the definition of a daily newspaper/a periodical. As concerns the second charge, the District Court overruled the former sentence and delegated the case for another hearing to the Regional Court. Following gby.pl, the court stated that a web portal, as a press title, needs to be registered: the District Court also suggested that

in a subsequent examination of the indictment, the Court should entertain upon sending case files back for pretrial proceedings due to its considerable shortcomings.

This might mean (the Regional Court still has to determine it) that the posted messages (posts) published on the forum might not have constituted an offence.

Discussion
If we go as far as to admit that in the light of the definition provided in Article 7(2) pt. 1 of the APL a website (such as gby.pl) is indeed “press”, considerable doubts still remain whether such a website is a “daily newspaper” or a “periodical”. Both definitions refer to the notion of “print” but also go further to encompass more media by providing that is might convey “sound or sound an image information”. Owing to the general lack of sound in internet websites, it is hard to deny that this regulation does not describe such a publishing medium. Article 7(2)(2) of the APL provides

1) press shall be defined as periodical publications that do not form a single and complete whole, are published at least once a year and bear a constant title or a name, a number and a date, in particular: daily newspapers and periodicals, news agencies bulletins, constant telex messages, bulletins, radio and television broadcasts, film chronicles; press shall also be understood as any and all existing and emerging in the course of technological advancement means of mass media, including broadcasting stations and television and radio broadcasting systems installed in facilities that distribute periodically publications via print, image, sound or any other broadcasting means; the press shall also encompass teams of people and individuals that deal with journalism,
2) a daily newspaper shall be a general-information periodical print or a sound or sound and vision message published more frequently than once a week,
3) a periodical shall be a periodical print published at least once a year but not more frequently than once a week; this regulation shall apply also to messages broadcast by means of sound or sound and vision and any other means than those described in section 2.

Similar Polish case law
Let us turn to Polish judicature concerning similar cases. The Appellate Court in Rzeszów ruled that an internet website cannot be recognised as a “daily newspaper” or a “periodical” as understood by the APL⁷. In another case, the Appellate Court in Warsaw recognised a teletext service not as a daily newspaper but as a text message as understood by article 4(9) of the Polish Act of 29 December 1992 on Broadcasting⁸ – LOB – (in Polish: Ustawa o radiofonii i telewizji), published in Journal of Law (Dziennik Ustaw) of 1993, No 7 item 34, consolidated text of 19 Novemver 2004, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 253 item 2531, with subsequent amendments. The press law provides the definition of “press material”. Article 7(2)4 of the Act reads

press material shall be any informative, journalistic, documental or other text or image already published or provided to the publisher and intended for publication in press, irrespective of the means of transmission, type, form, destination or authorship of the material.

The decision of the Supreme Court the criminal Chamber of 28 September 2000⁹ in the case of “traditional media” reads as follows

reader’s letters constitute press material as understood by Article 7 (2) 4 of the Act of 26 January 1984 on Press Law (Dz. U. 1984 No. 5 pt. 24 as amended) under the condition that the letters have been sent to the editorial office with the intention to be published. The editor-in-chief is responsible for their publication. A reader’s letter can be, therefore, published after the information contained in the letter has been cautiously and diligently verified as provided for by article 12 (1) of the Press Law. Publishing a reader’s letter does not constitute quotation of another individual’s statement. In view of that the editor-in-chief is still responsible for its publication.

The Supreme Court’s (Customs Chamber’s) decision of December 7, 1993¹⁰ reads as follows:

Article 24 (1) together with article 23 of the Criminal Code and article 37 of the Press Law of 26 January 2984 provide the basis for a non-property claim of the violation of personal interests in a press material. The claim may be filed against a publisher.

The authors also need to mention that the Republic of Poland is a civil law country and there are no binding precedents. Also, the Supreme Court’s resolution is only binding for the court that referred with a specific question but in practice Polish courts often apply rules that were interpreted by the Supreme Court.

Different European jurisdictions
The decision¹¹ of the Appellate Court in Berlin (Landgericht) of May 31, 2007 is an apt example of a similar case in German jurisdiction. The case revolved around the responsibility of a moderator of a website for posts made by third persons and the theory of the so-called “impartial internaut”. The court held that a moderator of an online portal is burdened with no general obligation to review (oversee) posts uploaded by third parties. The case involved a dispute between the administrator of the meinprof.de portal, a website used to evaluate professors of colleges and universities, and one of the evaluated professors who was dubbed on meinprof.de a “psycho” and “the bottom one”. Even though the moderator, having received a notice, did remove the posts, the professor filed a complaint with the court. The court held, however, that in this case the posts boiled down merely to airing one’s opinion. The justification of the ruling reads as follows

Under the press law, any publisher Verbreiter can be seen as an offender (Prinz/Peters, Medienrecht, 1999, Rn, 35). The publisher is anybody who, as in this case, contributes to the distribution of a statement. (BGH NJW 1986, 2503 (2504)–Ostkontakte).

