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Archive for: Polish Constitution

Press law, case SK 42/09

December 16th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 14 December 2011 case file SK 42/09 held that criminal sanctions for failure to register a daily newspaper or a periodical, as provided in Article 45 of the Polish Act of 26 January 1984 on Press law – APL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo prasowe), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 5, item 24, with subsequent amendments, are unconstitutional.

Anybody who publishes a daily newspaper or a periodical without registration or with registration suspended is subject to a fine penalty or the restriction of liberty.

This judgement indicates that the Polish legislator should consider a separate regulation for a printed press, and other rules for periodicals published, in particular, in the Internet. The Court pointed out not only the issue of criminal sanctions for the publication of press without registration, but also the issue of the obligation to register the press, which is still available in the APL.

See also “Press law, case IV KK 174/07“, “Press law, case II K 367/08” and “Press law, case VI Ka 409/07“.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 562/11

November 4th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Patent Office refused to grant the right of protection for the word trade mark flex fuga Z-297616 applied for by MAPEI POLSKA Sp. z o.o. for goods in Class 1 such as adhesives based on plastics and resins, silicone mortars, for goods in Class 6 such as decorative moldings, profiles, metal profiles, and for goods in Class 19 such as decorative moldings, profiles, profiles not made of metal, masonry mortars, dry plaster, mortars for grouting and welding.

The PPO decided that this trade mark is devoid of sufficient distinctive character and it lacks any additional elements, such as verbal or graphic, which would allow potential purchasers to identify the goods with the source of the origin of goods. The PPO noted that a fuga is a weld/joint between adjacent wall elements and flex means flexible in English.

MAPEI filed a complaint against this decision but it was dismissed by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 26 August 2009 case file VI SA/WA 1017/09. MAPEI decided to file a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 13 January 2011 case file II GSK 19/10 overturned the judgment of the VAC and held that the VAC relied on the erroneous assumption that the buyers (users) of goods bearing the trademark at issue are those who know English or use the Internet every day, which was not supported by any evidence. Besides, the trade mark flex fuga was applied for not only various types of mortars but also for various types of decorative moldings, profiles, sections of metal and non-metallic, and in relation to those goods it is difficult, to talk about “cut or bent” joint or weld.

The case went back to the Voivodeship Administrative Court. The VAC in its judgment of 9 May 2011 case file VI SA/Wa 562/11 held that the fact that the Polish Patent Office has granted the rights of protection for a number of trade marks containing the word “flex” or the word “flex” in combination with other words, should prompt the PPO to a broader examination of the merits of the MAPEI’s trade mark application. Thus, the PPO’s view that even if MAPEI relied on other decisions issued by the Polish Patent Office, it could not affect the assessment of the submitted application and its final examination, is not justified. The VAC noted that the PPO could change its position on the regularity of the grant of rights of protection, in which one element was the word “flex”, but it should justify such change in detail. The case law of the PPO may therefore be subject to change, if the authority demonstrates that there are reasonable grounds. However, any unfounded inconstancy of the opinion of the public body constitutes an infringement of the administrative procedure, because it may result in undermining citizens’ trust in state bodies and adversely affect the legal culture of citizens, and thereby cause a breach of the constitutional rule that all persons shall be equal before the law and all persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities.

Criminal law, case III K 76/08

October 28th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

In 2007, Marek Witoszek wrote SEO software that allowed him to change the visibility ranking of a website of the Polish president Lech Kaczyński in search engines, when one of the Polish offensive words was typed in. He was prosecuted and charged based on the provisions of the Article 135 § 2 of the Criminal Code – CRC – (in Polish: Kodeks Karny) of 6 June 1997, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 88, item 553, with subsequent amendments.

Article 135. § 1. Whoever commits an active assault on the President of the Republic of Poland
shall be subject to the penalty of the deprivation of liberty for a term of between 3 months and 5 years.

§ 2. Whoever insults the President of the Republic of Poland in public
shall be subject to the penalty of the deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years.

