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Polish case law on copyright

December 9th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

A more detailed discussion about each judgment may be found under the link provided with the case file. All judgments are presented in the chronological order.

– The judgment of the Regional Court in Lublin of 27 March 2015 case file I Ns 700/12.

– The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland of 17 February 2015 case file K 15/13.

– The judgment of the Appeallate Court in Warsaw of 7 May 2014 case file I ACa 1663/13

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 June 2013 case file I CSK 617/12.

– The judgment of the Appeallate Court in Lublin case file I ACa 134/13.

– The order of the Appeallate Court in Białystok of 7 February 2013 case file I A Cz 114/13.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 27 October 2011 case file VI ACa 461/11.

– The order of the Polish Supreme Court of 26 October 2011 case file III CZP 61/11.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 21 October 2011 case file IV CSK 133/11.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 17 October 2011 case file III CSK 30/11.

– The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland of 11 October 2011 case file P 18/09.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 15 June 2011 case file V CSK 373/10.

– The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 July 2011 case file I OSK 678/11.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 May 2011 case file II CSK 527/10.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Gdańsk of 26 January 2011 case file II SA/Gd 529/10.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 January 2011 case file IV CSK 274/10.

– The order of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 December 2010 case file I OSK 1975/10.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Łódź of 20 December 2010 case file II SAB/Łd 53/10.

– The judgment of the District Court in Warsaw of 14 September 2010 case file I C 626/06. Not final yet.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 July 2010 case file III CZP 1/10.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 22 June 2010 case file IV CSK 359/09.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Lublin case file I ACa 206/10.

– The judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 16 November 2009, case file I CSK 160/09.

– The decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 21 October 2009, case file P 31/07.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 February 2009, case file V CSK 337/08.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 June 2008, case file V CSK 22/08.

– The judgment of District Court in Tarnów of 20 December 2007 in re: Bochnia Independence Half-Marathon, case file I C 238/06.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 6 December 2007 case file III CZP 107/07.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 17 October 2007 case file VI ACa 1259/06.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 29 June 2007 case file VI ACa 210/07.

– The judgment of the Appeallate Court in Warszawa of 11 May 2007 case file I ACa 1145/06.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 3 January 2007 case file IV CSK 303/06.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 14 March 2006 case file VI ACa 1012/05, published in the Jurisprudence of Appellate Courts (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądów Apelacyjnych) of 2007, No 12, item 36, p. 56.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 January 2006 case file I CK 281/05, published in the Supreme Court’s Bulletin of 2006, No 5, the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the Civil Chamber (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Izba Cywilna) of 2006, No 11, item 186, p. 64, the “Wokanda” magazine of 2006, No 7-8, p. 17.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber of 13 January 2006 case file III CSK 40/05, published in the Supreme Court’s Bulletin of 2006, No 3, the “Wokanda” magazine of 2006, No 6, p. 6, the Review of Economic Legislation (in Polish: Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego) of 2006, No 7, p. 32.

– The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 13 October 2005, case file FSK 2253/04.

– The judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 23 November 2004, case file I CK 232/04.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 3 December 2003 case file I CK 312/02.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 7 November 2003 case file V CK 391/02, published in OSN 2004, No 12, item 203.

– The resolution of the Supreme Court – Criminal Chamber of 21 October 2003 case file I KZP 18/03.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber of 15 November 2002 case file II CKN 1289/00, published in the Supreme Court’s Bulletin of 2003, No 6, p. 7, the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the Civil Chamber (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Izba Cywilna) of 2004, No 3, item 44, p. 66.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber of 26 September 2001 case file IV CKN 458/00, published in the electronic database Legalis.

– The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 30 June 1999 case file I SA/Lu 408/98, unpublished.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 June 1998 case file I PKN 196/98, published in the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the Chamber of Administrative, Labour and Social Insurance (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Izba Administracyjna, Pracy i Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) of 1999, No 14, item 454.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 2 October 1996 case file I ACa 2/96.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 12 December 1995 case file I ACr 590/95, published in OSA 1997, No 3, item 16, at page 32.

– The judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 5 July 1995 case file I ACr 453/95, unpublished.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 October 1976 case file IV CR 127/7613.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 September 1975 case file I CR 312/75.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 April 1973 case file I CR 91/73.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 February 1970 case file I CR 666/69, published in OSP 1972, No. 2, item 30.

– The judgment of the Supreme Court of 8 November 1932 case file II. 1K. 1092/32, published in Zb. Orz. 1933/I item 7.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright“.

Copyright law, case V CSK 22/08

November 16th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Society of Authors and Publishers Polish Book from Kraków (in Polish: Stowarzyszenie Autorów i Wydawców Polska Książka w Krakowie) is one of the Polish collecting societies. The Society sued Euroimpex company which is a distributor of reprographic equipment, mainly photocopiers and scanners. The suit was based on Article 20(1)(ii) of of Polish Act on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych) of 4 February 1994, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631, with subsequent amendments.

1. The producers and importers of tape recorders, video recorders and other similar apparatus, or blank material for the recording of works with the aid of such apparatus for personal and private use, and also of reprographic apparatus shall be obliged to pay, for the benefit of the creators and performers of the said works and of the producers of phonograms and videograms, fees in an amount not exceeding 3% of the selling price of the said apparatus and material.
ii. The amount of the fees referred to in paragraph 1 shall accrue:
(1) to the creators for 50%,
(2) to the performers for 25%,

The District Court in Kraków ordered Euroimpex to pay the reprographic fee in the amount of 124,678 PLN. Euroimpex filed an appeal in which it argued that the provisions of ARNR are unconstitutional. However, the Appellate Court in Kraków shared the opinion issued by the District Court and ruled that there is a lack of grounds to question the compliance of article 20(1)(ii) and article 105(2) of the ARNR with the constitutional norms.

Article 105
1. The collective administration organization shall be presumed qualified to carry out the administration and protection of rights in the areas of exploitation in which its administration is conducted, and to engage in judicial proceedings associated therewith. This presumption may not be invoked where two or more collective administration organizations claim competence in respect of one and the same work or performance.
2. In the course of its activity the collective administration organization may demand that information be communicated to it and that documents that are essential for the calculation of the amount of remuneration and fees that it claims be delivered to it.

A similar view was also expressed in relation to provisions of the Regulation of the Minister of Culture of 2 June 2003 on designation of categories of devices and media used for recording of productions and payments levied on sales of these devices and carriers carried out by producers and importers, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 105, item 991. Euroimpex filed a cassation complaint.

The Supreme Court in a judgment of 19 June 2008, case file V CSK 22/08, ruled that according to the settled case law, any court, in principle, has the same power to assess whether the provisions of regulation that may be applicable in a given case are not inconsistent with the Constitution. Additionally, the SC ruled that the provisions related to the remuneration fees are justified and their introduction was an expression of global trends in intellectual property law that was also made in order to compensate authors and publishers for what they lose by copying or reproduction of works made by third persons for the personal use. These are the civil law claims, which the collecting societies have the right to collect and which they are allowed to claim before the court. As these fees are divided, is no longer a matter to be decided by the Court, but it is the inner matter of organization and artists who are members of this organization.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Copyright law, case P 31/07

October 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

A person who was acting without the authorization of the rightholder, sold in order to gain material benefits, a copy of a design of single-family house XENIA. The design was owned by the Project Studio Archipelag. The District Prosecutor’s Office qualified his actions as a criminal offense under article 117(1) and article 115(3) of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 90, item 631, with subsequent amendments.

Art. 115. 1. Any person who usurps the authorship or misleads as to the authorship of all or part of the work or performance of another shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to 3 years, restriction of freedom or a fine.
2. Any person who, without mentioning the creator’s name or pseudonym, discloses the work of another either in its original or in a derived form, or a performance, or who publicly distorts a work, a performance, a phonogram or videogram or a broadcast, shall be liable to the same penalty.
3. Any person who, with a view to making a material profit in a manner other than that specified in paragraph 1 or 2, infringes the rights of the author or neighboring rights within the meaning of Articles 16, 17, 18, 19 paragraph 1, art. 191, 86, 94 paragraph 4 or article 97 or without performing his duties as mentioned in article 193 paragraph 2, 20 paragraphs 1-4, 40 paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to one year, restriction of freedom or a fine.
(…)
Art. 117. 1. Any person who, without authorization or without respecting the conditions imposed, fixes or reproduces another’s work in its original version or in a derived form, or a performance, a phonogram or videogram or a broadcast, at the same time authorizing the disclosure thereof, shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to two years, restriction of freedom or a fine.
2. If the perpetrator of the infringement defined in paragraph 1 has made the infringement into a permanent source of income, or if he organizes or directs the offending activity referred to in paragraph 1, he shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of up to three years.

The Regional Court in Warsaw filed a question of law to the Constitutional Tribunal. The Court asked whether article 115(3) of the ARNR satisfy the requirement of preciseness, because it does not precisely define what actions are penalized by this provision. The Court noted that the construction of the aforementioned provision is deemed by the Polish doctrine of law as defective, because the phrase “in a manner other than (…), infringes the rights” is devoid of characteristic of criminal offenses, which in turn makes it impossible to identify what behaviors shall be punished. This is contrary to a fundamental principle of criminal law – nullum crimen sine lege, which is also included in the article 42(1) of the Constitution. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.

