Polish IP & IT law

Archive for: US law

Internet domains, case I ACa 272/06

February 8th, 2010, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Appellate Court in Katowice, in a judgment of 16 June 2006, case file I ACa 272/06, ruled that it is pointless to talk about the “ownership” of Internet domains, because the civil law sets the property rights in article 140 of the Civil Code, which only refers to tangibles, and domains are not such things, and further, due to the closed list of property rights in intangibles (the so-called numerus clasus of IP rights – the principle that the system of estates allows only a limited number of property rights available in a legal system), there are no regulations in the Polish law, which suggests that the effect of registering Internet domain names is, to acquire by the subscriber, the right to use and dispose of the domain. The agreement between the subscriber and the Internet domain registrar is a contract to provide telecommunications services within the meaning of article 1(1) of the Polish Act of 16 July 2000, Telecommunications Law – TLA – (in Polish: Prawo telekomunikacyjne), published in Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 171, item 1800 with later amendments. The subscriber may transfer his or her claims (contractual claims against the registrar) to another entity, if it comes with the assumption of debt from subscriber fees.

I realize that this differs significantly from the US law. Easpecially if you read Kremen v. Cohen, 335 F.3d 1035, (9th Cir. 2003).

The parties do not dispute that domain names are a kind of property. This proposition appears to be consistent with California’s broad definition of “property.” See Cal. Civ.Code §§ 654 & 655(property includes “all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual delivery”). The parties disagree, however, whether a domain name like sex.com is the kind of intangible property that can support a claim for conversion. At issue is whether such intangible property constitutes a sufficiently definite right and whether such intangible property must also be merged into a document or other writing.

Same opinions were issued in Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002), Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.Com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000) or In re Larry Koenig & Assoc., 2004 WL 3244582 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2004). But there are also different judgments such as Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999), Zurakov v. Register.com, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 176, 760 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dep’t 2003), Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc., 259 Va. 759, 529 S.E.2d 80 (2000) and the latest I know which is Palacio del Mar Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. McMahon, — Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2009 WL 1668294 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. June 16, 2009). The Court ruled that a domain name registration is not property, but merely supplies the intangible contractual right to use a unique domain name for a specified period of time. Does it sound familiar to you?

See also “Polish case law on domain names“.

Patent law, case VI SA/Wa 2566/08

October 13th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw in its judgment of 10 June 2009 case file VI SA/Wa 2566/08 held that it is up to the Polish Patent Office (PPO) to reconsider the matter in its entirety and refer to the statements and allegations contained in the request for the reconsideration of the case, taking into account the above guidance and administrative procedures by which the PPO is bound.

Looks like no big deal, right? But if you could read the whole judgment, which unfortunately is not available in English, you would understand that the Polish Patent Office will have to issue an opinion, and will have to justify and explain it appropriately, on the subject what is an invention and what is a computer program and why the PPO does not grant patents to so-called “digital” solutions.

In this context, I look forward to the EPO decision in G 3/08 case and to the SCOTUS’ judgment In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

It is out now!

July 14th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

My dear readers. All P.T. readers. I would like to draw your attention to the International Free and Open Source Software Law Review. It is an absolutely free publication on legal aspects of free and open source software. The first issue is available for download (both HTML or PDF versions) directly from its website. There, you’ll find couple of interesting articles. In particular, I recommend Shane Coughlan’s and Andrew Martin Katz’s article titled “Introducing the Risk Grid“. I will also immodestly mention that from the very beginning I was involved in the creation of the IFOSS L. Rev. and I am currently a member of the editorial board. Of course, I invite everyone to write for his periodical. Please do not hesitate to submit your papers.

There is another “Polish theme” in the IFOSS L. Rev. Great logotype and covers for the journal were created pro bono by my good friend Tomasz Politański.