The trial has been suspended for two years, because the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal was expected to answer the question, whether one can be punished for insulting the president as an institution, not as a person. The Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 6 July 2011 case file P 12/09 held that Article 135 § 2 of the CRC is consistent with Article 54(1) of the Polish Constitution in connection with Article 31(3) of the Constitution and Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, as amended. Mr Witoszek pleaded guilty and has requested a voluntary submission to punishment.

The District Court in Bielsko-Biała in its judgment of 25 October 2011 case file III K 76/08 sentenced Mr Witoszek for three months of imprisonment, and conditionally suspended the execution of a penalty for three years.

Copyright law, case P 18/09

October 14th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland in its judgment of 11 October 2011 case file P 18/09 held that Collecting Societies acting on behalf of authors, performers, producers of phonograms and videograms and publishers, may demand from manufacturers of copiers and recorders all information and documents necessary for calculation of the amount of fees levied on them. The producers and importers of tape recorders, video recorders and other similar apparatus are obliged to pay these fees according to Article 20(1) of of Polish Act on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych) of 4 February 1994, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631, with subsequent amendments.

1. The producers and importers of tape recorders, video recorders and other similar apparatus, or blank material for the recording of works with the aid of such apparatus for personal and private use, and also of reprographic apparatus shall be obliged to pay, for the benefit of the creators and performers of the said works and of the producers of phonograms and videograms, fees in an amount not exceeding 3% of the selling price of the said apparatus and material.
ii. The amount of the fees referred to in paragraph 1 shall accrue:
(1) to the creators for 50%,
(2) to the performers for 25%,

The Association of Copyright Collective Administration for Authors of Scientific and Technical Works requested one of the Polish companies to provide information about copiers imported and sold in Poland. Every Collecting Society has the right to request such information based on the provisions of Article 105 of the ARNR.

Art. 105(1) The collective administration organization shall be presumed qualified to carry out the administration and protection of rights in the areas of exploitation in which its administration is conducted, and to engage in judicial proceedings associated therewith. This presumption may not be invoked where two or more collective administration organizations claim competence in respect of one and the same work or performance.
2. In the course of its activity the collective administration organization may demand that information be communicated to it and that documents that are essential for the calculation of the amount of remuneration and fees that it claims be delivered to it.

This request created legal uncertainty and the case ended before the courts. The Appellate Court in Wrocław had doubts whether such request violates trade secrets of a company, and there are any guarantees to protect against fraud. The Court noted that the protection of trade secrets is guaranteed by the freedom of economic activity. That freedom may be restricted only for reasons of important public interest. Meanwhile, the interest of collecting societies is not the public interest, but the sum of the partial interests of private authors, creators and publishers.

The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that fees charged by Collecting Societies are collected in order to protect the rights of creators, performers, producers of phonograms and videograms and publishers. This means that the restriction of freedom of economic activity was in accordance to the condition expressed in Article 31(3) of the Polish Constitution.

Article 31

Freedom of the person shall receive legal protection.

Everyone shall respect the freedoms and rights of others. No one shall be compelled to do that which is not required by law.

Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights.

The Constitutional Tribunal held that in order to protect the rights of others, the legislature intervenes in the economic relations, that are based on the model of market economy in a democratic state, whose pillars are freedom of economic activity and private property. The Constitutional Tribunal held that Article 105(2) of the ARNR limits the freedom of economic activity, but it does not affect the principle of proportionality. The limitation of the freedom of economic activity serves to protect the interests and constitutional values such as the rights of creators, social conditions and economic foundations of a market economy. The limitations of economic activity are necessary to protect these values, and to avoid state interference in the sphere of access to modern reprographic equipment.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 615/10

September 7th, 2011, Tomasz Rychlicki

Mr Roman Oraczewski Oficyna Wydawnicza PRESS-MEDIA requested the Polish Patent Office to invalidate the right of protection for the trade mark “Sto Panoramicznych” R-102530 owned by TECHNOPOL Agencja Wydawnicza Spółka z o. o. and registered for goods in Class 16 such as magazines. The PPO invalidated this trade mark and ruled that this designation is descriptive and informative, because it is carrying explicit message on the number and type of crosswords included in each copy of the magazine. TECHNOPOL filed a complaint against this decision, but it was dismissed by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 16 February 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 1862/09. TECHNOPOL decided to file a cassation complaint. The Comapny argued inter alia that its trade mark has acquired secondary meaning because TECHNOPOL also used similar signs, for instance “100 panoramicznych” R-102531, which is a modification of the trade mark “Sto Panoramicznych”.