Article 42
1. Only a person who has committed an act prohibited by a statute in force at the moment of commission thereof, and which is subject to a penalty, shall be held criminally responsible. This principle shall not prevent punishment of any act which, at the moment of its commission, constituted an offence within the meaning of international law
2. Anyone against whom criminal proceedings have been brought shall have the right to defence at all stages of such proceedings. He may, in particular, choose counsel or avail himself – in accordance with principles specified by statute – of counsel appointed by the court.
3. Everyone shall be presumed innocent of a charge until his guilt is determined by the final judgment of a court.

The Court also pointed out that the scope of criminal penalties set by provision of article 115(3) of the ARNR are in fact too broad and unduly limits the rights and freedoms. Furthermore, this provision is particularly generous to authors, performers, producers of phonograms and videograms and broadcasting organizations. Namely, any breach of their rights, creates criminal liability.

The Constitutional Tribunal in a decision of 21 October 2009, case file P 31/07, discontinued the proceedings because of the inadmissibility to issue a judgment. The decisions was based on the fact that the request contained defects in the form.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Unfair competition, case III CZP 58/09

October 19th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The court of first instance held that the basic relationship linking the parties was the agreement of sale of goods defined as to its kind/sort, and therefore, the ownership of the goods sold by the plaintiff to the defendant passed in the moment of their release. Therefore, the fees for marketing services and logistics were taken for actions which the defendant has taken in relation to his goods. The Court also ruled the breach of article 15(1) point 4 of the Polish Act of 16 April 1993 on Combating Unfair Competition – CUC – (in Polish: ustawa o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 47, item 211, with subsequent amendments.

Article 15
1. An act of unfair competition is the introduction of difficulties for other entrepreneurs to access the market through:
1) the sale of goods or services below their purchase cost in order to eliminate other entrepreneurs,
2) the enticement of third parties to refuse to sell to other entrepreneurs or to purchase goods or services from other entrepreneurs,
3) materially justified differences in the treatment of some customers,
4) collection of charges other than commercial margins for accepting goods for sale,

According to the Court the fees charged to the plaintiff limited its access to the market. If it had not give his consent, the defendant wouldn’t establish a cooperation. The Court did not found any evidence to charge fees for marketing services and for the common commercial policy.

The defendant appealed and the court of second instance having some doubts decided to request the Supreme Court to answer the question whether article 18(1) point 5 of the CUC creates an independent basis to the claim by the buyer for an improperly obtained benefits.

Article 18
1. Where the act of unfair competition is committed, the entrepreneur whose interest is threatened or infringed may request:
1) relinquishment of prohibited practices,
2) removing effects of prohibited practices,
3) making one or repeated statement of appropriate content and form,
4) repairing the damage, pursuant to general rules;
5) handing over unjustified benefits, pursuant to general rules,

The Supreme Court in a resolution of 19 August 2009, case file III CZP 58/09, held that pursuant to article 18(1) point 5 of the CUC, the party may – regardless of other claims arising from the contract – to recover improperly obtained benefits from the collection of non-commercial premium charges for the acceptance of goods for sale.

Patent law, case VI SA/Wa 2566/08

October 13th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 10 June 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 2566/08 held that it is up to the Polish Patent Office (PPO) to reconsider the matter in its entirety and refer to the statements and allegations contained in the request for the reconsideration of the case, taking into account the above guidance and administrative procedures by which the PPO is bound.

Looks like no big deal, right? But if you could read the whole judgment, which unfortunately is not available in English, you would understand that the Polish Patent Office will have to issue an opinion, and will have to justify and explain it appropriately, on the subject what is an invention and what is a computer program and why the PPO does not grant patents to so-called “digital” solutions.

In this context, I look forward to the EPO decision in G 3/08 case and to the SCOTUS’ judgment In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 2376/08

August 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 21 February 2004, Wolny Związek Zawodowy Kierowców Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Free Trade Union of Drivers of the Republic of Poland) from Warszawa applied to register the word-figurative trade mark WOLNY ZWIĄZEK ZAWODOWY KIEROWCÓW in classes 4, 12, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45.

In a letter dated 30 August 2006, the Polish Patent Office informed the applicant that, under article 131(2)(ii) and article 145 of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with later amendments, it can not be granted the right of protection for the applied sign.

Article 131
2. A right of protection shall not be granted for a sign, if:
(ii) it incorporates the name or abbreviated name of the Republic of Poland, or its symbols (emblem, national colours or national anthem), the names or armorial bearings of Polish voivodships, towns or communities, the insignia of the armed forces, paramilitary organisations or police forces, reproductions of Polish decorations, honorary distinctions or medals, military medals or military insignia, or other official or generally used distinctions and medals, in particular those of government administration, local self-administration or social organisations performing activities in vital public interests, where these organisations’ activities extend to the entire territory of the State or to a substantial part thereof, unless the applicant is able to produce evidence of his right, in particular in a form of an authorisation issued by a competent State agency or a permission given by an organisation, to use the sign in the course of trade,
(…)
Article 145
1. Subject to paragraph (2), where the Patent Office finds that the statutory requirements for the grant of a right of protection for a trademark have not been satisfied, it shall make a decision on refusal to grant the right.

2. Before the decision referred to in paragraph (1) is made, the Patent Office shall fix a time limit, within which the applicant is invited to react on the collected evidences and documents which imply the existence of grounds that may cause the right of protection to be denied.

The PPO pointed out that the mark contains a white eagle, which is protected based on the provisions of the Act on Coat of Arms, Colours and Anthem of the Republic of Poland (in Polish: ustawa o godle, barwach i hymnie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) of 31 January 1980, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 7, item 18, with later amendments.

In response to the objections raised by the Polish Patent Office, the applicant in a letter dated 11 September 2006, disagreed with the PPO’s assessment and claimed that the drawing of a bird included in the trade mark recalls an eagle, but it is a completely different bird to that depicted in the emblem of the Republic of Poland. WZZK pointed out the different colour of a bird, the colouring of his crown and claws, and the differences in the background. WZZK also noted that the mark includes the inscription “Wolny Związek Zawodowy Kierowców” (Free Trade Union of Drivers).

The Polish Patent Office in its decision of 22 June 2007 refused to grant a right of protection for the applied trademark. In a letter dated 23 July 2007 WZZK requested a retrial, calling for the reversal of the contested decision. In its decision of 19 September 2008, case file DT265/07, the Polish Patent Office upheld the contested decision of 22 June 2007. The PPO pointed out, that the provisions of article 131(2)(ii) of the IPL meet a double function. It is one of the provisions to guarantee the state, its bodies and institutions a monopoly on the use of state symbols. These symbols have a specific role in business transactions and are intended solely for the identification of specific nationals’ bodies or institutions, or documents derived or issued by them. Moreover, this provision assures the average consumer that the national symbols are used by the authorized institutions of the Polish state. The PPO also cited article 16(2) of the Act on Coat of Arms, Colours and Anthem of the Republic of Poland, according to which, it is permitted to place on goods intended for trading the emblem of the Republic of Poland or the colours in a stylized or artistically prepared form, but the PPO also said that these provision only authorize for the placement and they do not allow to grant the right of protection. WZZK filed a complaint to the Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its a judgment of 6 March 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 2376/08 dismissed the complaint and ruled that pursuant to article 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the emblem, colours and the national anthem of the Republic of Polish are protected by law and details regarding these symbols are provided in the Act on Coat of Arms, Colours and Anthem of the Republic of Poland. Article 1(1)(2) and (3) of this Act provides that the white eagle, white-red color and “Mazurek Dąbrowskiego” are the symbols of the Republic of Poland. The right and the duty of every citizen of the Republic of Poland and all state organs, institutions and organizations is to respect these symbols. These symbols remain under special protection provided in different regulations. The provision included in article 131(2)(ii) of the IPL excludes the possibility to grant the right of protection for the sign, not only when it contains an exact reproduction of the image of an eagle as provided in the Annex 1 to the Act on Coat of Arms, Colours and Anthem of the Republic of Poland but also when a sign contains a drawing of an eagle as described in article 2(1) of the Act.

The coat of arms of the Republic of Poland is the image of a white eagle with a gold crown on his head turned right, with unfolded wings and gold beak and claws, on a red field.

This provision allows for the registration of a trade mark which contains, among others the emblem, only in one case – the applicant has to prove to have the right to use such trade mark in trade. It was undisputed for the Court that the applicant had no such right. And for all readers interested in these issues I would like to recommend reading Grzegorz Pacek’s article entitled Marks as imitations of State emblems ‘from a heraldic point of view’ that was recently published in the Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 4, Number 9, September 2009.