Any third parties that (having been viewed objectively) by their actions support (financially) illegal actions that infringe legally protected interests cannot be liable for the infringement in civil cases. The condition for actual liability as an offender is the default of the obligation of review and control. The specific circumstances of a given case should decide if and to what extent the control is or might be compulsory. The decision should also depend on the determination of the function and tasks of the person charged with infringement and that person’s responsibility. The defendant, being an administrator of a platform for exchanging views, did not infringe the obligation of such review/control. Individuals who administrate online portals do not have to control all their content. Owing to the immense amount of content, such control would be unfeasible¹².

Even the condition that in the rules of the website the defendant did reserve the right to delete illegal posts does not lead, contrarily to the assertions of the plaintiff, to the recognition of a general obligation to control content. Content control is obligatory only when a person, the personal interests of whom have been violated, brings an accusation in the form of a written notice. The notice should contain a detailed description of the violated personal interests with respect to a specific part of the content. In such a case the administrator of a portal does not have to conduct extensive searches at high personal and technological expense. The administrator will only have to check if the post that the accusation concerns can be described (from the perspective of an objective internaut) as conforming with the law. The defendant, dissimilarly to the administrator of a portal in the case decided upon by the BGH that the plaintiff evoked, did not violate the obligation of control. The administrator of the portal, upon the reception of a message from the plaintiff that centred upon the slanderous post, immediately deleted the post from the forum¹³.

No crime where there are doubts
In the Polish law, the regulations of the Act on Providing Services by Electronic Means, for example Article 14(1), provide that

A person who gives access to the contents of a network IT system to a customer, where the customer stores data, is not aware of the illegal features of the data or activity connected with the data and upon receiving an official notification or credible information about the illegal features of the data or activity connected with it, immediately bars access to the data, shall not be responsible for the data.

Chapter 3 of the PSEM, entitled “Exemption of responsibility of the service provider for providing E-services”, includes, as the title itself suggests, a number of other exemptions. The chapter concludes with a regulation in article 15 that reads

Any company that renders services described in article 12-14 shall not be required to verify the data described in article 12-14 that is transmitted, stored or made available by that company.

Having reviewed the above regulations, it seems there are two that actually collide with each other–one from the PL and the other from the PSEM. The modus operandi should be drawn entirely from provisions of the law. Having determined it, only now can we turn to the analysis of regulations such as, for example, article 25(4) of the APL, which reads

The editor-in-chief shall bear the responsibility for the content of the material prepared by the editorial team and the organizational and financial issues of the company within the frames set up in the articles of association or relevant regulations. The editor-in-chief is also responsible for safeguarding linguistic correctness of press materials and counteracting their vulgarization.

Another article of the APL, already mentioned above, article 54b (included in Chapter 8, “Proceedings in press cases”) reads

Provisions on legal responsibility and proceedings in press cases shall be applied to the infringement of law connected with the transmission of human thought via means designed to distribute information, irrespectively of the technology of transmission, especially nonperiodical publications and other print, vision and sound products, other that press.

All criminal cases should be decided on in the scope of the principle nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a law). The aforementioned cases are indeed riddled with doubts. The authors can hardly adhere to the claim that this clause might mean legal liability for the lack of registration of press other than a “daily newspaper” or a “periodical”, also because of the fact that the regulation covers mass media other than the press. In the authors’ opinion, the gby.pl website can be recognised as “press” but is neither a “daily newspaper” nor a “periodical”.

The legal basis is Article 414 of the Criminal Proceedings Code.

1. After the court proceedings have been instigated, if circumstances precluding prosecution or information substantiating conditional discontinuance of the proceedings are recognized, the court may decide to discontinue the proceedings or discontinue the proceedings conditionally. However, if circumstances provided in article 17(1) 1 and 2 are recognized, the court may issue an acquitting judgement, unless the offender at the time of the offence was non compos mentis

and article 66 (with subsequent ones) of the Criminal Code

The court may conditionally discontinue penal proceedings if the guilt and social harm of the illegal act are nor considerable, circumstances of the act are doubtless and the attitude of the offender that has not been punished for an intentional crime, the offender’s personal conditions and former lifestyle substantiate the speculation that the offender will obey the rule of law and especially that will not commit another crime…

Conclusion
Since the gby.pl is neither a daily newspaper nor a periodical, by discontinuing the proceedings in the case the courts apparently did not recognise that “the act was not committed or there was a lack of information sufficiently substantiating the suspicion of its committal” or that “the act did not bear the features of an illegal act or the law provided that the offender did not commit a crime”.