The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 25 May 2011 case file II GSK 615/10 dismissed the complaint and ruled that the use of a sign in order to prove its secondary meaning, can not be documented by the use of other similar designation that is also a separate, registered trade mark.

Press law, case I CSK 664/09

November 25th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

In 2001, the Polish magazine “Polityka” published the article entitled “Po pierwsze Sandauer”. The author quoted a surgeon who operated Adam Sandauer, the president of Primum Non Nocere association, in which he had said that instead of more surgery Mr Sandaur needed a psychiatrist. The author quoted other doctors, who spoke about Sandauer being in conflict with the medical community and suggested that he is in bad mental condition. He quoted passages of Sandauer’s private mail to confirm this statement. Mr Sandauer sued and the case went through all instances. The Supreme Court in its judgment of 17 listopada 2010 case file I CSK 664/09 held that publication of private correspondence without the permission of the author, and especially when it concerns the sphere of his or her private life, such as health, is unlawful.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 203/10

October 11th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company INTERKOBO Sp. z o.o. filed a request for the invalidation of the right of protection for “kucyk pony” R-139097 trade mark registered for HASBRO POLAND Sp. z o.o. Kucyk means “pony” in Polish language. INTERKOBO argued that it has the legitimate interest in the invalidation proceedings because it is a manufacturer of toys, and it offers products such as toy ponies. In addition, in the cease and desist letter dated on 24 April 2007, HASBRO called INTERKOBO to stop the infringement of the right of protection for “kucyk pony” R-139097 trade mark which consisted of using by the INTERKOBO of “Princes’ s Pony” sign for designation of ponies’ toys. INTERKOBO argued also that HASBRO restricts the freedom of economic activity of its competitors, asking them to stop marketing of toys in the form of a small pony and requesting destruction of such products. By registering of the trade mark in question HASBRO had the intention of its use in isolation from the goods for which it was registered, and the intention of closing the access to the market for its competitors, the more that HASBRO as a professional market player should knew or should have known that the term “kucyk pony” as used for the toys in the form of a pony does not have any sufficient distinctiveness. INTERKOBO stressed that HASBRO Sp. z o.o. is a part of capital group operating on the global toys market, which is the position that allows it to dominate the market for local manufacturers of toys and contrary to the scope of the use made of registration to combat competition, which is contrary to the principles of the social coexistence.

HASBRO claimed that its sign is used on the Polish market, on the packaging of “kucyk pony” toys and other materials, since 1998 and is the subject of a number of marketing activities, and the brand “kucyk pony” includes not only toys, but also videos and a monthly magazine for children. HASBRO argued that its trade mark has a strong distinctive character and can be regarded as a reputable one, in relation to the goods it designates it has the so-called primary distinctive character.

The Polish Patent Office dismissed the request. INTERKOBO filed a complaint against PPO’s decision. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 24 June 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 203/10 affirmed this decision and dismissed the case. The VAC held that the trade mark in question is is a fanciful sign and has the primary distinctive character. It is not a generic name of any of the listed goods, and it does not inform about their properties. Pony (in Polish: kucyk) is the generic name of the horse species while it is not the name of the goods protected by the trade mark, which goods do not have any direct connection with any species of horses.

Unfair competition, case V CSK 192/09

September 28th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

AFLOFARM Fabryka Leków sp. z o.o. from Ksawerów sued two Polish companies for trade mark infringement and unfair competition delict/tort with regard to selling similar pharmaceutical products. This case went through all instances.

Z-307527

The Supreme Court in its judgement of 22 January 2010 case file V CSK 192/09 published in the electronic database LEX, under the no 564857, dismissed the complaint filed by Hasco Lek S.A. and Hasco Lek Dystrybucja. The Court held that the specificity of the market’s segment in which the magnesium preparations are sold, and which boils down to the fact that the same or very similar products gains the advantage of customers, through its specific name and advertising of such product and its packaging, requires greater care when introducing a new product of a very similar name and packaging, because it cannot mislead consumers, and it cannot take away consumers from another producer.

