Polish IP & IT law – copyright trademark computer internet telecomm

Archive for: Art. 30 TMA

Trade mark law, case II GSK 1885/12

June 10th, 2014, Tomasz Rychlicki

Polskie Towarzystwo Tatrzańskie (Polish Tatra Society) requested the Polish Patent Office to invalidate the right of protection for the the word-figurative trade mark POL.TOW.TATRZAŃSKIE 1873 R-101381 owned by Zarząd Główny Polskiego Towarzystwa Turystyczno-Krajoznawczego (Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society). PTT argued that in 1994, the PTTK unlawfully applied for the trade mark in question. It was plagiarized traditional organizational badge of the PTT and at the same time a membership badge and a badge of honor of that Society. This organizational badge with the inscription “Pol. Tow. Tatra of 1873” and the image of chamois, was established in 1922. After the II World War, the Society ceased to function, but it has been reactivated in 1981 in times of Polish People’s Republic. The badge was re-established by the decision of the Chairman of the Committee on Youth and Sports of October 1990 issued according to the provisions of the Polish Act of 21 December 1978 on badges and uniforms, as a PTT’s badge. PTTK argued that the decision was challenged before the administrative bodies and courts.

R-101381

The PPO adjourned the proceedings until the Supreme Administrative Court in its final judgment of 2008 dismissed the cassation complaint against the decision of the Minister of Economy that refused to annull the decision of the Chairman of the Committee for Youth and Physical Culture of October 1990. The PPO invalidated the right of protection. PTTK filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 5 July 2012 case file VI SA/Wa 515/12 annulled the contested decision, and ruled it unenforceable. The Court held that the legal basis for invalidation of the trade mark were the provisions of the Article 8 point 5 of the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments. Under this regulation, the registration of a sign which contains the name or crest of the Polish voivodeship, city or town, a reproduction of a Polish order, badge of honor and a military badge or sign, is unacceptable. Where justified, such a sign may be registered following approval by the competent authority state or the relevant organizational unit. In the filing date for registration of the invalidated trade mark, the Polish Act of 21 December 1978 on badges and uniforms was in force. Article 2 of that Act established three types of badges: a badge of honor, an organizational badge and an occasional badge. There was no doubt for the Court that the PTT has established an organizational badge. Clearly, it was not a badge of honor, because the PTT has not preserved the procedures required for its establishment. In turn, Article 8 point 5 of the TMA introduces inadmissible registration of a sign containing a badge of honor, not organizational badges. The VAC ruled that the PPO has violated the substantive law while deciding this case. PTT filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 20 May 2014 case file II GSK 1885/12 dismissed it.

Trade mark law, VI SA/Wa 1962/07

January 22nd, 2013, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company Zakład Gospodarki Komunalnej Organizacja Odzysku Biosystem S.A. requested the Polish Patent Office to take a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for IR-653449 and IR-585713 trade marks registered for goods in the following Classes 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42. Both trade marks are owned by Der Grüne Punkt Duales System Deutschland GmbH.

IR-653450

In support of its legal interest, Biosystem S.A. explained that it is one of more than 30 domestic companies that are specializing in recovery of certain categories of waste and like other market participants have the right to use the informational signs. While Rekpol S.A., being the sole licensee of Der Grüne Punkt Duales System Deutschland GmbH trade marks, is sending C&D letters to different businesses, including Biosystem S.A. According to Biosystem the questioned trade marks are spread and used among various companies and as the result of negligence of the owner and licensee these signs cannot fulfill the functions to designate the origin of a particular entrepreneur and have degenerated in respect of all goods and services and become a carrier of information in trade that the product bearing the mark shall be recovered.

IR-653449

The PPO decided that the Polish company had no legal interest (but only factual one) in all classes of goods since it produces none of the goods covered by the protection right (and it doesn’t not sell them), but only provides services related to recovery of certain categories of waste. The PPO only agreed that Biosystem S.A. has shown legal interest in seeking the lapse of the disputed trade mark registration in part, on all services (i.e., services included in Classes 35, 36, 39, 40, 42). In this respect, the PPO considered that the interest can be inferred from the principle of freedom of establishment guaranteed in the provisions of Article 20 of the Polish Constitution and Article 6 of the Act of 2 July 2004 on Freedom of Economic Activity. Biosystem filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgments of 15 April 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1959/07 and VI SA/Wa 1960/07 held that the definition of waste and recycling, shows that waste are the goods. Thus, in the view of the Court it was possible to trade in such goods. The court held that it may be that the scope of activities of Biosystem S.A. include those goods. Hence the need to examine the legal interest in the classes of goods. Legal interest shall be tested at the beginning of hearings, therefore, the VAC did not address the merits of the dispute. The Court ruled that the repealed decisions of the Polish Patent Office should not be enforceable.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court has also decided on other PPO’s decisions with regard to IR-585714 and IR-653450 trade marks and held the same in its judgments of 24 April 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1961/07 and VI SA/Wa 1962/07. All four cases went back to the Polish Patent Office.

