Archive for: Art. 25 TMA

Trade mark law, VI SA/Wa 1962/07

January 22nd, 2013, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company Zakład Gospodarki Komunalnej Organizacja Odzysku Biosystem S.A. requested the Polish Patent Office to take a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for IR-653449 and IR-585713 trade marks registered for goods in the following Classes 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42. Both trade marks are owned by Der Grüne Punkt Duales System Deutschland GmbH.

IR-653450

In support of its legal interest, Biosystem S.A. explained that it is one of more than 30 domestic companies that are specializing in recovery of certain categories of waste and like other market participants have the right to use the informational signs. While Rekpol S.A., being the sole licensee of Der Grüne Punkt Duales System Deutschland GmbH trade marks, is sending C&D letters to different businesses, including Biosystem S.A. According to Biosystem the questioned trade marks are spread and used among various companies and as the result of negligence of the owner and licensee these signs cannot fulfill the functions to designate the origin of a particular entrepreneur and have degenerated in respect of all goods and services and become a carrier of information in trade that the product bearing the mark shall be recovered.

IR-653449

The PPO decided that the Polish company had no legal interest (but only factual one) in all classes of goods since it produces none of the goods covered by the protection right (and it doesn’t not sell them), but only provides services related to recovery of certain categories of waste. The PPO only agreed that Biosystem S.A. has shown legal interest in seeking the lapse of the disputed trade mark registration in part, on all services (i.e., services included in Classes 35, 36, 39, 40, 42). In this respect, the PPO considered that the interest can be inferred from the principle of freedom of establishment guaranteed in the provisions of Article 20 of the Polish Constitution and Article 6 of the Act of 2 July 2004 on Freedom of Economic Activity. Biosystem filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgments of 15 April 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1959/07 and VI SA/Wa 1960/07 held that the definition of waste and recycling, shows that waste are the goods. Thus, in the view of the Court it was possible to trade in such goods. The court held that it may be that the scope of activities of Biosystem S.A. include those goods. Hence the need to examine the legal interest in the classes of goods. Legal interest shall be tested at the beginning of hearings, therefore, the VAC did not address the merits of the dispute. The Court ruled that the repealed decisions of the Polish Patent Office should not be enforceable.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court has also decided on other PPO’s decisions with regard to IR-585714 and IR-653450 trade marks and held the same in its judgments of 24 April 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1961/07 and VI SA/Wa 1962/07. All four cases went back to the Polish Patent Office.

Again, Biosystem argued that the characters have lost their distinctiveness, as they appear on millions of packages of goods from various manufacturers. The company cited a research institute Pentor that consumers do not identify these signs with a particular trader. They are applied by different manufacturers for packaging and currently only indicate that they are subject to disposal (safe for the environment). Biosystem claimed that information as such cannot serve as trade mark and the sign does not identify an entrepreneur.

Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System Deutschland and Rekopol noted that they were active in defending these trade marks against the lapse, because both companies warned many entrepreneurs, that Grüne Punkt trade marks cannot be used without a proper license. In this way, both companies care about the protection of the brand which excludes the possibility of the lapse due to lack of distinctive character. The Polish Industrial Property Law clearly states that the loss of the distinctive character must be the consequence of the owner’s acting or negligence.

The Adjudicative Board of the PPO in its decisions of July 2010 case no. Sp. 363/08 and case no. Sp. 433/08 and ruled on the lapse of the right of protection. The PPO agreed with the argument that Grüne Punkt trade marks became very popular in many markets, especially in Europe. According to the case file, there are around 95,000 licenses granted all over the world for their use, and for example, in Western Europe, they are placed on almost 91% of the packaging. Such method of placing trade marks on a variety of products that originate from different manufacturers does not meet the conditions of the genuine use of the mark in its function.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its two judgments of 9 March 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 2169/10 and case file VI SA/Wa 2171/10 dissmissed complaints filed by Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System and Rekopol. Both companies filed cassation complaints. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgments of 21 November 2012 case file II GSK 1551/11 and case file II GSK 1646/11 dismissed them both which in consequence lead to the final lapse of both trade mark rights on the Polish territory.

Procedural law, case GSK 940/04

January 25th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 7 January 2005 case file GSK 940/04 held that the SAC shall apply the measures provided for in Article 135 the Polish Act of 30 August 2002 on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts – PBAC – (in Polish: Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 153, item 1270 with subsequent amendments, in order to eliminate breaches of law in respect of actions or acts issued or undertaken in all proceedings that were conducted within the case to which the cassation complaint was filed, if it is necessary to its final ending. The Court is obliged to go beyond the boundaries of a cassation complaint, but it does not mean, however, that the court is not bound by the limits of a case in which the action was brought. It cannot therefore adopt the measures provided for by the law and “interfere” in the new issue which has been or shall be the subject of proceedings before an administrative authority, and acts that should be issued in this kind proceeding.