Industrial design law, case VI SA/Wa 1764/09

September 28th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 14 December 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 1764/09 held that the examination of all of the evidence should include all evidence taken in the proceedings, as well as taking into account all the circumstances surrounding an individual evidence and relevant to assess their strength and reliability. The PPO while considering the evidence, cannot skip any of the proof, it may, however, in accordance with the principle of the free assessment of evidences included in Article 80 of the APC, refuse the reliability of an evidence, but then it is obliged to justify all the reasons of such decision.

Article 80
The public administration body shall assess whether a given circumstance has been proven on the basis of the entirety of the evidential material.

This case concerned the industrial design “Noga fotela” (in English: chair leg), Rp-3506.

Rp-3506

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 173/10

July 18th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 21 May 2010 case file VI SA/Wa 173/10 held that the statutory condition for the lapse of the right of protection is intended to eliminate the rights of protection granted to those signs that are not actually used in trade. The grant of the protection for a trademark is associated with the statutory obligation of genuine use of the mark for goods and services for which the trade mark is registered. It cannot be used symbolically, only to maintain the rights of registration. This case concerned the proceedings on lapse of the right of protection for “transpak gotuj ze smakiem” R-129729 trade Mark owned by Grajewski Zbigniew, Przedsiębiorstwo Produkcyjno-Usługowo-Handlowe TRANSPAK from Puszczykowo.

E-access to public information, case II SAB/Sz 148/09

February 20th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Szczecin, in a judgment of 16 December 2009, case file II SAB/Sz 148/09, held that the general principle set in article 61 of the Polish Constitution, is the access to information on the activities of public authorities. Any exceptions to this rule should be formulated explicitly, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the access.

Article 61
1. A citizen shall have the right to obtain information on the activities of organs of public authority as well as persons discharging public functions. Such right shall also include receipt of information on the activities of self-governing economic or professional organs and other persons or organizational units relating to the field in which they perform the duties of public authorities and manage communal assets or property of the State Treasury.

2. The right to obtain information shall ensure access to documents and entry to sittings of collective organs of public authority formed by universal elections, with the opportunity to make sound and visual recordings.

3. Limitations upon the rights referred to in paras. 1 and 2 above, may be imposed by statute solely to protect freedoms and rights of other persons and economic subjects, public order, security or important economic interests of the State.

4. The procedure for the provision of information, referred to in paras. 1 and 2 above shall be specified by statute, and regarding the Sejm and the Senate by their rules of procedure.

Judgments of the Polish courts are information on public matters according to provisions of article 1(1) of the Polish Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public information – API – (in Polish: Ustawa o dostępie do informacji publicznej) Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 112, item 1198, with subsequent amendments.

Each information on public matters constitutes public information in the understanding of the Act and is subject to being made available on the basis of principles and under the provisions defined in this Act.

The Court held that according to article 6(1) point 4 letter (a) of the API, a judgment is an official document that should be made available according to the procedures and principles set in the API.

Article 6(1) The following information is subject to being made available, in particular on:
(…)
4) public data, including:
a)contents and form of official documents, in particular:
- contents of administrative acts and other resolutions,
- documentation on the control and its effects as well as presentations, opinions, conclusions and statements of the entities having conducted the control,

The VAC also noted that anyone is allowed to request the access to public information in electronic form or in the traditional way, on paper.

Personal data protection, case I OSK 667/09

February 13th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 15 January 2008, Tomasz W. filed with the General Inspector for Personal Data Protection (GIODO) a complaint concerning an unauthorized processing of personal data carried out by the Polish company Nasza Klasa Sp. z o.o. from Wroclaw, the owner of nasza-klasa.pl website. He informed the GIODO, that this very popular Polish website on classmates, hosts a photo featuring his image together with a list of names of other photographed people attached to it. Tomasz W. has repeatedly appealed to the website administrators with the request to remove his name from the list. However, he received no response from Nasza Klasa company.