The Polish Act on Providing Services by Electronic Means was to implement into the Polish legislation the European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31 of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (Directive on electronic commerce) and the European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)¹⁴. The way Poland incorporated those two Directives into a single domestic legal act stirred considerable criticism¹⁵.

Many individuals pointed out that the implementation of the Directives boiled down mainly to the literal translation of their content into Polish, which was then put into a single legal act. In consequence, the Act draws on inconsistent terminology, for instance in some of the regulations the Polish Act uses the term “an information recipient” and in others “a service recipient”. Another problematic issue is the fact that the Act refers to other regulations provided in other domestic legal acts (e.g. the Telecommunications Law Act of 21 July 2000¹⁶). What is even more, the regulations of the Polish Act do not explicitly set out if a service provider is exempt from civil liability or also criminal liability resulting from rendering e-services. Even further, the European Council reminded Poland that it had implemented the Directive 2000/31 only partially¹⁷. As a result, Poland initiated another legislative process that aimed at full implementation of the Directive, especially with regard to the implementation of the “country of origin” rule and the rule of the freedom of providing e-services.

Apart from the imprecise PSEM and the 1984 Press Law Act, which is a legal act originating practically in another era¹⁸, the only legal act that directly refers to internet publications is the Access to Public Information Act of September 6, 2001. The Act introduced an “official teleinformation publishing system” in the form of a “unified webpage system” (article 8). The only Polish legal act that suggests how to create websites (for public institutions to comply with the obligation to publish public information) is the Minister’s of Interior and Administration Regulation of January 18, 2007 on the Public Information Bulletin (BIP). Under article 9(2) of the Regulation

Where a subject, referred to in article 4(1) and (2) of the Act, owns an internet website, the subject’s own BIP website shall be created as a part of the website by placing a link with the BIP logotype that shall give direct access to the subject’s BIP website.

Apart from the imprecise definition of the Public Information Bulletin, which functions on the basis of the aforementioned Access to Public Information Act, there can also be the socalled “own website” which, even though provided for in the Regulation, is not defined therein. In consequence, while creating websites, public administration bodies are bound by no other rules than those existing in the “outer world”. Having recognised that, the authors put forward a statement that since in Leszek Szymczak’s case the charges (publishing a periodical without a registration) were not dropped owing to the lack of features of a prohibited act, the same charges (publication of internet websites without proper registration) can be brought against the highest public institutions in Poland. The authors asked the Chief Police Officer on May 8, 2007 the following: do these “own” internet websites (of public institutions) exist legally? The answer was that the Polish police does not register their internet websites with a registration court.

In a democratic country observing the rule of law, the situation of a public institution, which under Article 7 of the Polish Constitution “functions on the basis and within the limits of the law”, differs from the situation of a subject functioning on the basis of economic freedom. Apart from publishing a BIP bulletin, Polish public institutions can also publish daily newspapers and periodicals (which is allowed under article 8 of the APIA)

The publisher can be a legal entity, a natural person or a different organizational entity, even if it is not a legal entity. In particular a publisher can be a public institution, a staterun company, a political organization, a labour union, a cooperative, a selfgovernment body and other social organization, a church or any other religious organization.

If this is the case, public administration institutions should also fulfil legal conditions on the publication of such a newspaper or a periodical. The current practice shows, nevertheless, that the public administration massively creates internet websites and does not register it with registration courts. The Chief Officer of the Police answered the authors¹⁹.

The Act of 28 January 1984, the Press Law, does not recognize internet websites as daily newspapers or periodicals.

The first President of the Supreme Court, Lech Gordocki, made a similar statement, later published in the press²⁰.

I am not going to apply to the Regional Court for the registration of the website of the Supreme Court since the Act does not provide such an obligation.

Neither the President of the Republic of Poland, nor the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection, the Prime Minister of Poland and none of the Polish ministries and state agencies registered their own websites, which functionally do not differ from news websites. Then, if a court held that an individual who published a periodical without proper registration brought minor social harm, the court could rule otherwise if the charged entities were the police, the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ombudsman or even the President, who apart from BIP bulletins all publish news websites without registering them with registration courts²¹.