Again, Biosystem argued that the characters have lost their distinctiveness, as they appear on millions of packages of goods from various manufacturers. The company cited a research institute Pentor that consumers do not identify these signs with a particular trader. They are applied by different manufacturers for packaging and currently only indicate that they are subject to disposal (safe for the environment). Biosystem claimed that information as such cannot serve as trade mark and the sign does not identify an entrepreneur.

Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System Deutschland and Rekopol noted that they were active in defending these trade marks against the lapse, because both companies warned many entrepreneurs, that Grüne Punkt trade marks cannot be used without a proper license. In this way, both companies care about the protection of the brand which excludes the possibility of the lapse due to lack of distinctive character. The Polish Industrial Property Law clearly states that the loss of the distinctive character must be the consequence of the owner’s acting or negligence.

The Adjudicative Board of the PPO in its decisions of July 2010 case no. Sp. 363/08 and case no. Sp. 433/08 and ruled on the lapse of the right of protection. The PPO agreed with the argument that Grüne Punkt trade marks became very popular in many markets, especially in Europe. According to the case file, there are around 95,000 licenses granted all over the world for their use, and for example, in Western Europe, they are placed on almost 91% of the packaging. Such method of placing trade marks on a variety of products that originate from different manufacturers does not meet the conditions of the genuine use of the mark in its function.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its two judgments of 9 March 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 2169/10 and case file VI SA/Wa 2171/10 dissmissed complaints filed by Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System and Rekopol. Both companies filed cassation complaints. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgments of 21 November 2012 case file II GSK 1551/11 and case file II GSK 1646/11 dismissed them both which in consequence lead to the final lapse of both trade mark rights on the Polish territory.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1486/08

June 17th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 17 February 2005, Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. from Vevey applied to the Polish Patent Office to register the word-figurative trade mark Frappé Z-291280 for goods in class 30. On August 2005 Nestlé filed a request for invalidation of the right of protection of the FRAPPE R-13842 trade mark, registered for goods in class 30 and 32 owned by Polish company “MASPEX” Spólka z o.o. form Wadowice. Nestlé based its request on provisions of Article 7(2) and Article 8(3) of the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

(2) A sign shall not possess sufficient distinctiveness if it simply constitutes the generic designation of the product, if it simply makes a statement as to the properties, quality, number, amount, weight, price, purpose, manufacturing process, time or place of production, composition, function or usefulness of the goods or any similar information that does not enable the origin of the goods to be determined

Article 8(3)
A trade mark shall not be registrable if:
iii) it contains incorrect statements;

Nestlé argued that the word “frappe” is a generic term, widely used in trade, as a sign for chilled coffee beverages. The company based its legitimate interest to have standing in proceedings before the Polish Patent Office on the principle of freedom of access to the indications that have descriptive meaning. In addition, Nestlé informed the PPO that it had sent a warning letter to Maspex because the Polish company had introduced to the market a product with similar name. In Nestlé’s opinion the exclusive right granted to Maspex to mark its products with the word “frappe” was a “unlawful constitutional restriction”. After the hearings and careful analysis of the evidence provided by both parties, the PPO found that the word FRAPPE (even being foreign word) was a term used widely to describe the properties of a beverage (cold, frozen, with ice cubes), especially of coffee, or to determine the type of coffee and it could not serve as sign capable of distinguishing goods of one entrepreneur from goods of another entrepreneur in normal market conditions. The PPO also shared Nestlé’s position based on the article 8(3) of the TMA that the wide range of names of goods covered in the registration of the contested trade mark are not frappe. Maspex filed a complaint.