As a result of the investigation, the GIODO found that on 31 December 2007, a registered user of nasza-klasa.pl posted classmates’ photo featuring students of a primary school. On the same day, another registered user, placed the names of people who were portrayed at the photograph – including the name and surname of Tomasz W. On 2, 9 and 14 January 2008, Tomasz W. requested Nasza Klasa Sp. z o.o. the removal of his personal data.

In a decision of 27 May 2008, case file DOLiS/DEC-314/08/13239, the GIODO, relying on the provisions of the Polish Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 29 October 1997, No. 133, item 883, unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 6 July 2002, No. 101, item 926, with later amendments, ruled that information on the applicant’s full name, school and class to which he attended, together with his image, are personal data and the data collector is Nasza Klasa Sp. z o.o.

However, the GIODO also ruled that it should be borne in mind that according to the provision of the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204, as amended, Nasza Klasa sp. z o.o. provides electronic services for registered users of the portal website, consisting of the storage of data of these users in the computer system. This activity is the condition to legalize the processing of personal data in accordance with article 23(1) pt. 5 of the PPD. In addition, the GIODO found that in this case the applicant’s rights have not been violated, because the access to its data was limited to a group of people registered on nasza-klasa.pl website.

Tomasz W. asked the GIODO for the retrial. He pointed out that the reasons for the decision have many contradictions, inconsistencies and is ambiguous. He accused the GIODO of laconic and cursory treatment of his case. He again emphasized that his personal data have been published on the nasza-klasa.pl website without his knowledge or consent, in violation of his civil rights and liberties.

After the rehearing of the case, the GIODO annulled the contested decision, and discontinued the proceedings. GIODO claimed that the re-examination of the case leads to the conclusion that the disputed information about Tomasy W. did not fall within the definition of personal data. The name and surname have been given under his old image from many years ago. Hence, the combination of photos from the past, with a name and surname of a person and a primary school, which such person attended did not allow for the identification of a person without excessive costs and time. The findings that the disputed information is not personal data within the meaning of the PPD caused the proceedings in the matter to be groundless and on the basis of article 105 § 1 of the APC, it had to be discontinued.

Tomasz W. lodged a complaint with the Viovodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw. The complainant asked for annulment of the decision of first and second instance. Tomasz W. claimed the violation of the substantive law, i.e. article 6(1) of the PPD, through its improper interpretation, of article 32(1) pt 7 and 8 of that Act, by recognizing that Tomasz W. is not entitled to request cessation of the processing of his data and the right to object, and a breach of article 7 of the APC by not explaining all the relvant facts. Tomasz W. disagreed with the statement of the GIODO that questioned information about his person is not personal data within the meaning of the PPD. He stated that any information about an identified or identifiable individual is personal data. Furthermore, he argued that the claim of the GIODO that the data are available only for specific people – registered users of the portal is not acceptable, because nasza-klasa.pl has no mechanisms for verification of users identity, which makes the questioned data easily accessible for everyone. Moreover, Tomasz W. also argued that a registered user who does not know him would have some difficulty in identifying his person but such obstacles would not happen to a person who knows about Tomasy W., and is looking for additional information.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in a judgment of 3 March 2009 case file II SA/Wa 1495/08 ruled that the GIODO erred in its decisions, because information about the name and surname of Tomasz W., combined with information about the name and address of the primary school and the determination of the class to which he attended in 1978/79, even if it was thirty years ago, are personal data. According to the Court provisions of article 1 of the PPD introduced the principle of autonomy of human information, meaning the protection of information about human being. This provision is a kind of emanation of the general right guaranteed by the Polish Constitution in article 47, according to which “Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life”. This means that the protection of personal data is related to the protection of privacy rights. This follows from the wording of article 6 of the PPD, indicating that the personal data concern identified or identifiable natural or legal person and that the identifiable is a person is one whose identity can be determined. From wording of that provisions the VAC concluded that personal data are data that identify a person’s identity.

The VAC also relied on the content of recital 12 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, which emphasized the protection of all data relating to a person, and therefore also information about someones past.