As already mentioned, the only normative suggestion concerning internet websites in Poland comes in the form of executive regulations relating to the Access to Public Information Act. These regulations do not differentiate between “websites”, “portals”, “vortals”, etc. Generally we do not know what a “portal”, a “vortal” or a “blog” are. However, Polish courts pass judgments in which judges try wrongly to differentiate between those terms²². If there is no difference between publishing a periodical necessitating proper registration and publishing a blog, then perhaps we should also scrutinise the publishing activities of Marek Siwiec, a Vice-President of the European Parliament, who has been publishing his ruminations at http://mareksiwiec.blog.onet.pl also without registration with a registration court since 2007.

Recent press releases in Poland induced several individuals to apply to registration courts for the registration of blogs as daily newspapers and periodicals (as understood by the Polish Press Law). In some of those applications courts decided to enter names of the blogs to the Register of Daily Newspapers and Periodicals. This, however, under the Polish law, does not mean that in Poland you need to register a blog with a registration court. First of all, such an application should be filed before publishing has started, but that, again, makes it impossible for a court to decide if a given activity necessitates registration. Secondly, courts cannot deny registration if an individual or an organisation files for the registration of something that is neither a daily newspaper nor a periodical. Under article 21 of the APL

A registrar body shall deny the registration if:
[1] the application does not contain data that the Act describes (the daily newspaper’s or the periodical’s title, the seat of the publisher and the exact address of the editorial office, the particulars of the editor-in-chief, the particulars of the publisher, the frequency of publishing of the daily newspaper or the periodical) and

[2] if granting registration would constitute infringement of the right to the legal protection of an existing press title.

Owing to the above, Polish registration courts did enter the names of blogs provided by their applicants²³.

In the case of Leszek Szymczak, the defence asked the Polish Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection to apply for a revocation of the sentence (it can be applied for only by the Commissioner and the Prosecutor General). By the end of June 2008 the defence also filed a constitutional complaint (see the website of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights²⁴).

P.S.
The Regional Court in Słupsk in its judgment of 16 December 2008 acquitted Leszek Szymczak from charges of publishing press material featuring criminal content that publicly incited its readers to commit offences. See “Press law, case II K 367/08“.

Footnotes
1. Case file VI Ka 409/7.
2. Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No.5, pos. 24, with subsequent changes.
3. Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No.88, pos. 553, with subsequent changes.
4. On the basis of the decision of the Voivodeship Court in Slupsk Ns-Rej.Pr 8/91 of September 12, 1991.
5. Ustawa z dnia 18 lipca 2002 r. o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczna, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of September 9, 2002, No.144, pos.1204, with subsequent amendments.
6. Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce) [2000] OJ L178/1-16.
7. Case file I ACa 277/05.
8. Case file I ACa 601/98. Broadcasting Act, Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 r. o radiofonii i telewizji, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2004, No. 253 item 2531.
9. Case file V KKN 171/98.
10. Case file III CZP 160/93.
11. Az. 27 S 2/07.
12. Decision of December 7, 2006, Az. 10 W 106/06; BGH NJW 2004, 3102.
13. J. Kurek, Comment available at http://prawo.vagla.pl/node/7341#comment-4526 [Accessed November 10, 2008].
14. [2002] OJ L 201/37-47.
15. G. Raczka, Ochrona Uslugobiorcy uslug elektronicznych (Torun 2007), p. 63, W. Iszkowski, X. Konraski, “Elektroniczne uslugi”, Rzeczpospolita newspaper, March 4, 2003.
16. Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001, no.73, pos. 852, as amended.
17. Commission of the European Communities, First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), Brussels, November 21, 2003, COM(2003) 702 final, p. 19.
18. It is noteworthy that August 17, 1991 is a symbolic date recognised as the inception of the Polish internet, i.e. the first time when via an IP protocol the Physics Department of the Warsaw University sent data to the Computer Centre of the Copenhagen University.
19 Letter of June 19, 2007 regarding the answer of the spokesman of the Chief Officer of the Police concerning websites run by the police. See http:// prawo.vagla.pl/node/7329 [Accessed November 10, 2008].
20. In a Polish daily newspaper, Rzeczpospolita, on September 6, 2007.
21. See http://www.president.pl, http://www.kprm.gov.pl/english, http:// www.rpo.gov.pl/index.php?s=3 [Accessed November 10, 2008].
22. See Judgment the district court in Warsaw (IV Civil Division) of June 9, 2008, case file Act IV C 806/07.
23. See http://olgierd.bblog.pl/wpis,moj;nowy;organ;prasowy,7042.html [Accessed November 10, 2008].
24. See http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/precedens/pl/aktualnosci/sprawa-gazety-bytowskiej-w-tk.html [Accessed November 10, 2008].

This article was originally published under the title Polish Courts Say Websites Should Be Registered As Press in the Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, C.T.L.R. 2009, 15(1), 9-14.