The rest of the story is described in the post entitled “Trade mark law, case II GSK 555/09“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 950/08

August 12th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 2 September 1998, the Polish Patent Office has granted the right of protection for word-figurative trade mark SCOTCH & SODA R-100588 for the Polish company “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA Jadwiga i Piotr Szlegiel Spólka Jawna from Gorzów Wielkopolski for goods in class 25. On 2005, Scotch & Soda B.V. from Netherlands filed a request for invalidation of the right of protection for SCOTCH & SODA R-100588 trade mark based on article 8(i) and 8(ii) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 1985, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 1985 No. 5, item 15, with later amendments:

A trade mark shall not be registrable if:
i) it is contrary to law or to the principles of social coexistence;
ii) it infringes the personal or economic rights of third parties

The request was also based on provisions of article 6septies of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. The S&S company argued that for over twenty years it exports clothing goods marked with the Scotch & Soda trade mark to many countries in the world through local distributors. One of them was a Polish businessman, who in 1994 became the sole importer and distributor of Scotch & Soda products in Poland. According to S&S his Polish partner has abused its trust by obtaining the trade mark protection for Scotch & Soda trade mark for himself and in this way blocking access to the Polish market for S&S. In 2002, the S&S company has signed with Piotr Szlegiel a document called “cession of rights from the registration of the mark.” However, at the date of the signature of this document, the right of protection for word-figurative trade mark SCOTCH & SODA R-100588 already belonged to “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA. In addition the S&S company received a financial request from the Polish entrepreneur.

“SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA claimed that it was an equal partner, rather than the official importer and sole distributor of the S&S company’s goods and it was not bound by the agency or representative contracts. The legal predecessor of “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA had full autonomy inter alia, he was allowed to apply for the registration of the disputed mark on the territory of the Republic of Polish. This fact was known to S&S. Polish company has claimed that S&S failed to obtain the trade mark protection for SCOTCH & SODA sign based on the international registration under the Madrid Agreement and it did not take any action to change this situation. After the completion of courts’ proceedings the S&S company has offered “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA a royalty-free (free of charge) license to use the disputed trade mark for shoes throughout Europe in return for the transfer of the right of protection. These negotiations have not yielded results.

“SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA was astonished by the fact that the S&S company “challenged” the right of protection for word-figurative trade mark SCOTCH & SODA R-100588 for the first time after it has received a cease and desist letter (a request for voluntary fulfilment of plaintiff’s demand is a prerequsite to file a complaint in a civil suit against trade mark infringer) on October 2003.

“SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA requested the Polish Patent Office to dismiss a request for invalidation of the right of protection for SCOTCH & SODA R-100588. The Polish company called the circumstances with regard to litigation that ended in a judgment issued by the Regional Court in Zielona Gora (case act signature V GC 522/03). the Regional Court dmissed a suit brought by S&S company based on article 161 of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo wlasnosci przemyslowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2001 No 49, pos. 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Dziennik Ustaw No 119, pos. 1117, with later amendments.

1. To the extent as follows from an international agreement, where a trademark has been applied for protection by and on behalf of, or the right of protection has been granted for, an agent or a representative of the person enjoying the exclusive right to use that trademark in another country, that person may, if the agent or representative acted without that person’s consent, demand that the protection granting proceeding be discontinued or the right of protection revoked. He may also demand that the right of protection be granted on his behalf, or the right already granted transferred to him.

2. The right may not be demanded to be revoked or transferred, where the entitled person referred to in paragraph (1) has acquiesced, for a period of five successive years, in the use of the registered trademark while being aware of such use.

However, the PPO did not agree with “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA arguments and it has invalidated of the right of protection for SCOTCH & SODA R-100588 trade mark in its decision of 2007. In the PPO’s assessment the legal predecessor of “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA has been acting in bad faith while applied for the protection rights to the disputed sign. According to the Polish case-law and doctrinal opinions that were cited by the PPO, the applicant for trade mark registration is acting in bad faith when he/she knows or should know that such action violates third parties’ rights. Acting in bad faith is also one who is relying on a right or legal relationship and knows that this right or a legal relationship does not exist, or he or she does not know, but the lack of knowledge can not be regarded as the justified circumstances. The PPO has also noted that in the legal commentaries on Polish trade mark law two competing views on bad faith are taken into account. First, bad faith occurs when a person who owns a disputed trade mark registration had to know or should know that the legal conditions to acquire this right were not met. In such case, the owner is always acting in bad faith when a mark has been registered contrary to the applicable provisions of the law or expressly recognized principle of social coexistence (see: article 8(i) of the TMA). By contrast, in the case of trade mark registration that was made despite the existence of an earlier priority right, an owner of such righ can be entitled as acting in good faith only if he or she was deceived (and it can be justified) with regard the extent of protection resulting from the trade mark right with an earlier priority. If the registration has been aquired by a person for a purpose other than to use a trade mark (for example, to force financial concessions from other entrepreneurs, to obtain control over imports, to force reaching of a license agreement) in this case, bad faith is understood as a qualified form of a breach of social coexistence rules. Such opinion was issued by R. Skubisz, Prawo znaków towarowych. Komentarz (in English: Trade mark law. Commentary), Warszawa 1997, p. 224. However, in turn, dr Elzbieta Wojcieszko-Gluszko thinks that there is no reason to modify the general concept of good and bad faith for the needs of the IPL regulations. According to dr Wojcieszko-Gluszko a valuable guidance for the interpretation with regard to bad/good faith may be a reference to the legal definition of a filing made in bad faith that is provided in the Benelux Trademark Law.

The PPO also cited arguments provided in the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 6 August 2002, case file II SA 3879/01 and interpretation included in the judgment of 17 July 2003, case file II SA 1165/02 that was issued on the basis of article 8(i) of the TMA and in which the Court concluded that the issue of an assessment of the contradiction of a trade mark application with rules of social coexistence does not refer to trade mark only and itself, but also takes into account the contradiction with the principles of actions made by an applicant and their intended effect. In courts’ opinion the extending interpretation of the rules of social coexistence is justified if one notices that this general clause/rule has displaced such clauses and rules as the principles of good manners, fair trading and good faith. The PPO has considered as totally unfounded all arguments that the consent for a trade mark registration belonging to a partner was justified due to a lack of prohibition in the relevant articles of association, or in other agreements concluded between the parties. The concept of an agent or a representative in this case should be interpreted according to the Polish law. Selling products on the Polish market by the involved people was in such a role. “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA brought a complaint to the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, which, in a jugment of 29 May 2008, case file VI Sa/Wa 402/08 dismissed the complaint. “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA brought a cassation complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court in Warsaw. The cassation complaint was dismissed in judgment of 2 July 2009, case file II GSK 950/08.

The SAC emphasized the fact that for the assessment of compliance of a registration of a mark with the principles of social coexistence (as referred to in article 8(i) of the TMA) the most authoritative is the moment of filing an application for trade mark registration of in the Patent Office, which in this case took place in March 1995. It could not be left imperceptible by the Courts that even “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA claimed that the disputed mark was not its property at the date of filing for registration in the Patent Office (sic!). Moreover, the legal predecessor of “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA did not inform S&S about his registration neither got a permission for such action. If it were otherwise, what is clear, the S&S company would not file for the recognition on the territory of the Republic of Poland of the protection for its international trademark.

As a distributor of the goods of an entrepreneur located abroad who was not leading any commercial activities in its own name on the Polish territory, the legal predecessor of “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA probably knew, or in any circumstance must have known that the application in its own name for registration of a trademark belonging to a foreign business violates provisions of article 6 septies of the Paris Convention. But not only. “SCOTCH & SODA” POLSKA predecessor’s behavior violated the rules of social coexistence, within the meaning of article 8(1) of the TMA. His actions in fact were directed at the appropriation of trade mark property rights owned by the S&S company, without obtaining any consent, in order to achieve unjustified benefits. Such behavior clearly violates the principles of social coexistence as it was decided by the Polish Patent Office and the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw.

Press law, case VI Ka 202/09

August 3rd, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

This is the continuation of a story described in “Press law, case II K 367/08“. The District Court in Słupsk in its judgment of 18 June 2009 case file VI Ka 202/09 held that gby.pl – a portal website operated by Leszek Szymczak constituted press under the Press law, however, comments posted on this website by the Internauts do not constitute a press material for the content of which the website administrator could be held responsible. The District Court held that the posts are not letters to the editor or are not – as the Prosecutor argued – “quasi-letters” to the editor. The court said that the posting process on an internet forum is made automatically, there is no prior moderation of such messages.

The administrator of a portal website, which allows for posting comments, is the hosting service provider and is subject to regulations included in Article 14 of the Polish Act of 18 July 2002 on Providing Services by Electronic Means – PSEM – (in Polish: ustwa o świadczeniu usług droga elektroniczną), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 144, item. 1204 with subsequent amendments.

1. A person who gives access to the contents of a network IT system to a customer, where the customer stores data, is not aware of the illegal features of the data or activity connected with the data and upon receiving an official notification or credible information about the illegal features of the data or activity connected with it, immediately bars access to the data, shall not be responsible for the data.
2. A Service provider who has received the official notification of an illegal character of the stored data that was supplied by the customer, and prevented the access to the data, shall not be liable to the customer for damages resulting from preventing access to such data.
3. A service provider who has received credible information of the illegal character of the stored data supplied by the customer and prevented access to the data, shall not be liable to the customer for the damage resulting from preventing access to such data, if it has immediately notified the customer of the intention to prevent access to data.

The Court ruled that the service provider cannot be held liable for material posted by its users. The court noted that the decision does not mean that no one should be held liable for the posts that contain an offensive material that is a subject to criminal prosecution. The responsibility for this activity should be borne by a direct perpetrator and the prosecution authorities should identify such persons by using the available technical resources (IP addresses). The Prosecution cannot go after the smallest line of resistance and charge the administrators, instead of the actual perpetrators.