(12) Whereas the protection principles must apply to all processing of personal data by any person whose activities are governed by Community law; whereas there should be excluded the processing of data carried out by a natural person in the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of records of addresses

However, in recital 26 of the abovementioned Directive states that data protection rules must apply to any information concerning an identified or identifiable person. In order to determine whether a person is identifiable, all the means which can be used by the controller or any other person to identify a person, should be taken into the account. The rules of data protection do not apply to data rendered anonymously in such a way that a subject of the data can not be identified. The identification of a given person concerns also past information about a specific human being, by which information one can learn about such person’s identity. Accordingly, the VAC held that European law means the protection of personal data as the protection of all the facts concerning the past of a particular person, which corresponds with the content of article 6(2) of the PDP. So this means that such data would also be protected.

Referring to the foregoing facts of Tomasz W. case, the VAC ruled that that nasza-klasa.pl website published his image and name. In the opinion of the court these are the personal data which are protected by the PPD, because on their basis one is able to identify given person.

Nasza Klasa sp. z o.o. filed a cassation complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) challenging in entirety the judgment of the VAC. The Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment of 18 November 2009, case file I OSK 667/09, rejected the complaint. The SAC held that the primary issue arising in this case was whether a classmates’ picture that was taken thirty years ago, at which Tomasz W. is potrayed, in the circumstances of the case, can be analyzed to determine his identity without necessarily involving excessive resources or time, and therefore, whether the data disclosed in the photo in question, constitutes personal data within the meaning of article 6 of the PPD, and whether it should be protected.

The concept of “personal data” on the Polish law includes any information concerning an individual if it is possible to define its identity and its identification. Personal data is a set of messages about a particular person such integrated that it allows for its individualization. It includes at least information necessary for identification (name, surname, place of residence), but this is not restricted, because it also include further information, strengthening the degree of identification. Such information will also include pictures of the individual, even if they were taken in the past, allowing to identify a person. In a situation where such a photograph is presented with a name and surname of the person portrayed, in a place accessible to an unlimited number of entities, it must be considered that it constitutes personal data subject to protection under the PPD. Mainly, the objective evaluation criteria decides for the qualification of given information as personal data, but it also should comprise of all information, including extralinguistic (context), to which third party may have or has an access. A different approach to the presented issues would maginalize the importance of the laws and it would not relate to its designated function.

Thus it should be considered that the image of Tomasz W. portrayed at the photograph that was taken 30 years ago, affixed with the class, his name and surname, and then published at nasz-klasa.pl website constitutes personal data within the meaning of article 6(2) of the PPD, and the cassation complaint was not justified. The SAC also noted that the consent for the processing of personal data cannot be in any way implied.

The SAC also stressed the fact the Internet as a source of information is increasing on a unknown scale and importance. It provides an access to specific information to a vast number of persons and allows for any of its processing within the meaning of the PPD. At the same time there are not yet developed appropriate mechanisms for the protection of individual rights when those rights have been violated as a result of the disclosure of information on the Internet. Then, it is a great role of law enforcement bodies, including the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection in creating practice to comply with applicable laws also on the Internet. It is an unacceptablr situation in which the entity seeks to remove its image from a particular website, and the administration fails to take action to ensure the protection of civil rights. The image is one of the very personal property rights and lack of consent to its publication, if it is not a public person, is a sufficient reason to believe that regulations of the PPD apply, if the conditions set in the article 6(2) of the PPD have been met. There is a legal sequel to this story. See “Personal data protection, case II SA/Wa 1212/10“.

Polish regulations on personal data protection

January 11th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

I. The law
The main sources of binding laws in the Republic of Poland are the Constitution of 2 April 1997, acts passed by the Parliament, ratified international treaties and regulations issued, for example, by the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers – Polish government. Regulations are issued for the purpose of implementation of acts. The main legal acts on personal data protection in the Republic of Poland are the following.

I.A. Substantive law

The Act of 29 August 1997 on the Protection of Personal Data – PPD – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of October 29, 1997, No. 133, item 883, unified text published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of July 6, 2002, No. 101, item 926, with subsequent amendments.
The Civil Code – CC – (in Polish: Kodeks Cywilny) of 23 April 1964, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 16, item 93, with subsequent amendments.