Samples, scratches and the law

April 6th, 2009, Tomasz Rychlicki

I wrote or should I say I’ve created an article together with Adam Zieliński and Grzegorz Czerkasow (DJ TWISTER) titled “Sampling and scratching in US copyright and Polish law: a comparative analysis“. It was published in the Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2009 4: 353-359. You may listen to the main theme of our article or you may download it – it is MP3 file and it is an integral part of the article. :)

Audio clip: Adobe Flash Player (version 9 or above) is required to play this audio clip. Download the latest version here. You also need to have JavaScript enabled in your browser.

This music work is released under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 United States License.

Just register or do not sue

December 23rd, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

Well… one could came to such conclusions reading article available at informationweek.com website regarding the case Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 3:08-CV-03251 (N.D.Cal., July 3, 2008). But according to Apple’s statements and pleadings the company is the legitimate owner of, among others, United States copyright registrations TX4-669-971 (Mac OS); TX5-401-457 (Mac OS X); TX6-849-489 (Mac OS X Leopard Version 10.5); TX4-991-736 (Mac OS X Server); and TX6-849-684 (Mac OS X Server Version 10.5 Leopard). Anyway, I’d like to recommend you to read my post entitled “Copyright registration” as a quick reminder for all my readers about differences in copyright registration requirements or lack thereof.

Categories: 17 U.S.C. | US law | copyright law.

“Piracy” in Poland

December 22nd, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

By the term “piracy” I do not mean “an offense against humanity” as defined in U.S. v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 5 L. Ed. 64 (1820) or that “the crime of piracy comprehends an act upon the high seas” (61 Am Jur 2d Piracy § 8). Although, I am being aware of the Oxford English Dictionary definitions such as “1603 T. Dekker Wonderfull Yeare sig. A4, Banish these Word-pirates (you sacred mistresses of learning) into the gulfe of Barbarisme” or “1668 J. Hancock Brooks’ String of Pearls (Notice at end), Some dishonest Booksellers, called Land-Pirats, who make it their practise to steal Impressions of other mens Copies” or “1703 D. Defoe True-born Englishman in True Collect. I. Expan. Pref. sig. B3v, Its being Printed again and again by Pyrates” or even “1706 D. Defoe Jure Divino Pref. p. xxvii, Gentlemen-Booksellers that threatned to Pyrate it, as they call it, viz. reprint it, and sell it for half a Crown”.

Anyway, according to the article which is available at onet.pl website, in Polish, the District Court in Koszalin has sentenced Łukasz D. – a former student of the Koszalin University of Technology (Politechnika Koszalińska) for a half year of imprisonment for computer “piracy”. The judgment was suspended for two years. The court found Łukasz D. guilty of the theft of 49 programs (of a total value of 180 709,66 PLN). Łukasz D. could even face 10 years in prison, but the court took into account his attitude during the investigation, and mitigated the sentence. The mitigation was also requested by the prosecutor in his final speech.

The case of 19 students from Koszalin who were involved in copyright infringement in P2P networks was widely publicized in Poland because the Police, Customs officers and private investigators from the Polish Society of the Phonographic Industry did not inform the vice chancellor of the Koszalin University of Technology (for my US English readers – the president) about their action which took place in university’s dorms. Academia authorities have deemed such operation as violation of the autonomy of universities and challenged the search action (which was performed without a proper search warrant, just on the basis of an official legitimacy of the Police) before the Public Prosecutor’s office. The Police search action was also officially condemned by the Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland and students organized pickets at the center of Koszalin. However, the Public Prosecutor’s office considered the complaint as unfounded and approved the dorms’ search.

They have the right, don’t they?

October 16th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

Please read R. v. S and A., [2008] EWCA Crim 2177, and tell me why the Court does not want to recognize defendants’ right? Maybe it wants the case to be decided by the European Court of Human Rights? What is more interesting the British Appellate Court discuss one American judgment In Re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473 (United States District Court for the District of Vermont, Nov. 29, 2007) which I mentioned in my post titled “Nemo se ipsum accusare tenetur“.

Just to remind you. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No.: 005.

Article 6 – Right to a fair trial
(…)
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

Do I miss something? Isn’t it the duty of the Police and a prosecutor to collect evidences against defendants and to prove that they are guilty?