See also “Press law, case VI Ka 409/07” and “Internet websites, case I C 1532/09“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 905/08

July 28th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On June 2006, the Polish Patent Office refused to grant the right of protection for a 3D trade mark Z-255004, that was applied for in September 2002 by Polish company “BARTEX – Bartol” Spólka jawna from Paproc. The reason was that the applied sign was similar to 3D trade mark IR-676508, registered under the Madrid Agreement with a priority of April 1997 for Bacardi & Company Limited for goods in class 33, such as alcoholic beverages.

Z-255004

In October 2007, after re-hearing the case, the PPO upheld its decision of June 2006 on the grounds that the assessment of similarity between both signs should be based on the overall impression both marks have on the consumer.

According to the PPO the distinguishing strength of the disputed signs should be taken into account, including its distinctive and dominant components. As usual, both trade marks should be compared in three aspects: visual, aural and conceptual. The PPO deemed both marks as “weak trade marks”. However, the PPO also noted that the 3D trade mark owned by Baccardi posses some features that are not common and are not reproduced in other 3D forms of bottles. The most distinctive element is the characteristic cut on both sides of the bottle. Along with all the rest it gives a unique shape to the bottle. Thus, in the assessment made by the PPO, the earlier trade mark as a whole had the distinctive character which allowed the PPO to issue a positive decision on the recognition on the territory of the Republic of Poland of the protection for the international trademark.

IR-676508

While deciding on the application made by the Polish Company, the PPO came to the conclusion that the differences between disputed trade marks are not so noticeable and the risk of confusion by the average consumer of such goods is significant.

As regards the Polish company’s argument that it should be taken into account the fact that alcohol is almost always sold in the bottle that has a label, the PPO said that it is possible to imagine a situation that the applied trade mark will have in the future a label which is an imitation of an earlier trade mark. The Polish Patent Ooffice pointed out that, if looked at the specific conditions of trade it should take into account the way in which the applicant puts its goods on the market. Some information regarding this issue were presented in the observations filed by Bacardi on 26 August 2003 as to the existence of grounds that may cause a right of protection to be denied in connection with the application Z-255004. These materials proved that the Polish company markets products that are the imitation of alcohol produced Baccardi.

BARTEX – Bartol filed a complaint to the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw. The VAC in its judgment of 28 April 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 126/08 ruled that while deciding whether the right of protection may be granted it must be determined whether a sign may serve as a trade mark at all. Only after having determined that a sign may be a trade mark it shall be examined whether such sign has sufficiently distinctive characteristics, to check out whether a sign is capable to distinguish on the market the specific goods for which it was applied for.

The VAC based its holding on article 129(1)(ii) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No. 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 119, item 1117, with later amendments.

Article 129
1. Rights of protection shall not be granted for signs which:
(ii) are devoid of sufficient distinctive character.

The lack of distinctive character is an absolute obstacle to trade mark registration, however, characters devoid of this charateristics can acquire it as a result of use. The distinctive character of a trade mark is fitted with such features, which in the minds of consumers it clearly indicate that the goods identified by it come from the specific company. The court cited doctrinal approach to the distinctiveness of a trade mark (a book by professor Urszula Prominska entitled Prawo wlasnosci przemyslowej published by Difin, Warszawa 2005, edt. II, p. 211). The assessment of a distinctive character is the result of two quite different elements. On the one hand, the way/form a trade mark is presented must be “itself” so distinctive that it can identify the goods. On the other hand, it must provide the consumer with a possibility to choose goods based on that way/form without the necessity of determining the origin of goods indirectly (eg. when the consumer is forced to look at the product manufacturer’s name). In examining signs that cannot distinguish the goods, it should be noted that such sign does not posses any characteristics in its tructure thus such sign as a whole is devoid of a sufficient distinctive characteristics and it is not suitable for the identification of goods, and therefore is does not have the ability to distinguish its origin. This is a category of signs that emerged of its structural features (such as a form which is the representation of the product, its generic name, etc.). The court rejected the complaint.

The cassation complaint was rejected in the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 13 May 2009, case file II GSK 905/08.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 774/08

July 20th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

In June 2005, Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A asked the Polish Patent Office to make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for “3in 1” R-90234 trade mark owned by “MOKATE” sp. z o.o. from Zory. The request was based on article 28(1) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 1985, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 1985 No 5, pos. 15, with later amendments.

The right deriving from registration of a trade mark shall expire if the person entitled has not used the mark within a period of three consecutive years in the Republic of Poland.

The request was also based on article 169(1) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo wlasnosci przemyslowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2001 No 49, pos. 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Dziennik Ustaw No 119, pos. 1117, with later amendments.

1. The right of protection for a trade mark shall also lapse:
(i) on failure to put to genuine use of the registered trade mark for the goods covered by the registration for a period of five successive years after a decision on the grant of a right of protection has been taken, unless serious reasons of non-use thereof exist,
(…)
2. In the cases referred to in paragraph (1), the Patent Office shall make a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest therein.

The request was based on non-use of “3 in 1” trade mark. Mokate filed a motion asking the PPO to reject Nestle’s request. The motion was based on the lack of legitimate interest on Nestle’s side. The PPO agreed with Mokate’s argument. Nestle filed a complaint to the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw. The VAC in its judgment of 3 December 2007, act signture VI SA/Wa 1036/07 rejected Nestle’s complaint. The company filed a cassation complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court. The SAC in its judgment of 12 March 2009, act signature II GSK 774/08 held that conditions of legitimate interest are based on two levels — procedural — because it is justifying the initiation of administrative proceedings in a particular matter and “substantive”, as it results from the provisions of the law that apply to certain rights and obligations of a person (legal or natural). Although the substantive law is the source for the legitimate interest but the legal interest as a condition that justfies the initiation of the procedure for declaration on the lapse of the right of protection for the trademark is primarily a category of administrative procedure – one of the principles of this proceedings as to its proper initiation. The cassation complaint was rejected.

The SAC ruled also that it was uncontested that the First Council Directive left Member States free to establish procedural rules. The requirement of legitimate interest included in article 169(2) the IPL only entitles a party to initiate the administrative proceedings on the lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark, but does not guarantee such applicant that the PPO will issue a decision that is favourable to him, because the PPO shall issue a decision on the lapse of the trade mark rights if it finds the fulfilment of the substantial prerequisites to the lapse, and not the infringement of the legitimate interest. Since then the provision of article 169(2) are only applicable only to a right to file a request for a decision on the lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark for the reasons referred to in section 1 of article 169 being the substantial prerequisites, the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate interest can not be understood as an additional substantial prerequisite for deciding on the lapse of trade mark rights. Such assessment is not changed by the fact that, as the court already stated, the legitimate interest is the normative category of the substantive law.

In the Polish administrative law the legitimate interests requirement creates the concept of a proceedings party. This issue has been dealt similarly in the law of industrial property, including a prerequisite to request the Polish Patent Office to take a decision declaring the right of protection for the trade mark.

The legitimate interest prerequisite has two grounds – procedural because it justifies the initiation of the administrative proceedings in a particular case and substantive, because it results from the provisions of substantive law that apply to certain rights and obligations of an entity. Although a source of the legitimate interests lays in the substantive law, the legal interest as a condition requesting the PPO to issue a decision declaring on the lapse of the right of protection for the trade mark lapsed is primarily a category of administrative procedure – one of the principles of this proceeding as to its proper initiation.

The issues on legal interest are both regulated in the procedural law (including the administrative proceedings that apply to trade mark cases) and these are also the normative category of the substantive law. The source of the legal interest is the substantive law. If the source is the substantive law then the Directive should apply. However the SAC consistently refuses to refer this matter to the Court of Justice.

See also “Trade mark law, case II GSK 309/07“.

Trade mark law, case I ACa 967/08

July 5th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Appellate Court in Poznań in its judgmet of 28 January 2009, case file I ACa 967/08 held that after the introduction of goods bearing a trademark on the market, the right of protection is “exhausted”. This follows directly from the provisions of Article 155(1) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments.

Article 155
1. The right of protection for a trademark shall not extend to the acts in respect of the goods bearing that trademark consisting, in particular, of offering the goods or further putting on the market the goods bearing that trademark, where the said goods have earlier been put on the market on the territory of the Republic of Poland by the right holder or with his consent.
2. The right of protection for a trademark shall neither be considered infringed by an act of importation or other acts, referred to in paragraph (1), in respect of the goods bearing the trademark, if these goods have earlier been put on the market on the territory of the European Economic Area by the right holder or with his consent.

3. Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply, where there exist legitimate reasons for the right holder to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market.

This means that further market participant has the right to use the trade mark for advertising and information purposes, as long as this does not mislead as to the existence of economic links between the trade mark owner and a person who uses such sign. See also “Trade mark law, case III CK 410/03“.

The Court also ruled that the “pauperization” of a word trade mark means its adoption to the colloquial speech, which involves changing its function from being the name the unit of goods to the description of the species or genus and by enlarging its description on items that are in no way connected with the person entitled to a trade mark. This is usually the result of the existence of the brand for a long time in large areas and of its high popularity and intensive advertising. Such a phenomenon does not limit the exclusive rights of a holder of a registered trade mark and per se does not authorize other entities to use a protected trade mark in their business.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1483/08

June 23rd, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On September 2006, the Polish Patent Office issued a decision invalidating the right of protection of the BOSS LIGHTS R-136520 trade mark, owned by Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH from Hamburg, Germany. The PPO ruled that the registration of the disputed mark occurred in violation of article 8(2) of the old Polish Trade Mark Act – TMA – (in Polish: ustawa o znakach towarowych) of 1985, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 1985 No 5, itme 15, with later amendments.