This case concerned the request to decide on the lapse of the right deriving from registration of a trade mark that was filed before the Polish Patent Office by P.H. “Jubiler” Spółka z o.o. from Poznań. The proceeding before the PPO proved that this case should be focused on other important issues, mainly, the validity of transfer of the registration of the trade mark JUBILER R-60833. The PPO dismissed the request. The company from Poznań filed a complaint against this decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Poznań in its judgment of 16 March 2004 case file II SA 2550/02 dismissed it. P.H. “Jubiler” sp. z o.o. filed a cassation complaint.

R-60833

The Supreme Administrative Court held that the boundaries of the administrative case are determined by the extent of judicial review of public administration, which is provided in Article 1 of the Polish Act of 25 July 2002 on Law on Administrative Courts – LAC – (in Polish: Prawo o ustroju sądów administracyjnych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 153, item 1269 with subsequent amendments. Therefore, in the case that concerned a complaint filed on the issue of the lapse of the registration of trade mark, the Court could not examine and apply the measures provided for by law in another case, namely concerning the agreement on the transfer of the registration of the trade mark.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 668/08

March 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 25 January 2005, Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. applied to register the word trade mark CHOKELLA Z-290315 in Class 30, for goods such as: breakfast cereals, muesli, corn flakes, cereal bars, cereal flakes, cereal preparations, food products based on rice, flour or cereals, also in the form of ready-to-use meals. Nestlé was aware that there is a possiblity that the Polish Patent Office rejects the application because of the earlier registration of the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, registered with priority on 30 August 1993 for the Company Kelsen The International Bakery A/S from Norre-Snede, which during Nestle’s application was under the grace period based on the provisions of Article 132(1)(iii) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments.

2. A right of protection for a trade mark shall not be granted, if the trade mark is:
(iii) a trade mark earlier registered in the Republic of Poland, whose registration has terminated, provided that an interval between the date of lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark and the date on which a similar trade mark has been applied for by another party, is, subject to Article 133, no longer than two years.

On 3 February 2005, Nestle filed before the PPO a request for a declaratory decision which would affirm the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, because of its non-use. According to Nestle, the declaratory decision should be effective from the date when an event which involves the effect of the expiry occured, i.e., at the date when the 5-year time period of non-use of a trade mark expired.

On January 2006, The PPO, dismissed the proceedings on the grounds that it was pointless, since before the date of Nestle’s request the rights of protections for CHOKELLA trade mark expired on 30 August 2003, under the law, due to the failure to extend the protection for the next ten years. It was unacceptable for the PPO to decide on the lapse of the rights of protecion for a trade mark, which did not exist at the date of application for such declaration. The PPO indicated that Nestle’s request was filed almost two years after the expiry of the CHOKELLA trade mark, so dismissal of the proceedings was justified because of the lack of subject that would be suitable for a substantive judgment. The PPO ruled that the right of protection shall expire on the date of the decision with effect from the date of filing a request to declare the right of protection for the trademark lapsed. So the decision has a constitutive nature and is applicable ex tunc. The PPO did not agree with Nestle’s argument, and the construction and interpretation of the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL.

The Patent Office shall make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest therein.

The PPO decided that this prejudge the declaratory nature of the decision on the lapse of the rights of protection and it differs from the provisions afforded in the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

Article 25.
The right deriving from registration of a trade mark shall lapse:
(i) on expiry of the term of protection;
(ii) on relinquishment of the right by the person entitled under the registration of the trade mark;
(iii) on failure to use the mark;
(iv) on loss of sufficient distinctiveness of the trade mark;
(v) on termination of economic activity on the part of the owner of the right deriving from registration of the trade mark.

Article 26.
In those cases referred to in section 25, items ii) to v), the Patent Office shall cancel the right deriving from registration of the trademark.

Article 30.
(1) Any person having a legitimate interest may submit a request for confirmation of lapse or a request for annulment of the right deriving from registration of a trade mark.

In the PPO’s opinion the provisions of article 169(2), beside different nomenclature of institutions (i.e. registration rights in the TMA and the rights of protection in the IPL), are identical and, even if the TMA did not indicate the date on which the lapse of registration rights or rights of protection, the legal doctrine and the case-law have established a method of calculating such date based on a specific event, for which it is considered the date of filing the request before the Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark.