Categories: European Convention on Human Rights | UK law | US law | computer crime | computer law.

Typosquatting and trade mark infringement

October 15th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

There is this case pending Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc. et al., No. 07 CV 3371 (N. Dist. Ill. June 15, 2007). You’ll have all necessary documents available at justia.com website. Ben Edelman from Harvard University made the whole case much more worse to argue for Google.

Edelman and other lawyers have filed a class action lawsuit representing domain owners who claim the Google Adsense for Domains (AFD) program is assisting in violating trademarks. A hearing is scheduled for as early as next month in which Edelman will ask an Illinois federal judge to allow the case against Google to proceed.

When it comes to trade mark infringement and keywords then all I can say is that European trade mark lawyers are eagerly awaiting for the Court of Justice of the EC to answer couple of important questions. In case C-236/08, Google France and Google, French Cour de Cassation reffered the following questions.

1) Must Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks[1] and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark[2] be interpreted as meaning that a provider of a paid referencing service who makes available to advertisers keywords reproducing or imitating registered trade marks and arranges by the referencing agreement to create and favourably display, on the basis of those keywords, advertising links to sites offering infringing goods is using those trade marks in a manner which their proprietor is entitled to prevent?

2) In the event that the trade marks have a reputation, may the proprietor oppose such use under Article 5(2) of the directive and Article 9(1)(c) of the regulation?

3) In the event that such use does not constitute a use which may be prevented by the trade mark proprietor under the directive or the regulation, may the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000,[3] so that that provider cannot incur liability until it has been notified by the trade mark proprietor of the unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?

In case C-237/08, Google France, French Cour de Cassation reffered the following questions.

1) Must Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks[1] be interpreted as meaning that a provider of a paid referencing service who makes available to advertisers keywords reproducing or imitating registered trade marks and arranges by the referencing agreement to create and favourably display, on the basis of those keywords, advertising links to sites offering goods identical or similar to those covered by the trade mark registration is using those trade marks in a manner which their proprietor is entitled to prevent?

2) In the event that such use does not constitute a use which may be prevented by the trade mark proprietor under the directive or Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark,[2] may the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000, [3] so that that provider cannot incur liability before it has been informed by the trade mark proprietor of the unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?

In case C-238/08, Google France, French Cour de Cassation reffered the following questions.

1) Does the reservation by an economic operator, by means of an agreement on paid Internet referencing, of a keyword triggering, in the case of a request using that word, the display of a link proposing connection to a site operated by that operator in order to offer for sale goods or services, and which reproduces or imitates a trade mark registered by a third party in order to designate identical or similar goods, without the authorisation of the proprietor of that trade mark, constitute in itself an infringement of the exclusive right guaranteed to the latter by Article 5 of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988?[1]

2) Must Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks be interpreted as meaning that a provider of a paid referencing service who makes available to advertisers keywords reproducing or imitating registered trade marks and arranges by the referencing agreement to create and favourably display, on the basis of those keywords, advertising links to sites offering goods identical or similar to those covered by the trade mark registration is using those trade marks in a manner which their proprietor is entitled to prevent?

3) In the event that such use does not constitute a use which may be prevented by the trade mark proprietor under the directive or Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark,[2] may the provider of the paid referencing service be regarded as providing an information society service consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service, within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000, 3 so that that provider cannot incur liability before it has been informed by the trade mark proprietor of the unlawful use of the sign by the advertiser?

I may presume that there will be another questions asked, and not only from France.

Legal responsibility for the attempt in copyright law

September 25th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

In Capitol Records v. Jammie Thomas, CIV 07-3417 MJD/JJK (D.Minn. August 26, 2008), PDF file, Judge Michael J. Davis presented two very forcible arguments.

Plaintiffs and their supporters also urge the Court to consider an entirely separate title of the U.S. Code, Title 18, addressing criminal penalties for distribution of child pornography. In that context, the term “distribute” has been interpreted to include placing the material on a shared folder of a peer‐to‐peer network. See, e.g., United States. v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223‐24 (10th Cir. 2007) (interpreting term “distribute” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) to include placing child pornography in Kazaa folder and freely allowing others to access and download the files). The criminal statute regarding distribution of child pornography is unrelated to the Copyright Act. The Court does not find the comparison to criminal law persuasive.