A trade mark shall not be registrable if:
ii) it infringes the personal or economic rights of third parties

It was indisputable for the PPO that BOSS LIGHTS R-136520 consists of the “BOSS” sign, which was written in black, this being the only element of BOSS R-66417 trade mark and the main element of other signs: HUGO BOSS R-66418, BOSS HUGO BOSS IR-584899 and BOSS IR-606620 which are owned by HUGO BOSS Trade Mark Management GmbH & Co. KG from Metzingen, Germany.

Reemtsma filed a complaint before the Voivodeship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw. The court rejected the complaint in its judgment of 4 September 2007, case file VI SA/WA 2195/06. Reemtsma filed a cassation complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court. The SAC agreed with Reemtsma’s arguments that the PPO did not explain the facts accurately and did not thoroughly conside the entire evidence. The case was sent back to the VAC. See “Trade mark law, case II GSK 506/07“

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in its judgment of 6 February 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 1483/08 annulled the contested decision of the PPO and decided that the decision was not subject to execution. The VAC also stressed the fact that it is necessary to distinguish the renown of an entrepreneur – its good reputation and positive image – from the trade mark’s reputation (renown). In the case of the reputation (renown) of a trade mark – the subject of positive perceptions is the mark itself and the goods identified by such mark as originating from a particular business, and the reputation of the entrepreneur is generally positive perceptions and assessments about the business.

The case went back to the PPO. However, the Polish Patent Office in its decision of 15 October 2010 case Sp. 255/09 invalidated the right of protection for the BOSS LIGHTS R-136520 trade mark. This time, the PPO found that the trade mark in question is confusingly similar to BOSS HUGO BOSS IR-584899 and BOSS IR-606620 trade marks, and these findings were justified by the literal interpretation of the provisions of Article 9(1)(iii) of the TMA.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1486/08

June 17th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 17 February 2005, Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. from Vevey applied to the Polish Patent Office to register the word-figurative trade mark Frappé Z-291280 for goods in class 30. On August 2005 Nestlé filed a request for invalidation of the right of protection of the FRAPPE R-13842 trade mark, registered for goods in class 30 and 32 owned by Polish company “MASPEX” Spólka z o.o. form Wadowice. Nestlé based its request on provisions of Article 7(2) and Article 8(3) of the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

(2) A sign shall not possess sufficient distinctiveness if it simply constitutes the generic designation of the product, if it simply makes a statement as to the properties, quality, number, amount, weight, price, purpose, manufacturing process, time or place of production, composition, function or usefulness of the goods or any similar information that does not enable the origin of the goods to be determined

Article 8(3)
A trade mark shall not be registrable if:
iii) it contains incorrect statements;

Nestlé argued that the word “frappe” is a generic term, widely used in trade, as a sign for chilled coffee beverages. The company based its legitimate interest to have standing in proceedings before the Polish Patent Office on the principle of freedom of access to the indications that have descriptive meaning. In addition, Nestlé informed the PPO that it had sent a warning letter to Maspex because the Polish company had introduced to the market a product with similar name. In Nestlé’s opinion the exclusive right granted to Maspex to mark its products with the word “frappe” was a “unlawful constitutional restriction”. After the hearings and careful analysis of the evidence provided by both parties, the PPO found that the word FRAPPE (even being foreign word) was a term used widely to describe the properties of a beverage (cold, frozen, with ice cubes), especially of coffee, or to determine the type of coffee and it could not serve as sign capable of distinguishing goods of one entrepreneur from goods of another entrepreneur in normal market conditions. The PPO also shared Nestlé’s position based on the article 8(3) of the TMA that the wide range of names of goods covered in the registration of the contested trade mark are not frappe. Maspex filed a complaint.

The Voivodeship Administrative Cout in Warsaw in its judgment of 12 October 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1486/08 fully agreed with the PPO’s decision and dismissed the complaint.

Trade mark law, case IV CSK 61/09

June 16th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

Combination of colors can be a protected trademark in Poland. Such a conclusion stems from the Supreme Court’s (SC) judgment of June 3, 2009, case file IV CSK 61/09. Pursuant to the SC, a combination of colors can be protected as a trademark, and shall not be deemed an attempt to monopolize the colors themselves. The issue arose in connection with the British Petroleum suit against Marian S., a Polish entrepreneur, who used the characteristic green and yellow colors to attract the prospective clientele to his gas stations. The efforts of the legitimate holder of the BP trademark, to convince the infringer to substitute the yellow component of his stations’ logo with another color proved unfruitful, and the case ended up in court. British Petroleum based its claims primarily on the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments, and the Polish Act of 16 April 1993 on Combating Unfair Competition – CUC – (in Polish: ustawa o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 47, item 211, with subsequent amendments.

BP owns several Polish trade mark registration for color trade marks. For instance R-115842 and R-115843.

The Court of first instance found in favor of the claimant, stating that Marian S. had indeed committed not only the acts of unfair competition as described in articles 5 and 10 of the CUC.

Article 5. The designation of the undertaking in a way which may mislead customers in relation to its identity, due to the use of trade mark, name, emblem, letter abbreviation or another characteristic symbol already lawfully used to indicate another undertaking, shall be the act of unfair competition.

(…)

Article 10.1. Such indication of products or services or its lack, which may mislead customers in relation to the origin, quantity, quality, components, manufacturing process, usefulness, possible application, repair, maintenance and another significant features of products or services as well as concealing the risks connected with their use, shall be the act of unfair competition.
2. Releasing for free circulation products in the packing which may cause effects referred to in section 1 above shall be the act of unfair competition, unless the use of such packing is justified by technical reasons.

But primarily, the Court ruled that Marian S. had infringed article 296(2)(ii) of the IPL that is, he had unlawfully used – in the course of trade – a trademark similar to a trademark registered in respect of identical goods, and the use of such mark is likely to mislead part of the public, in particular by evoking associations between the marks concerned (here Marian S. gas station logo and the BP gas station trademark). Unfortunately on appeal, the Court of II instance refused to share this view and the case was subsequently dismissed in whole, as the BP’s attempt to monopolize the colors of green and yellow. BP filed a cassation complaint. The SC did not understand why having made the same factual findings as the court of first instance, the court of appeals refused to recognize that the respondent had indeed committed the alleged acts of unfair competition. The SC noted also that the court of appeals should have and yet failed to address the important issue of whether the claimant’s trademark does indeed deserve protection under the IPL. As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court for retrial.

See also “Trade mark law, case IV CSK 231/10“.

Copyright law, case I C 238/06

June 15th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

In the town of Bochnia, the so-called annual “Bochnia Independence Half-Marathon” used to take place. The event had been organized by the town and county authorities, in collaboration with the originator, one Zenon G., ever since year 2001. As the name indicates – the event’s primarily purpose was to celebrate the regained independence of the town of Bochnia and attracted a substantial amount of participants each and every year. The cooperation between the county and the “founding father” lasted for 4 happy years until it was broken off abruptly in 2005, due to a dispute that sparked over money. The authorities of Bochnia decided to organize the marathon on their own, without either the help or the permission of the originator. This understandably got the latter’s hackles up. The case ended up in court.

The District Court in Tarnów in its judgment of 20 December 2007 case file I C 238/06 held that the route of the half-marathon is an artistic work. The originator accused the county and the mayor of infringing his copyrights, claiming that both the initiative as well as the sole idea to organize the run, along with the manner in which the whole event was planned and arranged, met the prerequisites of an artistic work within the meaning of the polish copyright law, including the requirements of “creativity” and “individual character”.

The Court before which the case appeared, agreed with the Claimant’s theory and held that whenever talking about an artistic work within the meaning of Article 1 of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Authors Rights and Neighbouring Rights – ARNR – (in Polish: ustawa o prawie autorskim i prawach pokrewnych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 24, item 83, consolidated text of 16 May 2006, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 90, item 631 with subsequent amendments, “the entirety of features, in their original juxtaposition” should be taken into consideration. The Court emphasized that the fact that the commonly available elements had been used to create the work, does not necessarily mean that such work does not fall within the definition of an artistic work under the Article 1 of the AARNR. Although, as a matter of rule, such individual elements, in and of themselves, are never protected under the polish law, any and all compilations thereof do get protection so long the manner in which they’re segregated, arranged and presented demonstrates certain degree of originality and creativity. In the Court’s opinion the process of creating a work is a subjective one and is a “projection of the author’s imagination”. If the result of such process is original and unique enough (meaning it can be easily distinguished from any other results of human activity), then it shall be protected by law as an artistic work. This happens every time we deal with a specific configuration of elements, particularly relevant and accurate when juxtaposed with the intended result, where the author uses his unbound discretion to select and arrange such elements. To apply this to the case at hand, the Claimant’s idea to organize the half-marathon to celebrate the town’s Independence Day along with a scrutine preparation of the marathon race plan so as to obtain a special certificate of the Polish Athletics Association, meet the requirements of an artistic work, as understood by the Act. The fact that similar race events had been organized by the town of Bochnia long before 2001 remained without any effect on the Court’s conclusion.