Nestle filed a complaint before the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, and argued that, contrary to the PPO findings, the IPL quite differently regulates the rules of declaration on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark. The Office shall issue a decision on the lapse of the rights of protection for trade mark and the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL indicates clearly that the decision is a declaratory act with a constitutive effect, that is, the decision itself, does not abolish the rights, but merely states that the right is expired under the law, which has effect for third parties from the time it was decided.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 December 2007 case file VI SA/Wa 791/07 dismissed the complaint. The Court agreed with the PPO’s findings. Nestle filed a cassation complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 January 2009 case file II GSK 668/08 annulled the ruling of the Voivodeship Administrative Court. First, the Court noted that the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 23 April 2008 case file II GPS 1/08 held that according to the provisions of Article 169(1)(i) of the IPL, the date of lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark is set on the last day of a period of five successive years, counting from the first date of non-use. See also “Trade mark law, case II GPS 1/08“. The SAC ruled that aforementioned judgment can not be excluded from the examination of the matter of Nestle’s complaint. According to the Court, it is accurate and consist of compelling arguments that are sufficient to answer the question formulated in Nestle case. The Court held that the similarity of the nature of “industrial property” within the meaning of property in the civil law context is in the exclusive use of goods that are understood as property, the beneficial use and disposal of such goods. However, the industrial property differs because its formal nature that is resulting from the relationship with a decision on granting the rights of protection, invalidation and the lapse of rights of protection. The decision to grant the rights of protection for a trade mark mark is clearly a constitutive act creating the legal status for a person. Declaratory decisions can not determine the occurrence of the new legal situation, but must refer to another fact or event occurring earlier in time and combine them with the rights or duties of the entity (legal or natural person). The vague regulations of the TMA encouraged the formulation of views on the constitutive nature of the decision on the lapse of the registration rights of a trade mark under article 26 and 30 of the TMA. The SAC did not agree with two separate opinions issued by judges who were appointed to decide in case II GPS 1/08 and article written by professor Ryszard Skubisz and Marcin Trzebiatowski in which the authors provided examples on declaratory and constitutive nature taken from family law or labour law. According to the Court, the difficulties arise when the vague provisions of formal law create the need for an interpretation if, in connection with the answer to the question of when and on what basis (fact, event, operation), the decision has constitutive or declaratory nature. It was incomprehensible for the SAC to give the examples of judgments of nullity of marriage or fatherhood, the effects of which can not be transferred by the declaratory act on the life of the party in the family and the society. The Court held that similarities between industrial property and the instutution of the property taken from the civil law (property and ownership of tangible goods) should be taken into account to justify the recognition of decision on the lapse of the rights of protection as declaratory one instead of the principles of family law. The Court analyzed the nature of such decision in the scope of the property law rules i.e. the acquisition of property (perpetual use of the property or servitude of the ground) is decided by the declaratory ruling of the civil court following the expiry of the last day of the period when such possession is required by the formal law. The SAC also stated that the day of filing the application for declaration on lapse of the rights of protection does not affect the date of expiry of the right, because it is initiating administrative action on the request of the parties. Whether and when the rights of protection shall lapse should be declared by the findings made during the proceedings for the purposes of the law.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 252/06

June 30th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

The British company Imperial Tobacco Limited requested the Polish Patent Office to decide in litigation procedure on the lapse of a right of protection for trade mark MOON R-91725 owned by Polish company Altadis Polska S.A. Imperial Tobacco based its legal interest on the fact that it has applied for the recognition on the territory of the Republic of Poland of the protection for the international trademarks with the word element MOON IR-811335, IR-812000, IR-811953 and IR-811992. These trade marks were intended to designate goods in Class 34. The Company wanted to use them in Poland. Imperial Tobacco also pointed out that the trade mark MOON R-91725 was not used on the Polish territory in the way that is required by law.

Altadis demanded the dismissal of the request. The Polish company argued that Imperial Tobacco has no legal interest in seeking the lapse of a right of protection for the trade mark MOON R-91725, because John Player & Sons Limited of Ireland is the company entitled to international registrations of above-mentioned trade marks.

The PPO dismissed the request and PPO’s decision was upheld by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 30 March 2006 case file VI SA/Wa 2048/05. The Court based its reasoning on the lack of legal interest. Imperial filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 8 February 2007 case file II GSK 252/06 held that the entrepreneur who plans to place on the domestic market identical or similar goods bearing a sign that is identical or similar to registered but unused trademark, has a legal interest in requesting the PPO for the decision on the lapse of a right of protection for the trade mark because of its non-use by the holder, provided, however, that such entrepreneur will demonstrate that its intention is real and genuine, especially if it’s a manufacturer of such goods and introduces them to a common market under the sign.