I.B. Procedural law

Administrative Proceedings Code – APC – (in Polish: Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego) of 14 June 1960, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 30, item 168, consolidated text of 9 October 2000, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 98, item 1071 with subsequent amendments.
Act on proceedings before administrative courts – PBAC – (in Polish:Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) of 30 August 2002, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 153, item 1270, with subsequent amendments.
Civil Proceedings Code – CPC (in Polish: Kodeks Postępowania Cywilnego) of 17 November 1964, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 43, item 296, with subsequent amendments.

I.C. Case law
See “Polish case law on personal data protection“.

I.D. EU law
Since 1 May 2004, which was the accession day to the EU, the Republic of Poland has been bound by all aquis communitaire, including judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

I.E. International law
The Republic of Poland is a party of many International treaties and agreements concerning the protection of personal data.

II. National bodies and procedures
The Inspector General for Personal Data Protection decides cases within its competence under provisions of the Code of Administrative Proceedings, unless provided for otherwise. A party dissatisfied with a decision issued by the GIODO may request for the reconsidering of the case. The decision by the GIODO on the application to reconsider the case may be appealed against with the Voivodeship Administrative Court. The judgment of the VAC may be a subject to a cassation complaint which is decided by the Supreme Administrative Court.

Copyright law, case P 31/07

October 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

A person acting without the authorization of the rightholder, sold in order to gain material benefits, a copy of a design of single-family house XENIA. The design was owned by the Project Studio Archipelag. The District Prosecutor’s Office qualified his actions as a criminal offense under article 117(1) and article 115(3) of the Polish Act on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych) of 4 February 1994, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 90, item 631, with subsequent amendments.

Art. 115. 1. Any person who usurps the authorship or misleads as to the authorship of all or part of the work or performance of another shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to 3 years, restriction of freedom or a fine.
2. Any person who, without mentioning the creator’s name or pseudonym, discloses the work of another either in its original or in a derived form, or a performance, or who publicly distorts a work, a performance, a phonogram or videogram or a broadcast, shall be liable to the same penalty.
3. Any person who, with a view to making a material profit in a manner other than that specified in paragraph 1 or 2, infringes the rights of the author or neighboring rights within the meaning of Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 paragraph 1, art. 191, 86, 94 paragraph 4 or article 97 or without performing his duties as mentioned in article 193 paragraph 2, 20 paragraphs 1-4, 40 paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to one year, restriction of freedom or a fine.
(…)
Art. 117. 1. Any person who, without authorization or without respecting the conditions imposed, fixes or reproduces another’s work in its original version or in a derived form, or a performance, a phonogram or videogram or a broadcast, at the same time authorizing the disclosure thereof, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to two years, restriction of freedom or a fine.
2. If the perpetrator of the infringement defined in paragraph 1 has made the infringement into a permanent source of income, or if he organizes or directs the offending activity referred to in paragraph 1, he shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to three years.

The Regional Court in Warsaw filed a question of law to the Constitutional Tribunal. The Court asked whether article 115(3) of the ARNR satisfy the requirement of preciseness, because it does not precisely define what behaviors are penalized by this provision. The court noted that the construction of the aforementioned provision is deemed by the Polish doctrine of law as defective, because the phrase “in a manner other than (…), infringes the rights” is devoid of characteristic of criminal offenses, which in turn makes it impossible to identify what behaviors shall be punished. This is contrary to a fundamental principle of criminal law – nullum crimen sine lege, which is also included in the article 42(1) of the Constitution. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.

Article 42
1. Only a person who has committed an act prohibited by a statute in force at the moment of commission thereof, and which is subject to a penalty, shall be held criminally responsible. This principle shall not prevent punishment of any act which, at the moment of its commission, constituted an offence within the meaning of international law
2. Anyone against whom criminal proceedings have been brought shall have the right to defence at all stages of such proceedings. He may, in particular, choose counsel or avail himself – in accordance with principles specified by statute – of counsel appointed by the court.
3. Everyone shall be presumed innocent of a charge until his guilt is determined by the final judgment of a court.