In particular the Claimant prepared the race plan independently, selected the respective streets of the city in such a way that the whole race plan would constitute an entirety, had a proper paving, that is a hardened one, and so that there were no substantial differences in route gradient. The race plan should take account of the conditioning of the terrain, routes of public transportation and additionally the length of the route should equal half the length of the actual marathon. Moreover, the Claimant saw to it that the race plan be certified and the result, which the participants of the race would likely achieve, could be comparable to those achieved in other like races in the country. The race plan has been recorded in the form of a map with the marathon route marked on it and the race description attached. To plan the route in such, and not other, way determines its originality and creativity, since no one has ever before drew the route of the Bochnia race in such topographic layout.

Additionally, the Court pointed to the new categories of the participants (teachers and persons with disabilities), in comparison to those of the Bochnia races that were organized before 2001, highlighting at the same time that “the requirement of novelty is not an inevitable feature of an artistic work”. The Court rejected the argument that any other person could prepare the race plan of the said half-marathon and reiterated, after the Supreme Court, that “the possibility of achieving analogical results by two different authors does not suffice to deprive a particular act of creativity, of the individual character.”

To conclude, the District Court in Tarnow held that by organizing the “Bochnia Independence Half-Marathon” against the will of the originator and using the race plan prepared by him, the Respondents infringed upon the latter’s copyrights. Hence, the Claimant was entitled to the protection of the polish copyright law. In the Court’s opinion the Respondents should have never free ridden on someone else’s creative efforts and should have come up with their own idea and race plan.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Trade mark law, case IV CSK 335/08

June 14th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Court in its judgment of 4 March 2009, case file IV CSK 335/08, published in Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Civil Chamber (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Izba Cywilna) of 2009, No. C, item 85, p. 161, ruled that the degree of similarity, which leads to linking (associating) both signs by relevant recipients is sufficient for the assessment of the similarity of the signs as a condition for infringement of a reputed trade mark. However, first, it is necessary to determine whether a trade mark has a status of reputable one, if the claim is based on article 296(2)(iii) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text of 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 119, item 1117, with later amendments.

2. Infringement of the right of protection for a trademark consists of unlawful use in the course of trade of:
(iii) a trademark identical or similar to a renown trademark registered for any kind of goods, if such use without due cause would bring unfair advantage to the user or be detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trademark.

Patent Attorneys, case C-564/07

June 13th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Court of Justice of the EU (Third Chamber) in its judgment of 11 June 2009 Case C-564/07, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, declared that, by obliging patent lawyers lawfully established in another Member State who wish temporarily to perform services in Austria to appoint an approved agent resident in Austria, the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 49 EC.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 503/08

May 6th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish company Gemi from Karczew filed before the Polish Patent Office a request for invalidation of the right of protection for the trade mark PLANTAGINIS R-105263. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 20 November 2008 case file II GSK 503/08 ruled that it is usually assumed that legitimate interest is the normative category of the substantive law and its source is the substantive law. On this basis the party of an administrative proceedings is entitled to request to specify his or her powers and duties or require an administrative court or body to perform an examination of a legal act or acts in order to protect him or her against violations that was made by this legal act or acts and to lead to a situation that it is consistent with the law. The legitimate interest may also derive from legal norms not only belonging to the administrative law. The confirmation of legitimate interest is always due to the likely connection between the norm of the substantive law and the situation of legal entity to the effect that the act of application of this legal norm (eg, an administrative decision) may affect the legal position of this entity in the field of the substantive law. The SAC also agreed with the opinion of academics that there aren’t any universal definition of a legitimate interest in the field of industrial property law that would include complex situations to justify the submission of the request for invalidation of an exclusive right. The Court noted that the case law indicates the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997 as published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) No. 78, item 483.

A social market economy, based on the freedom of economic activity, private ownership, and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall be the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Poland.

The Court also pointed out to Article 6(1) of the Act on Freedom of Economic Activity (in Polish: ustawa o swobodzie dzialalnosci gospodarczej) corresponding to the content of Article 5 of the Act of 19 November 1999 on Law of Economic Activity (in Polish: Prawo dzialalnosci gospodarczej), published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) No. 101, item 1178, as amended.

The assumption, conduct and termination of economic activity shall be free to all on an equal-rights basis, subject to conditions determined in provisions of law.
2. The public administration authority shall neither demand nor make its decision in the matter of the assumption, conduct, or termination of economic activity by an interested party conditional upon satisfaction by this party of additional conditions, including without limitation on the submission of documents or disclosure of information other than that set out in provisions of law.

These are the basis for deriving the legitimate interest for the party seeking for the standing in the proceedings for the lapse or invalidation of a right of protection for a trade mark. When deriving the legitimate interest from the aforementioned legal regulations in case of the invalidation proceedings of a trade mark it is necessary to demonstrate why and how the right of protection for the trade mark PLANTAGINIS R-105263 affect on the legal position of Gemi Company as an entrepreneur. Each entrepreneur has the right to a trademark if the right is not in conflict as to the form, and the period of validity of the previously acquired trade mark right of the same sign. It was necessary to demonstrate that the GEMI’s legitimate interest is relevant to its legal position, because it is current, real, direct and their own (these are the most common elements and features of the legitimate interest), such as verifiability of the legitimate interests and the possibility of obtaining specific benefits. In such cases it concerns the so-called “reflections right” which is creating the legal position of a party not directly, but by a decision of the Polish Patent Office which is “taking back” a right of protection for an earlier trade mark granted to another company.

The SAC dismissed the cassation complaint because it has found that GEMI company did not file its request for invalidation of the right of protection for the trade mark PLANTAGINIS R-105263 in order to obtain the right of protection for the disputed mark for its own. It also did not demonstrate the existence of any obstacles to conduct its business during the sale of goods marked with the disputed trade mark.

Copyright law, case II CR 244/71

April 29th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the copyrighted can be any work, if – at least in its form – it shows some elements of creativity, even the minimum. See for instance a judgement of the Supreme Court of 31 March 1953, case file II C 834/52. As a subject of copyright law have been considered health and safety instructions – judgement of the Supreme Court of 23 July 1971, case file II CR 244/71, unpublished, instructions for operating a machine – judgement of the Supreme Court of 25 April 1969, case file I CR 76/69, published at OSNCP 1970, No. 1, item 15, train timetables, cookbooks, patterns and forms – judgement of the Supreme Court of 8 November 1932, Zb OSN 1933, poz.7.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

Polish regulations on prohibited contractual provisions

April 8th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

I. The Law
The main sources of binding laws in the Republic of Poland are the Constitution of 2 April 1997, acts passed by the Parliament, ratified international treaties and regulations issued, for example, by the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers – Polish government. Regulations are issued for the purpose of implementation of acts.

I.A. Substantive law

Act of 16 April 1993 on Combating Unfair Competition – CUC – (in Polish: ustawa o zwalczaniu nieuczciwej konkurencji), Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 47, item 211, with later amendments.
Act of the Protection of Certain Consumer Rights and on the Liability for damage caused by a dangerous product – PCCR – (in Polish: ), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 31 March 2000, No. 22 , item 271.
Act on Protection of the Purchasers of the Right to use a building or residential unit for a specified time each year and on amendment to the Civil Code, Code of Minor Offenses,and the Law on Land and Mortgage Registers and Mortgage, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2000, No. 74, item 855.
Act on Specific Terms and Conditions of Consumer Sale and Amendments to the Civil Code.
Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection, Journal of Laws – CCP – (in Polish: Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2007, No. 50, item 331.
Act of 23 August 2007 on Combating Unfair Commercial Practices – CUCP – (in Polish: ustawa o przeciwdziałaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 171, item 1206.

I.B. Case law
See “Polish case law on abusive clauses in B2C IT and IP contracts“.

II. Prohibited contractual provisions
Prohibited contractual provisions or “abusive clauses” are understood as provisions of the contract concluded with the consumer that were not agreed individually and in consequence shape consumer’s rights and obligations in a manner contrary to good customs and grossly violate consumer’s interests. Such provisions are not binding on the consumer, but the parties are bound by other provisions of the contract.

In accordance with the provisions of article 385³ of the Civil Code, if in doubt – it is considered that unlawful contractual provisions are those that, in particular:

exclude or seriously limit the liability to the consumer for failure to perform or improper performance of an obligation,
provide provisions, of which the consumer was unable to get acquaint with before concluding the contract,
impose solely on the consumer an obligation to pay a fixed sum in the case of the resignation from the conclusion or performance of the contract,
impose on the consumer, who has not performed the obligations or departed from the contract, the obligation to pay grossly inflated penalty or smart money,
exclude the jurisdiction of Polish courts or submit the matter to a Polish or foreign arbitration court, or other authority, and impose the adjudication by the court which is not locally relevant according to the Civil Code.

These are couple of examples of the so-called “gray abusive clauses”.

III. Procedure
The District Court in Warsaw, the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection decides if a given provision is prohibited and abusive. Anyone who has been or may be offered a contract containing such a clause, consumer organizations, consumer ombudsmen and the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection may bring an action before the Court. Consumers may obtain assistance from the local consumer ombudsman or one of the state-funded consumer organizations.