The Voivodeship Administrative Cout in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 October 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1486/08 fully agreed with the PPO’s decision and dismissed the complaint.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 668/08

March 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 25 January 2005, Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. applied to register the word trade mark CHOKELLA Z-290315 in Class 30, for goods such as: breakfast cereals, muesli, corn flakes, cereal bars, cereal flakes, cereal preparations, food products based on rice, flour or cereals, also in the form of ready-to-use meals. Nestlé was aware that there is a possiblity that the Polish Patent Office rejects the application because of the earlier registration of the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, registered with priority on 30 August 1993 for the Company Kelsen The International Bakery A/S from Norre-Snede, which during Nestle’s application was under the grace period based on the provisions of Article 132(1)(iii) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments.

2. A right of protection for a trade mark shall not be granted, if the trade mark is:
(iii) a trade mark earlier registered in the Republic of Poland, whose registration has terminated, provided that an interval between the date of lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark and the date on which a similar trade mark has been applied for by another party, is, subject to Article 133, no longer than two years.

On 3 February 2005, Nestle filed before the PPO a request for a declaratory decision which would affirm the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark CHOKELLA R-85159, because of its non-use. According to Nestle, the declaratory decision should be effective from the date when an event which involves the effect of the expiry occured, i.e., at the date when the 5-year time period of non-use of a trade mark expired.

On January 2006, The PPO, dismissed the proceedings on the grounds that it was pointless, since before the date of Nestle’s request the rights of protections for CHOKELLA trade mark expired on 30 August 2003, under the law, due to the failure to extend the protection for the next ten years. It was unacceptable for the PPO to decide on the lapse of the rights of protecion for a trade mark, which did not exist at the date of application for such declaration. The PPO indicated that Nestle’s request was filed almost two years after the expiry of the CHOKELLA trade mark, so dismissal of the proceedings was justified because of the lack of subject that would be suitable for a substantive judgment. The PPO ruled that the right of protection shall expire on the date of the decision with effect from the date of filing a request to declare the right of protection for the trademark lapsed. So the decision has a constitutive nature and is applicable ex tunc. The PPO did not agree with Nestle’s argument, and the construction and interpretation of the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL.

The Patent Office shall make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest therein.

The PPO decided that this prejudge the declaratory nature of the decision on the lapse of the rights of protection and it differs from the provisions afforded in the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

Article 25.
The right deriving from registration of a trade mark shall lapse:
(i) on expiry of the term of protection;
(ii) on relinquishment of the right by the person entitled under the registration of the trade mark;
(iii) on failure to use the mark;
(iv) on loss of sufficient distinctiveness of the trade mark;
(v) on termination of economic activity on the part of the owner of the right deriving from registration of the trade mark.

Article 26.
In those cases referred to in section 25, items ii) to v), the Patent Office shall cancel the right deriving from registration of the trademark.

Article 30.
(1) Any person having a legitimate interest may submit a request for confirmation of lapse or a request for annulment of the right deriving from registration of a trade mark.

In the PPO’s opinion the provisions of article 169(2), beside different nomenclature of institutions (i.e. registration rights in the TMA and the rights of protection in the IPL), are identical and, even if the TMA did not indicate the date on which the lapse of registration rights or rights of protection, the legal doctrine and the case-law have established a method of calculating such date based on a specific event, for which it is considered the date of filing the request before the Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark.

