Karalność zamiaru w prawie autorskim
September 25th, 2008, Tomasz RychlickiW wyroku w sprawie Capitol Records v. Jammie Thomas, CIV 07-3417 MJD/JJK (D.Minn. August 26, 2008), plik PDF, sędzia Michael J. Davis przedstawił dobitnie dwa istotne wnioski.
Plaintiffs and their supporters also urge the Court to consider an entirely separate title of the U.S. Code, Title 18, addressing criminal penalties for distribution of child pornography. In that context, the term “distribute” has been interpreted to include placing the material on a shared folder of a peer‐to‐peer network. See, e.g., United States. v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223‐24 (10th Cir. 2007) (interpreting term “distribute” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) to include placing child pornography in Kazaa folder and freely allowing others to access and download the files). The criminal statute regarding distribution of child pornography is unrelated to the Copyright Act. The Court does not find the comparison to criminal law persuasive.
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there is no liability for an attempt to infringe under the Copyright Act, there is corresponding liability for attempted distribution in the criminal context. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (b)(1)
Tak na marginesie mogę tylko dodać, że wykładnia rozszerzająca w polskim prawie karnym wogóle nie wchodzi w grę. W przypadku sprawy Jammie Thomas, sędzia Davis uznał za nieprzekonywujące argumenty powodów wskazujące na analogię z “zamiarem rozpowszechniania” występującym w orzeczeniach dotyczących rozpowszechniania pornografii dziecięcej w sieciach P2P. Co kraj to obyczaj.
However, the Court does note that, while Congress has not added “offer to distribute” to § 106(3) of the Copyright Act.
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The Court’s examination of the use of the term “distribution” in other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well as the evolution of liability for offers to sell in the analogous Patent Act, lead to the conclusion that the plain meaning of the term “distribution” does not including making available and, instead, requires actual dissemination.