The Court also pointed out that the scope of criminal penalties set by provision of article 115(3) of the ARNR are in fact too broad and unduly limits the rights and freedoms. Furthermore, this provision is particularly generous to authors, performers, producers of phonograms and videograms and broadcasting organizations. Namely, any breach of their rights, creates criminal liability.

The Constitutional Tribunal in a decision of 21 October 2009, case file P 31/07, discontinued the proceedings because of the inadmissibility to issue a judgment. The decisions was based on the fact that the request contained defects in the form.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 774/08

July 20th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

In June 2005, Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A asked the Polish Patent Office to make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for “3in 1″ R-90234 trade mark owned by “MOKATE” sp. z o.o. from Zory. The request was based on article 28(1) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 1985, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 1985 No 5, pos. 15, with later amendments.

The right deriving from registration of a trade mark shall expire if the person entitled has not used the mark within a period of three consecutive years in the Republic of Poland.

The request was also based on article 169(1) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo wlasnosci przemyslowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2001 No 49, pos. 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Dziennik Ustaw No 119, pos. 1117, with later amendments.

1. The right of protection for a trade mark shall also lapse:
(i) on failure to put to genuine use of the registered trade mark for the goods covered by the registration for a period of five successive years after a decision on the grant of a right of protection has been taken, unless serious reasons of non-use thereof exist,
(…)
2. In the cases referred to in paragraph (1), the Patent Office shall make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest therein.

The request was based on non-use of “3 in 1″ trade mark. Mokate filed a motion asking the PPO to reject Nestle’s request. The motion was based on the lack of legitimate interest on Nestle’s side. The PPO agreed with Mokate’s argument. Nestle filed a complaint to the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw. The VAC in its judgment of 3 December 2007, act signture VI SA/Wa 1036/07 rejected Nestle’s complaint. The company filed a cassation complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court. The SAC in its judgment of 12 March 2009, act signature II GSK 774/08 held that conditions of legitimate interest are based on two levels — procedural — because it is justifying the initiation of administrative proceedings in a particular matter and “substantive”, as it results from the provisions of the law that apply to certain rights and obligations of a person (legal or natural). Although the substantive law is the source for the legitimate interest but the legal interest as a condition that justfies the initiation of the procedure for declaration on the lapse of the right of protection for the trademark is primarily a category of administrative procedure – one of the principles of this proceedings as to its proper initiation. The cassation complaint was rejected.

The SAC ruled also that it was uncontested that the First Council Directive left Member States free to establish procedural rules. The requirement of legitimate interest included in article 169(2) the IPL only entitles a party to initiate the administrative proceedings on the lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark, but does not guarantee such applicant that the PPO will issue a decision that is favourable to him, because the PPO shall issue a decision on the lapse of the trade mark rights if it finds the fulfilment of the substantial prerequisites to the lapse, and not the infringement of the legitimate interest. Since then the provision of article 169(2) are only applicable only to a right to file a request for a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark for the reasons referred to in section 1 of article 169 being the substantial prerequisites, the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate interest can not be understood as an additional substantial prerequisite for deciding on the lapse of trade mark rights. Such assessment is not changed by the fact that, as the court already stated, the legitimate interest is the normative category of the substantive law.

In the Polish administrative law the legitimate interests requirement creates the concept of a proceedings party. This issue has been dealt similarly in the law of industrial property, including a prerequisite to request the Polish Patent Office to take a decision declaring the right of protection for the trade mark.

The legitimate interest prerequisite has two grounds – procedural because it justifies the initiation of the administrative proceedings in a particular case and substantive, because it results from the provisions of substantive law that apply to certain rights and obligations of an entity. Although a source of the legitimate interests lays in the substantive law, the legal interest as a condition requesting the PPO to issue a decision declaring on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark lapsed is primarily a category of administrative procedure – one of the principles of this proceeding as to its proper initiation.

The issues on legal interest are both regulated in the procedural law (including the administrative proceedings that apply to trade mark cases) and these are also the normative category of the substantive law. The source of the legal interest is the substantive law. If the source is the substantive law then the Directive should apply. However the SAC consistently refuses to refer this matter to the Court of Justice.

See also “Trade mark law, case II GSK 309/07“.