Nestle filed a complaint before the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, and argued that, contrary to the PPO findings, the IPL quite differently regulates the rules of declaration on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark. The Office shall issue a decision on the lapse of the rights of protection for trade mark and the provisions of Article 169(2) of the IPL indicates clearly that the decision is a declaratory act with a constitutive effect, that is, the decision itself, does not abolish the rights, but merely states that the right is expired under the law, which has effect for third parties from the time it was decided.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 December 2007 case file VI SA/Wa 791/07 dismissed the complaint. The Court agreed with the PPO’s findings. Nestle filed a cassation complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 January 2009 case file II GSK 668/08 annulled the ruling of the Voivodeship Administrative Court. First, the Court noted that the Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 23 April 2008 case file II GPS 1/08 held that according to the provisions of Article 169(1)(i) of the IPL, the date of lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark is set on the last day of a period of five successive years, counting from the first date of non-use. See also “Trade mark law, case II GPS 1/08“. The SAC ruled that aforementioned judgment can not be excluded from the examination of the matter of Nestle’s complaint. According to the Court, it is accurate and consist of compelling arguments that are sufficient to answer the question formulated in Nestle case. The Court held that the similarity of the nature of “industrial property” within the meaning of property in the civil law context is in the exclusive use of goods that are understood as property, the beneficial use and disposal of such goods. However, the industrial property differs because its formal nature that is resulting from the relationship with a decision on granting the rights of protection, invalidation and the lapse of rights of protection. The decision to grant the rights of protection for a trade mark mark is clearly a constitutive act creating the legal status for a person. Declaratory decisions can not determine the occurrence of the new legal situation, but must refer to another fact or event occurring earlier in time and combine them with the rights or duties of the entity (legal or natural person). The vague regulations of the TMA encouraged the formulation of views on the constitutive nature of the decision on the lapse of the registration rights of a trade mark under article 26 and 30 of the TMA. The SAC did not agree with two separate opinions issued by judges who were appointed to decide in case II GPS 1/08 and article written by professor Ryszard Skubisz and Marcin Trzebiatowski in which the authors provided examples on declaratory and constitutive nature taken from family law or labour law. According to the Court, the difficulties arise when the vague provisions of formal law create the need for an interpretation if, in connection with the answer to the question of when and on what basis (fact, event, operation), the decision has constitutive or declaratory nature. It was incomprehensible for the SAC to give the examples of judgments of nullity of marriage or fatherhood, the effects of which can not be transferred by the declaratory act on the life of the party in the family and the society. The Court held that similarities between industrial property and the instutution of the property taken from the civil law (property and ownership of tangible goods) should be taken into account to justify the recognition of decision on the lapse of the rights of protection as declaratory one instead of the principles of family law. The Court analyzed the nature of such decision in the scope of the property law rules i.e. the acquisition of property (perpetual use of the property or servitude of the ground) is decided by the declaratory ruling of the civil court following the expiry of the last day of the period when such possession is required by the formal law. The SAC also stated that the day of filing the application for declaration on lapse of the rights of protection does not affect the date of expiry of the right, because it is initiating administrative action on the request of the parties. Whether and when the rights of protection shall lapse should be declared by the findings made during the proceedings for the purposes of the law.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 385/08

November 14th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 26 June 1996 the Polish company “Sniezka” Chłodnia from Częstochowa applied for the figurative trade mark in Class 30 for goods such as ice creams. The graphic represented a black boy’s head. On 10 September 2001, the Polish Patent Office granted the right of protection R-132332.

R-132332

On 31 July 1998, the Lodmor company from Gdansk applied for word-figurative trade mark “calypso lody smietankowe waniliowe LODMOR” Z-190131 in class 30 for goods such as ice creams, ice cream powder, ice cream binders. The PPO rejected Lodmor’s application justyfing its decision on priority of the “Sniezka” company’s trade mark.

Z-190131

Lodmor filed a request for trade mark invalidation. The company from Gdańsk claimed that “Sniezka” illegally appropriated a sign of a black boy’s head, which was put on Calypso ice creams in the ’70s and ’80s by companies that were part of the Union of the Freezing Industry (Lodmor is a legal successor of one of them). The PPO has invalidated “Sniezka” trade mark in 2006. The Office ruled that this sign was registered in contrary to principles of merchant’s honesty because the mark was already used for a long time by other entrepreneurs.

“Sniezka” Chłodnia company appealed. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 17 October 2007 case file VI SA/Wa 1005/07 held that Lodmor had no legal interest in filing a request for trade mark invalidation. The Court annulled PPO’s decision. The VAC held that the concept of legal interest in invalidation proceedings can not be derived from the fact that one company applies for a trade mark protection and there is an obstacle in the form of earlier registration. Such conclusion would lead to negation of principles that are the basis for granting rights for trade mark protection. In this case the interest involved only economic issues.

Lodmor filed a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 23 October 2008, case file II GSK 385/08 agreed with Lodmor’s arguments that VAC only referred to the trade mark application and it did not consider Lodmor’s legal interest. The SAC already issued decisions and opinions as regards the breach of principles of mercantile honesty and the bottom line of each ruling was that, in specific circumstances, a legitimate interest of a competitor may be found, as it was in Lodmor’s case. The Court held that every entrepreneur has the right to designate its products and services, with a trade mark, if it does not remain in conflict as to the form, duration and territorial aspect, with the absolute right that was previously obtained by another entity. An entrepreneur has a legal interest in the request for invalidation of the right of protection for a trade mark on the basis of circumstances provided in the request and conditions included in such a motion if the right of protection was granted in violation of the statutory requirements. The relevance and application of these conditions shall be assessed in proper proceedings. Therfore, the SAC returned the case to VAC for further reconsideration.