The clauses which have been found abusive by a final decision of the Court are entered into the Register of Prohibited Clauses that is available on the website of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and as of this moment cannot be used in relations with consumers. The application of such clauses may be regarded as an infringement of collective consumer interests and may result in a fine of up to 10% of the trader’s revenue.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1042/08

April 3rd, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On July 2003 the French company Bongrain S.A. from Viroflay asked the Polish Patent Office to decide on the lapse of the right of protection for APETITO IR-615850 trade mark. The Polish Patent Office must consider whether there has been a lapse of the right of protection for a trade mark at the request of any party having a legitimate interest. The French company claimed its interest based on trade mark application to register the word trade mark APETITO Z-204328.

The request was based on articles 169(1)(i) 169(2) and 169(6) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej) of 30 June 2000, published in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) of 2001 No 49, item 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Dziennik Ustaw No 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments.

1. The right of protection for a trade mark shall also lapse:
(i) on failure to put to genuine use of the registered trade mark for the goods covered by the registration for a period of five successive years after a decision on the grant of a right of protection has been taken, unless serious reasons of non-use thereof exist,
(…)

6. Where a proceeding for the declaration of the right of protection lapsed is initiated, the burden of proof that the trade mark has been used or that serious reasons for non-use of the trade mark exist shall be on the holder of the right of protection.

The Polish Patent Office decided on the lapse of the right of protection for APETITO IR-615850 trade mark in part concerning the goods in Class 29. The owner – APETITO AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT – filed a complaint against this decision.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 30 September 2008, case file VI SA/Wa 1042/08 dismissed the case and ruled that in order to aviod the situation of non-use of a trade mark, the use has to take place in the territory of the Republic of Poland. It has to have an unequivocal nature, as well as being real and serious, and should apply to a registered trade mark for goods and services covered. The actual use of a trade mark to prevent the lapse of the right of protection should consist of affixing the mark to goods and putting of such designated goods on the market within a specified period of time. The period of time is crucial for a revocation of the right protection. The preparatory steps to use the trade mark cannot be equated with the reasons to justify the occurrence of non-use of a trade mark. Taking certain preparatory steps which are without a connection with a valid reason that is preventing the use of a trade mark can not determine a dismissal of a request to decide on the lapse of the right of protection. The judgment is not final yet. APETITO AG filed a cassation complaint. See “Trade mark law, case II GSK 120/09“.

Personal rights, case II CSK 539/07

March 27th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The company QXL Poland sp. z o.o. is the owner of the allegro.pl auction website which removed the user account of a natural person (Cezary O.) who was using the nicknames CezCez, 2cez, 2xcez and espia. The company presented different reasons for its decision to remove the account and tried to justify such action by putting various statements about CezCez on its forum website “Cafe Nowe Allegro”. CezCez did not agree with QXL’s statements and sued. The court of first instance agreed with Cezary O.’s arguments and ruled that QXL Poland make a statement of apology as follows

Allegro.pl wishes to apologize to CezCez for using comments by one of its employees which publicly appeared on the New Cafe Allegro on 17 January 2003,– wording that implied CezCez was dishonest, he lies, he is selfish and that he pursues his own self-interest. These actions and comments affected the good name of CezCez, which was not the intention of QXP Poland.

The above statement was to be published on the Allegro.pl website but both parties appealed. The Appellate Court in Lodz did not share the conclusions of the court of first instance that the username (a nickname) used in internet services is personal right/interests (i.e. intangible personal property) eligible for protection under Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code – CC – (in Polish: Kodeks Cywilny) of 23 April 1964, published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 16, item 93, with subsequent amendments.

Article 23
The personal interests of a human being, in particular to health, dignity, freedom, freedom of conscience, surname or pseudonym, image, secrecy of correspondence, inviolability of home, and scientific, artistic, inventor’s and rationalizing achievements, shall be protected by civil law independent of protection envisaged in other provisions.

Article 24
§ 1 The person whose personal rights are threatened by someone else’s action, may require the desist of that action, unless it is not illegal. In the event of the infringement one may also require, the person who committed the violation, to fulfill the actions necessary to remove its effects, in particular, to make a statement of the relevant content and appropriate format. According to the conditions laid down in the Code one may also require monetary compensation or payment of an appropriate amount of money for a social purpose indicated.
§ 2 If as the result of a breach of personal rights one has suffered pecuniary prejudice, the aggrieved person may claim compensation based on general principles.
§ 3 The above shall not prejudice the entitlements provided by other regulations, in particular in copyright law and the patent (invention) law.

The Appellate Court did not agree with the arguments that the user name (a nickname) has parallels with a pseudonym. The case went to the highest court in a further appeal as a cassation complaint. The Supreme Court of Republic of Poland in its judgment of 11 March 2008 case file II CSK 539/07 dismissed the case for procedural reasons. However, the SC did not agree with conclusion of the Appellate Court with regard to protection of nicknames or usernames in the digital environment. The court noted that a username fulfils a variety of functions. First, the creation of a username is a prerequisite to registering on the allegro.pl website in order to obtain its own account and so participate in auctions. A person using such a nickname may be a buyer or a seller. Secondly, a username allows a person to log into Allegro.pl website. In the process of logging in, the user is given a pair of identifiers, such as a username and password. Thirdly, the username/nickname identifies the individual in question in the online environment, in this particular case, in the environment of people using Allegro.pl services. The individual is therefore recognised as a user using a specific nickname. The Supreme Court could not agree with the position of Court of Appeal that the nickname is purely a technical issue used to personalise the operation. On the contrary it argued, the username/nickname defines and characterises the person who uses such an auction site, bids on it, is the party to a contract of sale, issues comments or is involved in correspondence with other users. The Court found that in some cases, participations in the auction website by a user using a specific name can be a source of information for other participants who know that this user typically takes part in an auction of that type, bids only to a certain amount of money, only on certain days, in a certain way, does not compete with users using specific names, that the user is honest, efficient and immediately carries out transactions, etc. The Supreme Court also ruled that a username identifies a specific natural person. A username consists of a series of signs and letters, and there are no counter-indications that a person who created his or her own username could use his or her own name, surname, artistic pseudonym, pen name, or alias or it could even be a natural person who is the agent and uses the company name (the firm) under which it operates its business. It appeared to the court that in the assumption of a username by a person rather than his or her own name, the pseudonym (which has so far been used as an example in artistic activities) is meant as the assumption of a nickname in order to allow for individualisation of that particular person. The word “nickname” comes from the Greek language (“pseudonymos”–bearing a false name, falsely named) and it means a first name, last name or another name which someone uses to conceal his real name or surname. The court found irrelevant the motivation of a person who takes a nickname which is used as a pseudonym only in the “internet environment” or that the nickname may only be associated with the activities of that particular person carried out within the scope of services offered by Allegro.pl, since it may also have a broader meaning and go beyond the services of Allegro.pl. Consequently, the court noted that a username is subject to legal protection on the same basis on which protection is granted for any name, pseudonym or firm name, under which a person has established its business (whether it is a company name or that of a private person). At the same time, the court found no reason to treat a username/nickname as a separate personal right.

Personal rights, case III CZP 17/86

February 25th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Court in a judgment of 10 November 1986, case file III CZP 17/86, published in OSNCP 1987, No. 10, item 145, ruled that the circumstances excluding the unlawfulness of an infringement of personal rights/interests include: the exercise of personal rights, the consent of a harmed person. It should be noted, however, that the consent as a condition repealing the illegality, applies if its expression does not affect either existing legislation or the rules of the application of a consent.

Polish case law on advertising of pharmaceuticals

February 1st, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

Below you will find a list of judgments and decisions on advertising of pharmaceuticals. You can find a more detailed discussion on each judgment or decision under the link provided with the case file. All judgments and decisions are given in chronological order.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw case file VI SA/ Wa 1136/10.

– The decision of the the Main Pharmaceutical Inspector of 10 March 2010, no. GIF-P-R-450/141-4/ZW/09/10.

– The decision of the the Main Pharmaceutical Inspector of 4 March 2010, no. GIF-P-R-450/147-3/ZW/09/10.

– The decision of the the Main Pharmaceutical Inspector of 6 January 2010, no GIF-P-R-450/126-3/ZW/09/10.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 11 March 2010, case file VI SA/Wa 2110/09.

– The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 10 March 2010, case file II GSK 461/09.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 18 December 2009, case file VI SA/Wa 1758/09.

– The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 June 2008, case file II GSK 199/08.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 17 June 2008, case file VII SA/Wa 556/08. This judgment is not yet final. A cassation complaint may be filed to the Supreme Administrative Court.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 3 October 2007 case file VII SA/Wa 1157/07.

– The judgment of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 29 December 2005 case file I SA/Wa 584/05.

– The judgment of the of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber of 2 October 2007, case file II CSK 289/07, published in the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the Civil Chamber (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Izba Cywilna) of 2008, No 12, item 140, p. 54.

Polish patent attorneys, case III CZP 118/08

January 29th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Court in its judgment of 23 January 2009 case file III CZP 118/08 held that an advocate, legal advisor or patent attorney who is acting as a substitute representative cannot authenticate a copy of the basic power of attorney that was issued in the name of the primary proxy. The court also ruled that the defect in form of a pleading based on improper form of powers can be removed by a confirmation of a party that issued the primary POA. The court should assign the other party a reasonable time limit for supplementation of a pleading and POA.