(…)

there is no liability for an attempt to infringe under the Copyright Act, there is corresponding liability for attempted distribution in the criminal context. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (b)(1)

(…)

However, the Court does note that, while Congress has not added “offer to distribute” to § 106(3) of the Copyright Act.

(…)

The Court’s examination of the use of the term “distribution” in other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well as the evolution of liability for offers to sell in the analogous Patent Act, lead to the conclusion that the plain meaning of the term “distribution” does not including making available and, instead, requires actual dissemination.

I can only add that extending the interpretation (interpretatio extensiva) is not even an option in Polish criminal law. This kind of analogy is prohibited in criminal law. Two most important and basic rules include prohibition of criminalizing of human acts by any regulation that isn’t a legal act adopted by the Polish parliament (Latin rule nullum crimen sine lege scripta) and the ban for extending analogy and interpretation to the detriment of the perpetrator (Latin rule nullum crimen sine lege stricta).

Illegal links

September 22nd, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

I was wondering whether I should use a different title for this post. Something more like “how to overturn technological realities upside down by the law” but it is probably too pretentious and far too long. Ad rem. What is the problem? The problem is whether the act consisting of giving links within a website may be subject to legal liability (criminal, civil, etc.). Someone who studied history and specification of HTML for a while will probably smile and nag his or her head in the negative. Ok, so let’s think about couple of problems. First question: whether adding a link to a particular source may be subject to legal liability? Even if a certain resource contains illegal content, for example: materials containing child pornography. The second question: whether you can claim for the legal ban of the use of links, for example, whether someone can prohibit the use/indication of a link to my page. There are other questions and I have more examples, but these two seem most important to me for now. The issue raised in my second question appeared in the U.S. in two recent interesting cases.

In Jones Day v. BlockShopper.com, 1:2008 cv04572 (ND Ill.. August 12, 2008), a large law firm (and I was afraid to give up the name ;) – Jones Day has sued BlockShopper.com for trademark infringement by publishing links and information about two flats bought by lawyers working for Jones Day. The petition does not mention any copyright infringement claims. It included trade mark ifringement claims based on 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and § 1125(a)

Defendants’ use of the Jones Day Marks, in connection with their real estate advertisement scheme, is likely to deceive and cause confusion and mistake among customers as to the source or origin of the services provided or offered for sale by Defendants and the affiliation of Jones Day with those services and/or the sponsorship or endorsement of those services by Jones Day.

and false designation of origin claim based on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

Defendants’ use of the Jones Day Marks, in connection with their real estate advertisement scheme, is likely to deceive and cause confusion among consumers as to the source of origin of the services offered by Defendants and the sponsorship or endorsement of those services by Jones Day.

and trade mark dilution claim based on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)

Defendants’ use of the Jones Day Marks is disparaging the distinctiveness of the Jones Day Marks.

In Reisinger v. Perez et. al, 2:2008 cv00708 ((EDWis. August 20, 2008), the City of Sheboygan, requested from Jennifer Reisinger to remove the link to the official site of the Police – sheboyganpolice.com. Initially, being impressed by the cease and desist letter, PDF, 52 KB, she has received, Mrs. Reisinger dediced to remove the aformentioned link. But after some time she decided to sue the city (in the person of Mayor Perez) for violation of freedom of speech granted her under the First Amendment to the Constitution in relation to the provisions of 42 U.S.C § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

Of course, the question of liability for the use of links is a little bit more complicated if you use trade marks in the content of the link (for example: Do not buy Pepsi), or link’s content is potentially subject of libel (for example: he is really an id*ot), or when the content would include works protected by copyright. However, as you can see in the accompanying examples, the problem does not affect the process of linking to a resource, but only the relationship of resources and content between tags <A HREF=”"> and </A> and in my humble opinion that’s completely different issue.

Update on September 23, 2008.
I forgot to add a link to linksandlaw.com website.

Categories: US law | computer law | copyright law | personal data | personal rights.

“Protected” PDF

September 21st, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

Eric Goldman wrote about the judgment in Saadi v. Maroun, 2008 WL 4194824 (MD Fla.. Sept. 9, 2008), while pointing to the “protected” PDF file with complaints in the aformentioned case. Someone tried to “protect/hide” personal data of one of the parties. I suggest to perform a simple action: select and copy the black section and paste it into any text file. It’s a post I wrote a propos of certain comments which appeared on Piotr Waglowski website.

Categories: US law | legal research | personal data.

How many lines is de minimis?

September 17th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

It looks like not too much. In Dun & Bradstreet Software Services, Inc. v Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 US 1032, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003), the court held that copying 27 lines of total 525,000 lines of computer software code is copyright infringement.

In Veritas Operating Corp. v Microsoft Corp., No. 06-0703, 2008 US Dist. LEXIS 8166 (W.D. Wash. Feb 4, 2008), the Court held that copying 54 lines of total 160,000 lines of computer software code is copyright infringement and such action is not eligible for de minimis defense.

2. Whether the Code at Issue is Protected by Copyright Law
To succeed on its copyright infringement claim, Veritas will have to prove that Microsoft “copied protected elements of [Veritas'] work.” Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1126, 121 S.Ct. 881, 148 L.Ed.2d 790 (2000). Absent direct evidence of copying, such as an admission that defendant copied the work at issue, this factor is normally proven by circumstantial evidence of defendant’s access to plaintiff’s work and substantial similarity between the works. Id. Before the Court reaches the substantial similarity analysis, however, the Court must first filter out any non-protected material from the purportedly protected expression. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir.1992). As to whatever “golden nugget” of protected expression in the LDM code remains, the Court will then consider whether it is substantially similar to the allegedly infringing LVM code. Id.

i. Non-Protected Elements
*8 The section of code allegedly infringed, by both parties’ accounts, is a “transaction macro.” (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27), Pl.’s Resp. 26 (Dkt. No. 289 at 32).) Veritas’ expert Dr. Chase describes transaction processing as a “transactional update and recovery in the implementation of configuration changes to disk groups or packs.” (Chase Report ¶ 102 (Dkt. No. 296-3 at 61).) As best the Court can determine, the transaction macro essentially works to preserve data and prevent its loss in the event of a range of hardware or software failures. Dr. Chase opines that “[t]his core code to store, update, and recover disk group configurations safely is crucial to the value of the software in an enterprise setting.” ( Id.)

Under copyright law, even as to software code, “functional elements and elements taken from the public domain do not qualify for copyright protection.” Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir.1992). Microsoft argues that the transaction macro was “required to maintain functionality with the Defined Interface, as required by the Agreement,” and as such, constitutes a functional, non-protected element of the allegedly infringed work. (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27).) However, Veritas’ expert Dr. Chase states that copying the transaction macro “was not necessary to maintain compatibility with the LDM on-disk structures.” (Chase Report ¶ 96 (Dkt. No. 296-3).) As a result, whether the transaction macro is a functional element is a disputed material fact.

Additionally, Microsoft argues that similar transaction macros have been in the public domain for decades, and that therefore the transaction macro at issue is not protected by copyright. (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27).) Veritas’ expert, however, has stated that the transaction macro was a proprietary feature that was developed by Veritas over many years. (Chase Report ¶ 103 (Dkt. No. 296-3 at 62).) Even Microsoft’s expert, Dr. Gary Nutt, recognizes that the transaction macro is crucial to the value of the product and stated that he was not aware of the publication of the macro:

Q: I am asking you whether you are aware of any publication by Veritas or anyone else of the unique implementation details associated with the transactions technology in LDM?

…

A: I would repeat that I am unaware of any source code being published, any of Veritas’ LDM source code appearing in publication.