Personal rights, case II CR 419/89

January 25th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Supreme Court in a judgment of 19 October 1989, case file III CR 419/89, published in OSP 1990, book 11-12, p. 377, ruled that the circumstances excluding the unlawfulness of an infringement of personal rights/interests include inter alia actions that are allowed under the law, i.e. an action that is permitted by an applicable legal regulation and an action taken in the defense of a legitimate interest.

Trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 1388/07

January 15th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 11 May 2004, the Polish Patent Office issued a positive decision on the registration of EAU DE TOKYO R-153843 trade mark for goods in Class 3. It was applied for by the MGT Parfum Création from Hofheim-Wallau on 7 September 2000.

R-153843

Kenzo Societe Anonyme from France filed a request for invalidation of the right of protection claiming it was granted in violation of the provisions of Articles 8(1) and 9(1)(i) of the old Polish Act of 31 January 1985 on Trade Marks – TMA – (in Polish: Ustawa o znakach towarowych), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 5, item 15, with subsequent amendments.

Article 8
A trade mark shall not be registrable if:
(i) it is contrary to law or to the principles of social coexistence;

Article 9
(1) Registration of a trade mark for goods of the same kind shall not be permissible where:
i) it resembles a mark registered on behalf of another enterprise to such an extent that it could mislead purchasers as to the origin of the goods in ordinary economic activity;

The request had to be based on the old Act because the trade mark application was filed while the old act was in force. KENZO was claiming the similarity of marks, KENZO TOKYO BY KENZO R-207663 and TOKYO BY KENZO R-207662 and their reputation. The French company has also argued that the German company imposes its trade mark on similar bottles to Kenzo’s bottles. On February 2007, the PPO rejected the invalidation request and KENZO has appealed this decision.

R-153843-3D

The German company did not respond to the correspondence on this matter and no other address was known. During earlier hearings on July 2008, the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw had to ask the President Polish Chamber of Patent Attorneys to designate a curator for the German company. The curator did not agree with KENZO arguments. He pointed that the assessment had to be a comparison of the signs as they were registered, and not the packaging.

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 27 November 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 1388/07 dismissed the complaint. The Court acknowledged the fact that the PPO did not negate the reputation of KENZO trade marks. According to the VAC, the PPO was not obliged to take into account KENZO’s reputation, since the Office found that the disputed signs were not similar. The Court did not agree with the argument that these signs had similar associations because cosmetics marked by them come from Japan. According to Judge Olga Żurawska-Matusiak such conclusion would be too far-reaching. She also pointed that the PPO has properly assessed both trade marks. The issue of passing off of packages should be decided by a civil court in a different proceedings.

Industrial design and trade mark law, case VI SA/Wa 710/08

November 25th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 10 April 2001, the Polish company Rosinski Andrzej Rosinski Michal Rosinska Joanna Zaklad Produkcji Opakowan Rosinski i S-ka, Sp. J (this is the actual company name – the firm, which consist of names of partnes “Rosinski Andrzej Rosinski Michal Rosinska Joanna”, the name “packages production plant” and the type of legal entity they operate “general/partnership company”) applied for the design registration for bottle with top. On 14 January 2003, the Polish Patent Office has registered the design, Rp-2543.

Rp-2543

In 2006, Unilever NV of Holland asked the PPO to annul its decision regarding Rp-2543. Unilever based its claims on the provisions of Article 117(2) of the Polish Act of 30 June 2000 on Industrial Property Law – IPL – (in Polish: ustawa Prawo własności przemysłowej), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) of 2001 No. 49, item 508, consolidated text on 13 June 2003, Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No. 119, item 1117, with subsequent amendments.

A finding that the exploitation of the industrial design infringes third parties’ personal or author’s economic rights will also constitute a ground for invalidation of the right in registration.

Unilever’s legitimate interest to request the invalidation was based the earlier 3D trade mark registration, R-134678, which was granted by the PPO in a decision of 28 January 1999. However, the problem with applying article 117(2) lays in the rules of Polish administrative procedure. The PPO is not allowed to decide if third parties rights are infringed.

R-134678

The PPO in its decision of 19 October 2007, act signature Sp. 187/06 invalidated the contested design. The Office recognized the similarity between the trade mark and the design based on arguments presented by Unilever’s patent attorney. The Polish company appealed. Its representative called into question the correctness of PPO’s decision in applying provisions of article 117(2). In his opinion the infringement issue should be decided by the civil court, not the administrative body which the Polish Patent Office is. However, the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 21 November 2008 case file VI SA/Wa 710/08 did not agree with the Polish company arguments. In Court’s opinion the PPO has been given the opportunity to assess similarities between a registered trade mark and a design. PPO’s conclusions that there exist a significant similarity may entitle the Office to decide with regard to the infringement of third parties rights.

This judgment is not yet final. A cassation complaint was filed to the Supreme Administrative Court. It will clarify the interpretation of Article 117(2) of the IPL. See “Industrial design and trade mark law, case II GSK 481/09“.

Trade mark law, case II GSK 385/08

November 14th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

On 26 June 1996 the Polish company “Sniezka” Chłodnia from Częstochowa applied for the figurative trade mark in Class 30 for goods such as ice creams. The graphic represented a black boy’s head. On 10 September 2001, the Polish Patent Office granted the right of protection R-132332.

R-132332

On 31 July 1998, the Lodmor company from Gdansk applied for word-figurative trade mark “calypso lody smietankowe waniliowe LODMOR” Z-190131 in class 30 for goods such as ice creams, ice cream powder, ice cream binders. The PPO rejected Lodmor’s application justyfing its decision on priority of the “Sniezka” company’s trade mark.

Z-190131

Lodmor filed a request for trade mark invalidation. The company from Gdańsk claimed that “Sniezka” illegally appropriated a sign of a black boy’s head, which was put on Calypso ice creams in the ’70s and ’80s by companies that were part of the Union of the Freezing Industry (Lodmor is a legal successor of one of them). The PPO has invalidated “Sniezka” trade mark in 2006. The Office ruled that this sign was registered in contrary to principles of merchant’s honesty because the mark was already used for a long time by other entrepreneurs.

“Sniezka” Chłodnia company appealed. The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 17 October 2007 case file VI SA/Wa 1005/07 held that Lodmor had no legal interest in filing a request for trade mark invalidation. The Court annulled PPO’s decision. The VAC held that the concept of legal interest in invalidation proceedings can not be derived from the fact that one company applies for a trade mark protection and there is an obstacle in the form of earlier registration. Such conclusion would lead to negation of principles that are the basis for granting rights for trade mark protection. In this case the interest involved only economic issues.

Lodmor filed a cassation complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court in its judgment of 23 October 2008, case file II GSK 385/08 agreed with Lodmor’s arguments that VAC only referred to the trade mark application and it did not consider Lodmor’s legal interest. The SAC already issued decisions and opinions as regards the breach of principles of mercantile honesty and the bottom line of each ruling was that, in specific circumstances, a legitimate interest of a competitor may be found, as it was in Lodmor’s case. The Court held that every entrepreneur has the right to designate its products and services, with a trade mark, if it does not remain in conflict as to the form, duration and territorial aspect, with the absolute right that was previously obtained by another entity. An entrepreneur has a legal interest in the request for invalidation of the right of protection for a trade mark on the basis of circumstances provided in the request and conditions included in such a motion if the right of protection was granted in violation of the statutory requirements. The relevance and application of these conditions shall be assessed in proper proceedings. Therfore, the SAC returned the case to VAC for further reconsideration.

Polish patent attorneys, case III CSK 337/07

October 29th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Polish Supreme Court in a judgment of 16 October 2004, case file CK III 580/03, published in the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the Civil Chamber (in Polish: Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Izba Cywilna) of 2005/9/164/109, recognized the scope of representation for matters relating to unfair competition quite narrowly with regard to Polish patent attorneys’ profession.

Fortunately, there is a judgment of the Polish Supreme Court of 13 March 2008, case file III CSK 337/07. The Court was very brief and set a clear rule in one important sentence.

Patent attorney may be a representative in each case relating to unfair competition.

This case was brought before the Supreme Court by Unilever Polska. The company sued Przedsiębiorstwo Produkcji Lodów “Koral” – Józef K. for unfair competition. The defendant ran an advertising lottery promoted under the slogan “million ice creams to win”, which in Unilever’s opinion breached the unfair competition law, because the advertising slogan could mislead customers as to the origin of goods in such a way that it might prompt them to unconsciously purchase the goods promoted by the opposite party. At about the same time Unilever was running a similar advertising campaign. The court of first instance rejected Unilever’s complaint. The Court of Appeal agreed with the court of lower instance and also rejected Unilever’s claim that the plaintiff cannot be represented by a patent attorney in unfair competition proceedings which do not directly concern IP rights.

The Supreme Court provided detailed analysis of Article 2 of the Law on Patent Attorneys. According to the Court, extensive interpretation should be applicable, which means that it would be difficult to rationally evaluate unfair competition cases, due to their diversity, so that one can tell where a patent attorney can and cannot act as an agent. According to the Court, conducting a case against unfair competition in connection with IP matters requires full knowledge about combating unfair competition proceedings. Therefore, it would be against the law to prevent patent attorneys from being involved in all unfair competition proceedings. The Supreme Court’s arguments were also based on the fact that the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property explicitly defines IP issues in the broadest possible sense. The definition of the protection of industrial property also covers combating unfair competition.