(Nutt Dep. 51:3-13, 145:4-7 (Dkt. No. 296-4 at 15, 41).) It may be that similar transaction macros were common in computer science, as Microsoft contends, (Def.’s Mot. 26 (Dkt. No. 212 at 27)), but there is at least a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.

Finally, Microsoft’s argument that the alleged copying is de minimis is unpersuasive:

[E]ven a quantitatively small amount of copied material may be sufficiently important to the operation of plaintiff’s program to justify a finding of substantial similarity. For instance, a small portion of the structure or code of a program may nonetheless give it distinctive features or may make the program especially creative or desirable. In such a case, a finding of substantial similarity would be appropriate.

*9 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03(F)(5). In the instant case, as noted above, Veritas’ expert has opined that the transaction macro at issue makes the disputed technology more “desirable” because it is “robust against a range of adverse events that might occur” and “is crucial to the value of the software in an enterprise setting.” (Chase Report ¶ 102 (Dkt. No. 296-3 at 61).) Microsoft’s expert agrees with that characterization. (Nutt Dep. 145:5-7 (Dkt. No. 296-4 at 41). Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the copyright claim on de minimis grounds.

Categories: US law | computer law | copyright law.

Copyright law, case I ACr 590/95

September 12th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

The No Electronic Theft Act (Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (Dec. 16, 1997)) introduced changes into 17 U.S.C § 101. Definitions.

The term “financial gain” includes receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.

In Poland, we have judgment of the Appellate Court in Warsaw of 12 December 1995, case file I ACr 590/95, published in OSA 1997, No 3, item 16, at page 32, where the Court held that benefits are generally a part of the net profit achieved as a result of copyright infringement. The benefits are also the savings on expenses for copyright fees, if the copyright infringement was based on the use of work without a proper remuneration. Interesting approaches in two different jurisdictions. I just need to remind you that the Republic of Poland is not a common law country.

See also “Polish regulations on copyright” and “Polish case law on copyright“.

HOWTO eliminate personal use of copyrighted works

September 11th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

You just need to remember that historia magistra vitae est. The story that I am going to tell could serve as a short HOWTO eliminate personal use of copyrighted works. I will try to be brief. First, there is a judgment in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The holding it is not too good for copyright holders but it is the analog technology i.e. copies are not as good as originals. The content providing industry will handle it. The Audio Home Recording Act (Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237) with its (17 U.S.C § 1002 (a)), (17 U.S.C. § 1002(c)) and (17 U.S.C. § 1003. Obligation to make royalty payments) is a very good job! The lobby is better, but what tha heck is that: 17 U.S.C. § 1008. Prohibition on certain infringement actions)?

No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.

The judgment in Recording Industry Ass’ n of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 29 F. Supp.2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998), 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) is not very not good sign for the owners!

The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or “space-shift,” those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive (…) Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the AHRA

No Electronic Theft Act (Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (Dec. 16, 1997)) is what they needed.

Categories: 17 U.S.C. | US law | computer law | copyright law.

Funny terms and Carl wants to be sued

September 4th, 2008, Tomasz Rychlicki

There is an article available at valleywag.com website commenting on funny terms from TOU/TOS licenses. There is also a post regarding recent action of Carl Malamud at slashdot.org website. Go Carl!

California claims copyright to its laws, and warns people not to share them. And that’s not sitting right with Internet gadfly, and open-access hero, Carl Malamud. He has spent the last couple months scanning tens of thousands of pages containing city, county and state laws — think building codes, banking laws, etc. Malamud wants California to sue him, which is almost a given if the state wants to continue claiming copyright. He thinks a federal court will rule in his favor: It is illegal to copyright the law since people are required to know it. Malamud helped force the SEC to put corporate filings online in 1994, and did the same with the patent office. He got the Smithsonian to loosen its claim of copyright, CSPAN to stop forbidding people from sharing its videos, and most recently Oregon to quit claiming copyright on state laws.

I’d like to remind you of some of my post I’ve “commited” regarding licenses’ issues. Among other things are posts such as “Oh, these Internet’s contracts” and “TOS not so absolute“.

Categories: US law | contract law | copyright law | copyright misuse.